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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three essays examining the behavior of informed traders in 
financial markets and how they affect asset pricing. It examines informed traders’ role 
in shaping securities prices in three ways. It examines whether on a macro and micro 
basis insider traders move prices to a different degree than non-insiders. In addition, it 
uses econometric methods to determine what exchange generates permanent price 
trends in UK shares. Lastly, it looks at another side effect of fragmentation – how a 
‘best execution’ mandate and related market structure changes affect transactions 
costs in liquid UK, French, and German shares.  
These studies expand on current literature in various ways – extant insider trading 
literature has either primarily focused on daily price movement and volume or had 
consisted of case studies, the conclusions of which may be idiosyncratic and therefore 
unrepresentative of typical insider behavior. The new phenomenon of multilateral 
trading facilities (also known as electronic communications networks) and the 
proliferation of algorithmic or computer-mediated trading had not been examined in 
price discovery papers, due to their relative novelty. In addition, despite a bevy of 
literature offering informed insight into the impact of the European Union’s Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), there has been a dearth of empirical 
studies assessing its impact on European securities markets. Chapters 2 and 3 examine 
MiFID and computerized trading from two different perspectives: that of which trades 
lead to permanent prices, and that of transactions costs.  
The conclusions drawn in this thesis will be of interest to regulators, market operators, 
and traders, as they offer insight into the impact of market structure and how it 
impacts informed traders who participate in them. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
 
‘The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old 
ones.’ - John Maynard Keynes 
Informed trading is critical to the determination of asset prices. According to Efficient 
Market Theory (Fama, 1969, 1998), asset prices respond to new information by 
informed traders’ activity and thereby find appropriate prices in securities markets. By 
their participation in the market, informed traders will seek to capitalize on private 
holdings on information, and short of brief disturbances such as order imbalances, 
prices will adjust to the arrival of new information. Informed traders are distinguished 
from the bulk of traders (liquidity traders) by their holdings of private information, 
derived either from superior analysis as to an asset’s fundamental prospects or from 
so-called ‘insider’ information – material non-public information obtained from 
within the company.  
Theoretical work on informed traders ranges from the hypothesis that informed 
traders will execute trades multiple times in order to extract maximum rent from their 
private information (Kyle, 1985) to empirical findings that informed traders will use 
multiple execution channels in order to mask their presence in the market (Menkveld, 
2008). Other theories of informed trading speculate that uninformed market 
participants will widen the bid-ask spread (increase transactions costs) to compensate 
them for the potential of adverse selection (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Research 
questions arise from how the impact of informed traders affects price formation, both 
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in terms of trade-to-trade price movement as well as what trades lead to permanent 
prices and what trades produce only transitory shocks. 
This thesis examines both types of informed traders: Chapter 3 investigates the daily 
and intraday effects of insider trades – those trades whose information comes from the 
company in which the insider trades. Chapter 4 examines the locus of price discovery 
– on which exchange do informed traders both quote and execute their trades- while 
Chapter 5 studies transactions costs at various exchanges in Europe, a metric highly 
influenced by the presence (or absence) of informed traders.  
1. Introduction to Chapter 3 – Insider Trading in Transaction Time: 
Impacts and Profits 
 
A type of market abuse performed by informed traders is insider trading, in which a 
corporate insider or another party in possession of proprietary non-public information 
trades upon it. In most countries, insider trading is a violation of the law, but 
economists have also contended that it increases price efficiency by impounding 
fundamental information into asset prices. 
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of insider trading on share prices and volumes, both 
on a daily basis as well as on an intraday basis. Chapter 3 seeks to determine whether 
the impact of insiders on both a daily and an intraday basis is statistically significant 
both in terms of price movements as well as the lot sizes insiders transact. By 
employing a database created from US Securities and Exchange Commission 
prosecutions of insider trades, Chapter 3 segments insider trades from non-insider 
trades in the same 30 minute interval (to control for market-wide factors) and 
investigates insider trades’ impact on price and volume. Chapter 3’s sample also 
allows for analysis by different market structure, as both specialist (New York Stock 
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Exchange and American Stock Exchange) and dealer (NASDAQ) market structures 
are examined. Using the Lee and Ready (1992) algorithm, trades are classified as 
either buyer-initiated or seller-initiated, and insider trades are compared with trades 
with similar classifications. 
 Glosten and Milgrom (1985) note that price reactions are more pronounced in a 
specialist market structure, under which the specialist is counterparty to all trades in a 
security, as opposed to a dealer market structure.  This is due to the relative 
anonymity of an informed trader active in a dealer marketplace. Garfinkel and 
Nimelandram (2003) show that counterparties’ price reaction to a potential adverse 
selection situation extends to legal corporate insiders trading in their firm’s securities.  
Easley and O’Hara (1987) theorize that uninformed traders may also refrain from 
trading when they perceive the presence of an informed trader, leading to diminished 
volume.  Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) examines the importance of the spread in the 
case of informed traders and conclude that although the specialist will, on average, 
suffer losses to informed traders, he will benefit from liquidity traders paying for 
immediate execution. 
There is also a welfare dimension to the examination of insider trading, as insider 
trading increases the cost of capital and alters the capital rationing function of the 
markets (Bhattarchaya and Daouk, 2002). Therefore, determining whether insider 
trades have different impacts than non-insider trades is key to assessing how insider 
trading affects market participants both in terms of price movements as well as 
volume. This thesis examines the two in tandem, as larger trades are more liable to 
have a larger price impact due to their greater demand for liquidity.  
Chapter 3 uses ordinary least squares regressions as well as point estimates to 
determine the statistical significance (or lack thereof) of insider trading activity on 
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both a daily and intraday basis. In addition, subsets of the sample are examined in 
order to assess whether findings in prior literature may be influenced by sample 
composition. These subsets include insider trading by category of information traded 
upon (e.g. merger announcement, positive earnings report) and insider trading by 
market structure of the exchange traded on (the specialist system of NYSE and 
AMEX and the dealer system of NASDAQ). 
Chapter 3 finds that at the intraday level, insider trades are statistically significantly 
different from non-insider trades in the same 30 minute period in both trade-to-trade 
price impact and in volume (lot size traded). This effect is most pronounced on the 
specialist exchanges of NYSE and AMEX, as NASDAQ insider lot sizes are not 
statistically significantly different from NASDAQ non-insiders. This result confirms 
the anonymity hypothesis of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and shows that specialist 
markets react differently in the presence of an insider than dealer markets, where the 
insider can remain anonymous. 
2. Introduction to Chapter 4 – Price Discovery in Liquid British Stocks 
After the Advent of MiFID and Chi-X 
The drive to integrate previously segmented equities markets in Europe led the 
European Commission to promulgate the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID). MiFID both allowed for pan-European trading of nationally-listed shares as 
well as catalysed the growth of new trading platforms such as Chi-X by requiring 
‘best execution’ in equities. The launch of Chi-X spurred fragmentation in the 
European equities market, and can be viewed in conjunction with MiFID, the 
directive that enabled it. MiFID’s intent was to create a pan-European securities 
market through two key mechanisms. First, the passport rule allows for a firm 
regulated by any EU national entity to operate throughout the European Union. 
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Second, the abolition of the concentration rule eliminated the mandatory shipping of 
trades to national exchanges (which was not in place in UK or German shares prior to 
MiFID) (Davies, 2008). With the increased competition due to lower barriers to entry, 
order flow fragmentation increased. In addition, Chi-X also targeted traders who were 
more focused on swift trade execution and highly sensitive to marginal fee rates.  
Chapter 4 uses price discovery econometrics to determine whether the origin of price 
formation has migrated from the London Stock Exchange to Chi-X in light of 
regulatory changes at the European level. By examining the source of permanent 
trends (caused by impounding of fundamental information into asset prices) as 
opposed to that of transitory shocks (caused by order imbalances), price discovery 
econometrics can pinpoint the prevalence of informed traders within each channel.  
Securities often trade in multiple markets and across multiple execution channels 
within markets. Through the no-arbitrage principle, it is reasonable to believe that 
trading follows error correction processes towards full-information and efficient 
security prices.  As information is impounded into each market’s price, the question 
arises as to which market is contributing more to this on-going price discovery. The 
observable price can be conceived as a common factor that impounds information 
plus a transitory shock.  Two security prices that adhere to this common stochastic 
trend are expected to be co-integrated. From microstructure theory (Grossman, 1976), 
it is expected that informed traders, those traders aware of the true path of future 
prices based on information, are the source of this information impounding, as they 
are the sole market participants with information. 
Two methodologies are used in conjunction to determine the locus of price discovery. 
Hasbrouck (1995) proposes a vector autoregressive model that decomposes price 
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volatility into the variance of innovations in the common factor. Hasbrouck’s 
Information Share (IS) represents each market’s contribution to the innovations in the 
common factor. This contrasts with Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) Common Factor 
Share (CFS) approach, which is a proportion of the common factor innovations that is 
driven by adjustment of the price series from each of the exchanges.  Yan and Zivot 
(2010) confirm that both methodologies need to be used in conjunction, due to 
ambiguity in interpreting Hasbrouck Information Share estimates, in that the 
Information Share can be high either when a channel is impounding permanent 
information or when its competitors actively chase its stochastic shocks. Meanwhile, 
the Common Factor Share for an exchange will be high only if its prices avoid 
chasing transitory shocks relative to the competing markets. Therefore, using both 
measures helps to avoid an equivocal interpretation of Information Share, and at the 
same time allows one to interpret whether the trades on one channel are informative, 
or simply reflect another channel’s pursuit of transitory shocks.    
Chapter 4 examines how the launch of Chi-X, a Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF) 
targeting technological traders highly sensitive to costs and low latency, affected price 
discovery patterns. Prior assumptions would lead one to believe that, ceteris paribus, 
price discovery should take place on each exchange at a level proportionate to its 
order flow. However, the low latency nature of Chi-X may attract informed traders 
sensitive to speed of execution. Monthly values for Hasbrouck Information Share and 
Gonzalo Granger Common Factor Shares are calculated and analysed to assess how 
developments in the pan-European equities markets affect the source of price 
discovery.  
Chapter 4 finds that although the introduction of MiFID had no effect on price 
discovery flows between the London Stock Exchange and Chi-X, a subsequent event, 
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Chi-X’s central counterparty fee cut, led to the migration of the majority of price 
discovery from the London Stock Exchange to Chi-X. In addition, different price 
discovery patterns occur for shares with single primary listings in the UK and those 
with dual primary listings in the UK and in Asia. Importantly, Chapter 4 shows that 
MiFID introduced price cointegration when sampling price tuples every 1 second, 
causing prices on the London Stock Exchange to respond to prices on Chi-X, 
Deutsche Borse – Xetra, and the foreign exchange component to ensure that no 
arbitrage existed between all channels. This can be interpreted as the creation of a 
single pan-European securities market in equities. 
3. Introduction to Chapter 5 – Liquidity and Fragmentation after MiFID on 
European Exchanges 
 
Chapter 5 investigates MiFID’s effects on transactions costs on pan-European equities 
markets. Prior to MiFID, concentration rules in some European countries mandated 
that securities be traded on a national exchange. More importantly, MiFID imposed a 
requirement that parties handling trades seek ‘best execution’ on behalf of their 
customers. Best execution is most often defined in terms of achieving the minimum 
(maximum) price when buying (selling) a share.  
Central to the advent of MiFID was competition between a number of trading venues. 
As MiFID imposed a regime that required traders to obtain the best price for an order, 
order flow fragmentation occurred due to competition for best execution as well as a 
number of other preferences traders possess – from fastest execution to institutional 
arrangements for block trading. Prior theory offers two predictions as to what 
fragmentation will do to transactions costs. Hamilton (1979) hypothesizes that off-
NYSE trading will spur greater competition and thus better spreads, but that it may 
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also increase volatility – if exchanges in fact enjoy economies of scale in transacting 
shares. However, Madhavan (1995) theorizes that fragmentation will drive volatility, 
reduce liquidity, and may lead to inefficient prices, stemming from the belief that a 
large exchange enjoys economies of scale in trading an asset. The debate distils into 
whether the effects of increased competition outweigh diminished economies of scale. 
Pagano (1989) suggests that if trading costs are homogenous between two markets, 
trading will cluster on one of them. He also notes that traders will participate on an 
exchange with idiosyncratic attributes conducive to their activity (e.g. block traders 
will trade either over the counter or on a market that facilitates large transactions, 
whilst liquidity traders will interact on a different market).  
The literature in fragmentation suggests that there is a trade-off between the effects of 
stronger competition, as reflected in tighter spreads, and increased price volatility that 
results from the thinning of liquidity as traders migrate to satellite exchanges. In 
addition, market participants may split their orders between venues in order to 
opportunistically capitalize on different fee schedules and improved execution costs 
for desired order sizes. 
Chapter 5 uses Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) methodology to determine the 
most relevant variables to examine, and then uses Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE) methods to further examine relationships between transactions costs and a 
number of independent variables to investigate the launch of Chi-X, advent of MiFID, 
and a central counterparty fee cut on Chi-X to determine whether any of these three 
events have altered transactions costs in the UK, France, and Germany. It uses the full 
set of liquid stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange, Paris Euronext, and 
Deutsche Borse – Xetra to examine whether costs of a list of major European shares  
on each of these exchanges or collectively have been changed by fragmentation, the 
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abolition of France’s concentration rule, volume traded, short-term price volatility, or 
interactions between these variables. Chapter 5 measures transactions costs in relative 
effective spread, as a ‘round-trip’ trading cost of a share.  
Chapter 5 finds that increased fragmentation from the national exchanges to Chi-X 
after MiFID leads to decreased transactions costs in the form of lower relative 
effective spreads. However, incremental implicit pre- and post-trade costs in the form 
of a reduced central counterparty fee on Chi-X have a greater negative influence on 
transactions costs than MiFID’s introduction of a ‘best execution’ obligation.  
In summary, this thesis seeks to make a contribution to the literature on regulation and 
informed trading, utilizing the opportunity of a unique dataset in understanding the 
characteristics of insider trades in Chapter 3. A series of natural experiments created 
by regulatory restructures in Chapter 4 and 5 provides detailed insights as to how 
regulatory and market design affects the nexus between informed trading and 
transactions costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16
Chapter Two: 
Literature Review 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis examines the impact of informed trading on securities markets in several 
principal ways. Grossman (1976) defines informed traders as those traders who know 
‘the true underlying probability distribution that generates a future price, and they 
take a position in the market based on this information’. Informed traders generate 
price paths by trading upon their knowledge of this information, and through the 
interactions of informed traders with the market, prices reflect all available 
information. Therefore, informed traders stimulate asset markets by impounding 
information. This thesis examines the actions of informed traders in several fora: first, 
by examining the intraday impact of illegal insider traders, a subset of informed 
traders. Illegal insider traders possess private information on the future valuation of a 
company they either work for or owe a fiduciary duty towards – the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 defines insider information as ‘material’, thus providing a test 
that implies that those prosecuted for trading upon it use non-trivial information, and 
‘non-public’, that is, not disseminated to the general investing populace. The second 
and third chapters of the thesis examine how fragmentation affects both the 
development of prices and transactions costs. Through fragmentation, the splitting of 
the order flow between multiple exchanges, informed traders can engage in strategic 
behaviour and mask their participation in the market, thus extracting maximum 
economic rent from their information. The competition inherent in fragmentation may 
allow informed traders to capitalize upon their information at a lesser price, although 
existing literature offers differential evidence on this topic, as economies of scale may 
be diminished. As price discovery methodology allows for the determination of where 
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informed traders trade, in that it separates permanent price trends from stochastic 
price shocks (often caused by order imbalances, as opposed to the impounding of 
information into market prices), research in this field can determine if market 
structure innovations attract informed traders.  
2. Insider Trading 
According to microstructure theory, informed trades, which are trades made on the 
basis of private information or analysis thereof, should cause traders to react to offset 
the costs of predation. This predation can be conceptualized as the difference between 
the trading price of the asset and the ‘true’ price of the asset that only the informed 
trader knows. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model price setting in a specialist market. 
They theorize that with the adverse selection problem facing the specialist, the 
specialist will ensure a positive bid-ask spread, even when he is not seeking a profit, 
to provide a margin to compensate for unidentified insider activity due to information 
asymmetry. This problem may not confront the dealer, as he is anonymous and cannot 
detect any abnormal behaviour by floor brokers. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) see the 
specialist as requiring a higher price for liquidity when there is a chance that insiders 
or informed traders are present in the market who can take advantage of the specialist. 
As the specialist has a duty to ensure liquidity in the share, he is the monopolist 
provider of liquidity in the exchange, and thus, any sort of predation in the market is 
likely to take place at his expense. Easley and O’Hara’s (1987) theory compounds the 
specialist’s dilemma, in that if liquidity traders do not trade due to the perceived 
presence of an informed trader, the specialist incurs a greater loss as he must provide 
liquidity to the informed trader as opposed to mediating between uninformed traders 
and informed traders.  
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Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (BMW) (1992) suggest that the influence of a 
specialist-based exchange can compensate for the presence of an informed trader with 
price changes, notably by increasing the spread whenever the specialist perceives an 
informed trader is active in the market. This model demonstrates that as a result of 
repeated interaction between brokers and specialists on the floor, specialists will be 
able to spot informed trading, as the broker has a disincentive to deceive the 
specialist, as the specialist has the ability to sanction those who behave counter to his 
interests through mechanisms like failing to improve quoted prices. Through the 
repeated interaction of traders and specialists, the specialist will be able to detect 
when anomalous behaviour exists in the market and consequentially increase his 
spread or fail to improve prices. As opposed to the specialist’s means of detecting 
informed traders, the dealer is only able to infer the presence of informed traders 
through order imbalances.  Fishe and Robe (2002) empirically test Benveniste Marcus 
and Wilhelm (1992) using a natural experiment around traders in possession of a 
stock-picking column prior to publication. Their results show that spreads after the 
insider trades increased and depth shrinks, especially for NYSE-listed and AMEX-
listed shares. Interestingly, they find no change in spreads on NASDAQ, which is 
consistent with the anonymity inherent in a dealer market. As Chakravarty, Harris, 
and Wood (2009) show, information occurs first in changes in depth levels; dealers 
may be adjusting their risk exposure due to the perception of an insider in the market. 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) examine the importance 
of the spread in the case of informed traders and conclude that although the specialist 
will, on average, suffer losses to informed traders, he will benefit from liquidity 
traders who are willing or are forced to pay a spread for immediate execution. 
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Garfinkel and Nimelandran (2003) test the impact of market structure on transactions 
costs using a set of legal corporate insider trades falling within Barclay and Warner’s 
(1993) definition of ‘medium-sized trades’ (500-9999 shares). They posit and find 
that due to the anonymity of a dealer market such as NASDAQ versus a specialist 
system such as NYSE and AMEX, spreads and price impact costs on NASDAQ, the 
dealer market, will be lower, as dealers cannot detect the presence of an insider in the 
market.  
Kyle (1985) theorizes that insider traders will trade over a prolonged period to extract 
maximum value from their private information. Therefore, one should expect insiders 
to trade repeatedly and in such a way that does not cause their information to be 
exposed, which would erode their competitive advantage. Therefore, in a Kyle (1985) 
universe, insiders may use limit orders to avoid detection and trade over a period of 
several days in order to extract the maximum rent from their monopoly information.  
Meulbroek (1992) is the first empirical research paper on the daily impact of insider 
trading on share prices. She compiles private SEC files detailing insider trading 
prosecutions with publicly available data and news reports to profile and examine 
insider trading behaviour in cases prosecuted from 1980 to 1989. She tests for insider 
activity (proxied by abnormal returns on the day(s) of insider trading) using a market 
model with an estimation period of 150 days, controlling for news announcements 
and examining the return on the day of the public disclosure of the news upon which 
the insider traded. She uses the Centre for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
value-weighted index of all shares traded as the basis for the market model. 
Meulbroek (1992) also uses a lagged market model to test for abnormal volume on the 
days insiders are active in the market, controlling again for news. As a robustness test, 
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she examines abnormal volume net of insider volume to determine whether the 
differential increase in volume is directly attributable to the insider.   
She finds that price movements on insider trading days are almost half (47%) of the 
size of price movements on days when the news is publicly disclosed. She discovers 
an average run-up of 3.06% on the day of insider trading, and a cumulative abnormal 
return of 6.85% on insider trading days. This provides good support for the 
assumption that the information is leaking into the market and is impounded into 
prices. As Meulbroek’s sample consists primarily (80%) of insiders trading upon 
news of imminent mergers, her results reflect price movement around mergers, and 
are not driven by earnings or other announcements. Meulbroek attributes the run-up to 
information leakage from insider traders. She finds a higher price impact for insiders 
trading on news of impending mergers (2.55% abnormal return and 6.01% CAR) 
versus that of insiders trading on earnings announcement news, which is consistent 
with the findings of Jarrell and Poulson (1989), who find a 40% run-up prior to 
merger announcements that they credit to rumours and arbitrageurs. Some of 
Meulbroek’s results may be driven by her sample, which is composed of mostly 
specialist stocks (70%) and mergers (79%), which may exaggerate the impact of an 
insider trade. Meulbroek finds that insiders provide the marginal volume 
distinguishing insider trading days from non-insider days, and thus insiders are not 
driving additional participation in the market. She further notes that since insider 
trading drives abnormal volume, insider trading leads to abnormal returns, but asks 
whether insider trading is detected by trade aspects or by abnormal volume, and 
discovers that both have a marginal effect on abnormal returns.   
Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and McConnell (CM) (1997, 1999) examine 
a serial insider trader or ring – in Cornell and Sirri’s case, a group of insiders trading 
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in advance of a merger announcement, and in Chakravarty and McConnell’s case, 
arbitrageur Ivan Boesky’s insider trading in Carnation shares. Cornell and Sirri 
determine that insider trading’s effect in this acquisition was complex – while price 
was affected and volume increased. Contrary to Meulbroek’s findings, Campbell-
Taggart’s liquidity improved. This is unexpected in that an aggressive insider ring 
would lead specialists to protect themselves through changes in the spread (Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985), and thus, liquidity would be expected to decrease. Cornell and 
Sirri (1992) attribute these seemingly contradictory results to the presence of noise 
traders, who are defined as falsely informed traders1. Falsely informed traders can be 
defined as those traders who believe they are trading on superior information and 
analysis, but in fact do not have any advantage over other traders. Cornell and Sirri 
cite technical traders (‘chartists’) as a classic example of falsely informed traders. 
They argue that the specialist’s problem dissipates when he can match falsely 
informed traders and informed traders, as he is not subject to inventory effects, as the 
informed traders are counterparties to the falsely informed traders’ trades. This 
coincides with Admati and Pfleiderer’s (1988) conclusion that informed traders 
increase activity when liquidity traders are present in the market.2 Therefore, Glosten 
and Milgrom’s (1985) finding may not hold because insiders, not the specialist prey 
upon falsely informed traders. Cornell and Sirri’s case study is distinct from other 
studies in that the insider ring purchases a substantial proportion of traded shares. In 
their study, insider purchases constitute 29% of the total volume and represent a 
significant increase in volume. Cornell and Sirri attribute all the effects in their study 
to the presence of insiders and falsely informed traders, because the target company, 
                                                            
1
 Noise traders are differentiated from liquidity traders in that noise traders believe they are trading 
on ‘special’ information. See DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990).  
2
 In Cornell and Sirri’s case, 10 trades out of 78 (12.8%) were executed via limit orders. 
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Campbell Taggart, did not exhibit any confounding behaviour, such as news stories 
speculating on its potential as a merger target that could be driving abnormal volume. 
Through tracking short interest (unchanged), volume, and the share price of 
Anheuser-Busch (the acquirer), Cornell and Sirri conclude that the only informed 
traders present are the insider traders. 
Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) find a weak link between insider trading and 
subsequent stock prices, showing a lagged correlation between Boesky’s purchases in 
the market and subsequent prices with the strongest significance displayed in the link 
between Boesky’s purchases and the stock price two hours later but also showing a 
link between Boesky’s buying and contemporaneous price increases. However, price 
increases immediately after Boesky’s purchases may just be a liquidity effect, as any 
large trader aggressively buying in the market will push up the price and is thus not an 
effect per se of insider trading. Boesky’s trading, as in Cornell and Sirri (1992), did 
not affect spreads. Also, although Boesky contributed to the increased volume on days 
he traded, he was responsible for only half of it, with the other half potentially coming 
from falsely informed traders or momentum traders. By using time stamped trades 
and segmenting their sample into Barclay and Warner’s (1993) categories, 
Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) discover that the Boesky trades correlated with 
price movements are the ‘large’ trades. They further conclude that since insider 
trading may be beneficial, as it assists in price discovery, and if spreads do not change 
as in this case, there is no adverse selection component. However, Chakravarty and 
McConnell (1997) were unable to discern as to whether Ivan Boesky’s trading spurred 
the price run-up, or whether he chose to trade on days after observing such an increase 
in prices.  
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Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) reprise the 1997 study, but with an important 
inclusion of trade direction through the use of the Lee and Ready (1993) algorithm. 
They find that Ivan Boesky’s trades (buys) in Carnation did not have a different 
impact than other buy trades, and thus, conclude that a large component of price 
impact in that case was due to overall trade imbalance as opposed to the presence of 
an informed trader in the market. They also estimate Meulbroek (1992) and Cornell 
and Sirri’s (1992) regressions on the Ivan Boesky data, and discover that when 
adjusting their methodologies for trade direction, insider trading is statistically no 
different from a trade in the similar direction. They verify with the Boesky data 
Meulbroek’s (1992) contention that higher returns exist on insider trading days than 
on days with no insider trading or public news announcements. Chakravarty and 
McConnell (1999) notably state that their critical assumption is that all non-Boesky 
trades are uninformed.  
Fishe and Robe (2004) discuss the impact of insider trading in advance of a news 
column. This can be differentiated from the other cases inasmuch as the insiders’ 
trading pattern is relatively regular – to wit, they trade the day prior to public 
disclosure of the information. Fishe and Robe (2004) use spreads and depth in the 
limit order book as key metrics to measure the impact of illegal insider trading, 
ascertaining that when an insider is present in the market, depth shrinks in both dealer 
and specialist markets, but spreads increase only under specialists
3
. These results 
substantiate Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) model. They find that volume increases 
substantially only after the insiders are present in the market, and attribute this to the 
presence of falsely informed traders. The insiders are only responsible for a marginal 
increase in volume (9.2%), which seems to suggest that either the information on 
                                                            
3
 Fishe and Robe (2004) find that only ask depth changes significantly. As their data is comprised 
solely of purchases of shares, this may be a natural conclusion. 
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which the insiders trade leaks or liquidity or falsely informed traders are goaded into 
the market after observing a spike in price and volume. Fishe and Robe (2004) use a 
control group of equities in which information was available to the insiders but they 
did not trade, and find that normal price, volume, and spread patterns prevail.  
In summary, Cornell and Sirri (1992), Meulbroek (1992), and Chakravarty and 
McConnell (1997, 1999) all identify a significant price and volume impact on the day 
of the insider trading, but do not have sufficiently granular data to identify whether 
the increased volume and price are spurred by insider trades. In addition, each of these 
studies use aggregated data (for Cornell and Sirri and Meulbroek, daily data, for 
Chakravarty and McConnell, hourly data), leaving unanswered the question as to how 
insider trades immediately impact prices and volumes. Furthermore, all the studies 
with the exception of Meulbroek (1992) are comprised solely of insiders purchasing 
shares – which may provide an unrepresentative sample of data with which to make 
blanket conclusions as to the effect of insider trading. Meulbroek’s (1992) sample is 
driven by speculation on merger announcements, which she shows to have a higher 
abnormal return than the impact of other information disclosed into the marketplace.  
These inconsistent explanations merit further study, as Chakravarty and McConnell 
(1999) wrote, is whether results from a small population (with one insider trader or a 
small ring) are valid amongst a larger sample, or if the results are driven by 
idiosyncratic attributes of the trades (e.g. a trader accounting for a large proportion of 
trading volume).  
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 3. Fragmentation 
3.1 Regulation and Market Integration 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated 
Regulation NMS with the intent of protecting retail investors and promoting robust 
competition between markets, while ensuring markets remained integrated on a 
security level. Reg NMS’s intent is encapsulated in the idea that ‘[v]igorous 
competition among markets promotes more efficient and innovative trading services, 
while integrated competition among orders promotes more efficient pricing of 
individual stocks for all types of orders, large and small’ (Reg NMS, 2007).  As 
United States securities law has historically focused on protecting the retail investor 
from potential predation on the part of the more sophisticated institutional investors, 
Reg NMS also includes a battery of provisions to ensure the protection of retail 
investors. Foremost among these is the Order Protection Rule, which mandates that an 
order be ‘shipped’, or sent, to whatever exchange (known in Reg NMS as ‘market 
centers’) offers the best price, defined in terms of the highest price for a sell order and 
lowest price for a buy order. This principle is commonly known as ‘best execution’ in 
obtaining the optimal terms for an order. As is apparent in MiFID, best execution can 
take different forms, including speed of trade and likelihood of execution, as well as 
price.   
Concurrent with the drafting of Regulation NMS, the European Union launched the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), a successor to the Investment 
Services Directive (ISD), MiFID meant to develop a pan-European securities market 
and, like Reg NMS, ensure the protection of retail investors in European financial 
markets. While MiFID was drafted by the European Commission, as per European 
Union subsidiarity, it was the responsibility of individual European Union nation 
financial market regulators to enforce it and draft national regulations to that end.  
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Like Reg NMS, MiFID aimed to obtain the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions’ (IOSCO) twin goals of efficiency and fairness, and to a similar end, 
sought to encourage innovation and competition between markets and market 
participants within. Another similarity between Reg NMS and MiFID is that to 
comply with MiFID, market participants needed to invest in technological systems in 
order to ensure that they met best execution obligations. With these routing and 
trading systems, transparency arguably increased, as a trader could view and access 
order books in not only all of the established European exchanges, but on the new 
Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs), most notably Chi-X. MTFs differ from the 
established exchanges in their highly electronic nature and lean operating budgets. 
They also offer trading terms that may appeal more to technological traders - an 
increasing breed of market participants. The economic effect of MiFID was a 
transformation of the marketplace for security services from a monopoly, or highly 
concentrated oligopoly (in the case of states without concentration rules), to active 
competition to provide trading services across Europe.  
Reg NMS differs from MiFID in several fundamental ways. Whereas MiFID 
institutes transparency and requires firms to report on best execution policies, Reg 
NMS’s order protection rule mandates that brokers prevent execution of orders 
without regards for improved quotes on other exchanges. In short, Reg NMS 
categorizes best execution through the lens of price.  However, as noted by many 
academics, this rule does not apply to certain types of trades. By contrast, MiFID 
defines best execution in terms of price, speed, size, likelihood of execution, and a 
number of other variables (European Commission, 2007).  Reg NMS also places the 
affirmative burden on exchanges and other trading venues to ship an order to a 
preferential quote whereas MiFID only applies to brokers. Therefore, MiFID’s 
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structure encourages, but does not ensure, best execution in trading, due to the 
nebulous definition of best execution in MiFID. Furthermore, critics of MiFID have 
asserted that MiFID’s obligation to publish a best execution policy and statistics 
indicating the extent of a broker’s compliance is ineffective, as European securities 
regulators have not threatened sanctions on any firm in breach of its best execution 
duty. However, critics of MiFID have stated that competition may come at the price 
of ‘a transparent and effective price formation process’ (Lannoo, 2007). Blume (2007) 
argues that Reg NMS’s uniform/one-size-fits-all framework harms investors with 
heterogeneous preferences, and advocates for a MiFID-like regulatory framework to 
maximize choice among market participants. 
 The literature on fragmentation suggests that there is a trade-off between the effects 
of stronger competition, as reflected in tighter spreads, and increased price volatility 
that results from the thinning of liquidity as traders migrate to satellite exchanges. 
One can view this as the diminution of monopoly rents as the marketplace shifts to 
imperfect competition. In addition, market participants may split their orders between 
venues in order to opportunistically capitalize on different fee schedules and 
improved execution costs for desired order sizes. A cream-skimming effect may also 
take place with additional small size venues entering into the market. 
3.2 Fragmentation 
MiFID’s intent was to create a pan-European securities market through two key 
mechanisms. First, the passport rule allows for a firm regulated by any EU national 
entity to operate throughout the European Union. Second, the abolition of the 
concentration rule eliminates the mandatory shipping of trades to national exchanges 
(which was not in place in UK or German shares prior to MiFID) (Davies, 2008). 
With the increased competition due to lower barriers to entry, order flow 
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fragmentation increased. MiFID can be compared and contrasted with the United 
States’ Reg NMS. Whilst both had the intent of ensuring best execution (Lannoo, 
2007), MiFID’s goal of harmonizing securities market rules created different 
standards for the achievement of best execution than those in Reg NMS. The ultimate 
enforceability of the best execution requirement, however, is at issue in MiFID where 
market participants are at liberty to define their own meaning for best execution as 
long as that meaning is well known to their clients.  However, increased pre- and 
post-trade transparency requirements have bolstered competition as a vehicle to 
facilitate best execution.  In addition, it can be argued that the national exchanges 
enjoyed a quasi-monopoly privilege in Europe pre-MiFID, whereas that was not the 
case prior to Reg NMS. 
Petrella (2009) details the fragmentation in major index components that occurred 
after the advent of MiFID. Chi-X’s market share of FTSE 100 equities moved from 
2% in November 2007 to 7% in May 2008 to 12% in November 2008. Over the same 
period, LSE incurred a gradual decline in its market share, as it slipped from 70% in 
November 2007 to 58% in May 2008 to 59% in November 2008. Petrella (2009) 
notes that fragmentation can be attributed to the establishment of new MTFs offering 
different pricing schemes, and that are often owned in part by major brokers and 
dealers. 
Hamilton (1979) hypothesizes that off-NYSE trading will spur greater competition 
and thus better spreads, but that it may also increase volatility if exchanges in fact 
enjoy economies of scale in transacting shares.  Empirically, Hamilton finds that both 
effects exist, but that the competition effect outweighs the volatility effect attributable 
to fragmentation. Mendelson (1987) presents a theoretical framework in which he 
compares monopolists against a fragmented market, and shows that price variability 
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increases for individuals but that the overall amount traded decreases.  In addition, 
overall price volatility decreases, as fragmentation/competition effects dominate the 
removals of economies of scale. Pagano (1989) suggests that if trading costs are 
homogenous between two markets, trading will cluster on one of them. He also notes 
that traders will participate on an exchange with idiosyncratic attributes conducive to 
their activity (e.g. block traders will trade either over the counter or on a market that 
facilitates large transactions, whilst liquidity traders will interact on a different 
market). Pagano (1989) submits that search can be beneficial for large traders’ 
liquidity needs, despite having some cost. Chowdry and Nanda (1991) focus on the 
information transmission dynamic, theorizing that competition between market 
makers will speed-up information impounding into prices, and that liquidity traders 
will split their orders between markets. In a finding of significance to this thesis, they 
find that one market will become the information-dominant exchange for trading in a 
security.   
Madhavan (1995) theorizes that fragmentation will drive volatility, reduce liquidity, 
and potentially lead to inefficient prices. Batallio (1997) finds decreased spreads in 
NYSE-listed shares in which Madoff Securities competed.  However, it is worth 
noting that Madoff only executed share volumes at or beneath 5000 shares, so he may 
have engaged in cream-skimming. As a result, fragmentation may lead to this sort of 
predatory behaviour. Fong, Madhavan, and Swan (2001) provide empirical evidence 
corroborating Pagano’s (1989) theory that differential liquidity needs affect a trader’s 
cost of whether to trade on-market or in an alternative venue, such as an upstairs 
market or ECN.  Bennett and Wei (2006) empirically examined Madhavan’s findings 
and document how fragmentation in NYSE-listed shares affects liquidity and 
volatility through a natural experiment in which NASDAQ firms switch to the NYSE, 
 30
discovering that NYSE firms have lower bid-ask spreads attributable to the reduced 
fragmentation.  Lannoo (2007) contends that this was the intent of MiFID’s regulatory 
predecessor, the EU’s Investment Services Directive, which allowed for the 
concentration of trading at a national exchange. In this vein, MiFID’s encouragement 
of competition and the resultant fragmentation may simultaneously increase liquidity 
and spreads, but at the detriment of the price discovery process.  
Lee (1993) focuses on execution quality in US satellite exchanges, and discovers that 
in the presence of paid order flow, the payment amount tends to capitalize itself into 
the spread. To wit, non-NYSE trades have larger execution costs than NYSE trades 
by roughly the amount of the order flow payment.  Lee also discovered that satellite 
exchanges had better execution costs in medium size trades while the NYSE 
dominated in large trades, while NASDAQ performed worse than both NYSE and 
satellite exchanges. In a caveat, Lee noted that he focused only on execution costs, 
and other attributes of execution may reflect better on the NASDAQ.  
Economides (1996) documents potential network externalities in the context of 
financial markets. While markets must have a minimal level of liquidity to execute 
transactions, as O’Hara and Ye (2009) note, fragmentation has no detrimental effect. 
To the extent that fragmentation leads to an increase in liquidity, welfare increases for 
all participants. In the context of price discovery, this would imply that overall price 
discovery would not be harmed by fragmentation, and that migration to a new 
exchange offering will be determined by factors other than liquidity.  
Huang and Stoll (1996) attribute the larger spread on NASDAQ shares as compared 
to a matched sample of NYSE shares to both order preferencing agreements and a 
lower degree of competition from ECNs in NASDAQ listed shares, which diminish 
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competitive effects. Another factor to which they attribute higher spreads on 
NASDAQ to is the lack of a specialist with knowledge of complete order flow; 
therefore, each market-maker must protect himself from predation by informed 
traders. While this is theoretically possible, Huang and Stoll (1996) do not find 
evidence corroborating this. The two largest factors affecting the spread are 
NASDAQ’s existing interdealer market
4
, and internalizing and preferencing 
arrangements that reduce the incentive to compete, as that order flow is hypothecated 
to certain dealers. 
A number of recent studies have examined the effect of fragmentation and market 
integration on measures of liquidity. Liquidity can be posited to affect price discovery 
as informed traders need sufficient liquidity on which to execute their trades, and thus 
impound information into prices. In the absence of sufficient liquidity, information 
fundamentals may not drive prices, but rather order imbalances caused by a patchy 
limit order book. Moulton and Wei (2009) find that during overlapping ADR trading 
hours for European cross-listed securities spreads decrease while quoted depth 
increases. This is attributed to either competition for order flow between the European 
exchanges and NYSE or the influx of additional liquidity into the market during 
overlapping hours. Menkveld (2008) provides evidence of order-splitting behaviour in 
extending Chowdry and Nanda’s (1991) model to a sample of British and Dutch 
shares with ADRs. O’Hara and Ye (2009) examine how the growth of non-exchange 
trading venues affects market execution costs. They find that fragmentation occurs 
most frequently on small NASDAQ shares and least frequently on large NYSE 
shares. They conclude that fragmentation lowers transactions costs and increases 
transaction speed, which further verifies the competition hypothesis. 
                                                            
4
 This system is similar to SETS’s hybrid system – see Gresse and Gajewski (2007). 
 32
The literature in fragmentation suggests that there is a trade-off between the effects of 
stronger competition, as reflected in tighter spreads, and increased price volatility that 
results from the thinning of liquidity as traders migrate to satellite exchanges. In 
addition, market participants may split their orders between venues in order to 
opportunistically capitalize on both different fee schedules and improved execution 
costs for desired order sizes. A cream-skimming effect may also take place with the 
entrance of additional small size venues into the market. Recent literature, such as 
Jain and Johnson (2009) proposes a ‘network effect’ with the influx of many 
additional liquidity providers due to technological changes in the marketplace 
facilitating trading.  
3.3 MTFs, Algorithmic Trading and Fragmentation 
Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick (2003) demonstrate how lower latency in 
ECNs can lead to more informed trading, and therefore, greater adverse selection 
costs. In addition, they show that ECNs provide the majority of price discovery 
compared to traditional exchanges. Hendershott and Moulton (2009) find that lower 
latency leads to the greater incorporation of information into prices. They also outline 
how latency can lead to greater competition for liquidity providers, and attribute an 
increase in effective spreads to the price of immediate execution. Boehmer and 
Boehmer (2003) investigate the new listing of three exchange traded funds (ETFs) on 
NYSE and find that a significant amount (10%) of order flow migrates to NYSE, and 
that in two out of the three shares, NYSE impounds the most information relative to 
order flow. NYSE’s over performance in proportion to its overflow can be attributed 
to the influx of informed order flow.  Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) note that 
NASDAQ’s quotes come from the Island ECN, which provides further support to the 
theory that a large proportion of informed participation occurs on ECNs, although, 
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some informed traders may have moved to NYSE with the introduction of 
competition.  The implications of this is that price discovery is expected to follow the 
order flow of the informed traders, as per Grossman (1976), informed traders are the 
market participants aware of the future expected value of the asset, so in trading, they 
will impound permanent valuation fundamentals. 
Smith (2008) outlines the growth of non-exchange trading in the United States and 
speculates that MTFs will develop differentially to appeal to various sorts of traders. 
This coincides with existing literature5 positing that traders have heterogeneous 
preferences and endowments. Smith (2008) highlights Markit BOAT’s emergence as 
an alternative trade reporting facility (where trades that take place on another venue or 
over-the-counter can be reported to comply with regulation) and Chi-X’s advantage 
due to a speedier order book and a direct clearing system. Chistella et al (2007) 
describes Chi-X’s market model as comparable to Xetra and Euronext. Chi-X’s share 
of the order flow for the largest FTSE 100 components is under 1%, as compared to 
its 3-5% share of major Dutch and German equities.  
Hendershott and Riordan (2009) examine the information shares of algorithmic trades 
and non-algorithmic trades on Deutsche Borse’s Xetra Platform in the thirty shares 
comprising Germany’s main index, the DAX. They use a set of algorithmic trades on 
Xetra provided to them by Deutsche Borse. Using quotes, they find that algorithmic 
trading has an information share of 51%. Importantly, they find that algorithmic 
trading is sensitive to the price of liquidity, demanding liquidity when it is 
inexpensive, and supplying it when liquidity’s cost increases. They do not find that 
algorithms raise price volatility.  
                                                            
5
 Kyle (1985) and Foster and Vishwanathan (1990) are examples of this literature. 
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Gresse and Gajewski (2007) compare execution costs on Euronext Paris’s NSC 
trading system with the London Stock Exchange’s SETS. Drawing on prior literature 
showing that an electronic order driven market has lower trading costs than a quote-
driven market, they conduct an event study following the introduction of the LSE’s 
SETS system. The key difference between the two trading systems is that NSC (Paris) 
routes all systems to a central limit order book whilst LSE’s hybrid system includes 
SETS’s central limit order book with other trading mechanisms that are not displayed. 
The centralisation of Paris’s limit order book is an artefact of certain EU member 
states’ ‘concentration rule’ that stymied the development of ECNs outside of the 
United Kingdom (UK) by mandating that all trades in a nationally-listed share be sent 
to that country’s national stock exchange. By way of example, prior to MiFID, BP, a 
UK-listed share, could be traded on the London Stock Exchange, Deutsche Borse’s 
Xetra, and ECNs in the European Union (EU), while Total, a Paris-listed share, could 
only be traded on Euronext Paris. A result is that dealers are on standby to bilaterally 
offer non-displayed quotes outside the order book on London, while all quotes in 
Paris must be visible on the order book. Gresse and Gajewski (2007) find that prices 
are more volatile on SETS and that spreads are higher there which is in part driven by 
the marginally larger size of trades on SETS. Using Huang and Stoll’s (1997) spread 
decomposition6, they show that SETS has roughly half the proportion of the spread 
falling under both adverse selection and inventory holding that NSC has, which is in 
accord with most of the literature on adverse selection that shows that adverse 
selection is lower on venues with less pre-trade transparency. Gresse and Gajewski 
(2007) thus display that market structure affects local price volatility and can induce 
trading migration. Therefore, to the extent that market structure changes attract 
                                                            
6
 Huang and Stoll split the spread into ‘inventory holding and adverse selection’ and order-processing 
components.  
 35
increased informed order flow, fragmentation will alter price discovery patterns as 
well as drive changes in transactions costs.  
 4. Price Discovery 
4.1 Price Discovery Across Channels 
Securities often trade in multiple markets and across multiple execution channels 
within markets. From the no-arbitrage principle, it is reasonable to believe that trading 
follows error correction processes towards full-information and efficient security 
prices.  As information is impounded into each market’s price, the question arises as 
to which market is contributing more to this on-going price discovery. The observable 
price can be conceived as a common factor that impounds information plus a 
transitory shock.  Two security prices that adhere to this common stochastic trend are 
expected to be cointegrated. From microstructure theory (Grossman, 1976), it is 
expected that informed traders - those traders aware of the true path of future prices 
based on information - are the source of this information impounding, as they are the 
sole market participants with information. 
Two alternative econometric approaches seek to provide an answer to the question of 
contributions to price discovery. Hasbrouck (1995) proposes a vector autoregressive 
model that decomposes price volatility into the variance of innovations in the 
common factor. Hasbrouck’s Information Share (IS) represents each market’s 
contribution to the innovations in the common factor. This contrasts with Gonzalo and 
Granger’s (1995) Common Factor Share (CFS) approach, which is a proportion of the 
common factor innovations that is driven by adjustment of the price series from each 
of the exchanges.  De Jong (2002), Lehmann (2002), and Baillie et al (2002), have 
surmised that a combination of the two may be informative. Yan and Zivot (2010) 
argue that CFS is needed to more effectively interpret the IS. The IS for an exchange 
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can be large either because an exchange’s trades impound permanent information, or 
because its competitors’ trades are chasing transitory shocks. Meanwhile, the CFS for 
an exchange will be high only if its prices avoid chasing transitory shocks relative to 
the competing markets. Therefore, using both measures helps to avoid an equivocal 
interpretation of Information Share, and at the same time, permits a determination of 
whether the trades on one channel are informative, or simply reflect another channel’s 
pursuit of transitory shocks.    
Roughly four generations of price discovery technology have existed since Engle and 
Granger (1987) launched their study of cointegration/error correction systems. The 
first is exemplified by Harris, McInish, Shoesmith, and Wood (1995), when they 
specify a vector error correction model (VECM) to determine whether prices in IBM, 
a NYSE listed security, were solely formed from NYSE price changes, or whether 
there was an error correction dynamic between trade-based price adjustments in New 
York and those on the Chicago and Pacific Exchanges. At the time, all markets 
employed a specialist system, and although New York had ten times the trades of 
Midwest (and 3.5 times the trades of Pacific), Harris et al were able to match roughly 
80 observations per day for analysis. After performing a Johansen (1991) test for 
cointegration, discovered that the Midwest and Pacific exchanges contribute 
meaningfully to the price discovery process.  IBM prices on NYSE error correct to 
permanent innovations on the Midwest and Pacific exchanges as well as the Midwest 
and Pacific exchanges reacting to movements in the NYSE price. 
Hasbrouck (1995) investigates the price formulation process in Dow shares by 
determining how much of the variability in a share’s quote-based returns can be 
attributed to trading in all tape-reported execution channels in Dow shares. Hasbrouck 
notes that his sample includes alternative trading systems, but not overseas trades. 
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Both Harris et al (1995) and Hasbrouck (1995) seek to determine the dynamics of 
price adjustment, namely which price reacts to adjustments on another exchange. 
Hasbrouck proceeds to note the sensitivity of his analysis to reporting mechanisms 
such as auto-quotes, delayed posting of quotes, and to ‘stale’ behaviour in 
infrequently updated quotes and trades. In addition, due to the econometric 
specifications of Hasbrouck’s (1995) model, simultaneous correlation between quote 
updates on the primary exchange and on the satellite exchanges will result in a large 
range of estimates when the order of the series is reversed in the Cholesky 
factorization procedure.  
Harris et al (2002) pioneer a third generation of price discovery technology, adapting 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995)’s common factor share approach to financial markets. 
This extends their previous 1995 work, providing a snapshot in time across the Dow 
components to see if common factor weights are dynamic. Harris et al (2002) note 
that the Gonzalo-Granger measure is robust to cross-equation correlations, and 
characterise it as a representation of the permanent price trend caused by the 
incorporation of information into asset prices.  
Yan and Zivot (2010) and Harris, McInish, and Wood (2010) reconcile the Hasbrouck 
and Gonzalo-Granger approaches for determining price discovery by showing that 
although Hasbrouck’s IS approach measures informativeness, it also reflects the 
chasing of transitory shocks. An IS can be high either because a channel is 
impounding permanent information, or because its rivals are chasing transitory 
shocks. In contrast, the Gonzalo-Granger approach will produce a high CFS only if 
competing execution channels are chasing transitory shocks. Therefore, use of the two 
measures in conjunction will be required to determine which channel is impounding 
new information and which is chasing transitory shocks. 
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Kim et al (2000) investigate price discovery in American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) and their underlying securities, using VAR and Impulse response functions, 
finding that although the domestic price is the leading indicator in price adjustment 
(roughly 65% of the innovations), exchange rates (roughly 15%) and the ADR market 
(roughly 10%) play some role in the dynamics of price adjustment between the ADR 
and the underlying asset. 
4.2 Price Discovery Across Borders 
The international finance literature demonstrates the sensitivity of modelling of the 
exchange rate. Ding et al (1999) are the first in this literature with an examination of 
Sime Darby Berhad, one of Malaysia’s largest corporations, which trades on both the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and the Singapore Stock Exchange. Given the relative 
stability of the ringgit-Singapore dollar exchange rate, they convert all prices at 
several times in the day into a common currency. They note that the rate is 
sufficiently stable that practitioners do not convert prices on a real time basis. Ding et 
al (1999) discover that a significant amount of price discovery (from 26-32%) occurs 
in the foreign (Singapore) market, a price discovery share larger than its proportion of 
trading volume. The estimation of a VECM shows that although foreign prices 
strongly error correct to Malaysian prices, Malaysian prices’ error correction to 
Singaporean price adjustments is relatively weak.  
Grammig, Melvin, and Schlag (2005) study the rate of price discovery in German 
shares and their ADRs and find that an overwhelming (80-90%) amount of the 
information is impounded in German markets. They also display the importance of 
modelling the exchange rate process as a separate vector of prices, as opposed to 
converting to a common currency. Grammig et al (2005) draw the conclusion that a 
firm’s foreign earnings can affect the price discovery processes.  For example, they 
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find that the New York Stock Exchange influenced price discovery more in 
DaimlerChrysler, a firm with significant earnings on both sides of the Atlantic, than in 
Deutsche Telekom or SAP, the German software company. 
5. Transactions Costs 
5.1 Transactions Costs – Theory and Empirics 
Demsetz (1968) was the first to investigate transactions and conceptualized the bid-
ask spread as a way of incorporating ‘immediacy’ into the study of transactions costs. 
This is the first illustration of a concept of liquidity in the literature, and Demsetz 
illustrates it either as the direct cost of immediacy or as a profit margin on inventory. 
Demsetz enumerates five factors that will lead to the narrowing of the spread: 
competition from others to become the specialist, competing markets, order 
aggressiveness, trades directly between counterparties, and other specialists. Benston 
and Hagerman (1974) provide a framework where the spread is affected by the cost of 
holding inventory, matching orders, ‘trading with insiders’, and competition. 
Therefore, they expand Demsetz’s framework by incorporating what have come to be 
known as ‘order-processing costs’ and adverse selection. Grossman and Miller (1988) 
model liquidity as the supply and demand for ‘immediacy’ as negotiated between 
market makers and liquidity demanders. Market makers recapture the costs of 
inventory deviating from optimal levels and the costs of their presence in the market 
through the bid-ask spread. Copeland and Galai (1983) pioneer the modelling of the 
bid-ask spread as the dealer’s situation between trading with liquidity traders and 
informed traders. As the dealer profits from trading with liquidity traders and loses 
from trading with anonymous traders, the spread is set as a way to mediate that 
interaction. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model price setting in a specialist market. 
They theorize that with the adverse selection problem facing the specialist, the 
specialist will ensure a positive bid-ask spread, even when he is not seeking a profit, 
 40
to provide a margin to compensate for unidentified insider activity due to information 
asymmetry. This problem may not confront the dealer, as he is anonymous and cannot 
detect any abnormal behaviour by floor brokers. Even in the presence of multiple 
market makers, the factor of interest that will allow the market maker to detect 
abnormal behaviour is the concentration of order flow, and her ability to compare the 
entire order flow with historical patterns.  Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988)7 examine the importance of the spread in the case of informed 
traders and conclude that although the specialist will, on average, suffer losses to 
informed traders, he will benefit from liquidity traders who are willing or are forced 
to pay a spread for immediate execution. McInish and Wood (1992) note the presence 
of an intraday pattern in bid-ask spreads in the NYSE market.  Examining all these 
models of transactions leads one to conclude that a number of factors set liquidity’s 
price, but ultimately liquidity’s price works as a supply and demand interaction. 
Another variable this thesis considers is pre- and post- trading fees, costs levied by an 
exchange for access to it and for certainty and insurance of transactions. While the 
bid-ask spread can be conceived as an explicit and fluctuating cost, trade-related fees 
are often fixed costs (platform access fees), or a fixed amount per trade. 
Therefore, the spread can be conceived both as a price and insurance for the inventory 
holder to protect against the possibility of predation by an informed counterparty. 
Glosten and Harris (1988) are the first to estimate these ratios, and are unable to 
verify that the adverse-selection components of the spreads of a series of NYSE-
stocks in 1981-1983 were positive, and find that the primary determinant of spread 
size is trade size. This size effect can be seen as a cost of liquidity for large trades that 
need to walk the book in order to fully execute. However, this is a key driver in the 
                                                            
7
 Foster and Vishwanathan (1990, 1993) model how an informed trader’s decision and timing of 
trading is reliant on the timing of disclosure of public information. 
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innovation of ‘upstairs’ platforms where institutional traders can exchange large 
blocks of shares. In this vein, Huang and Stoll (1997) and Lin, Sanger, and Booth 
(1995) derive models that identify two components constituting the spread: order-
processing costs, which can be conceived as economic rents to trading service 
providers, and adverse selection costs, which can be conceived as the insurance 
premium captured in the spread to compensate the liquidity provider from the 
possibility of trading with an informed counterparty. The two papers diverge in that 
Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) study the impact of the size of the trade on the adverse 
selection component of the spread8.  Literature diverges on whether inventory risk 
(the risk of the market maker maintaining a level of inventory different from his 
preferred level) is a prime component of the spread. Grossman and Miller (1988) 
theorize it may be. Two empirical studies offer different evidence: while Hasbrouck 
(1988) finds mixed evidence to conclude whether inventory risk is a significant 
component in the spread, Bollen, Smith, and Whaley (2004) note that in a sample of 
NASDAQ stocks in 1996 through 2001, that 29% to 44% of the spread is attributable 
to inventory costs, a larger proportion than the adverse selection component various 
papers determine as the driver of the size of the spread.  
Sidhu, Smith, Whaley, and Willis (2007) document that the implementation of 
Regulation FD in the US, ostensibly in order to ‘level the playing field’ with regards 
to corporate disclosure of material information, led the adverse selection component 
of the spread to increase 36%. They hypothesize that this may be due to slowing the 
dissemination of corporate information into the market, leading to ‘longer lived’ 
information that is more useful to insiders, as opposed to the opposite scenario 
wherein multiple insiders simultaneously transact, leading to information to be nearly 
                                                            
8
 Lin et al (1995) find a monotonic increase in the adverse selection component with the size of 
trades. 
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instantaneously incorporated in prices.  Sidhu et al (2007) may be discovering that 
informed traders after Regulation FD behave similarly to Kyle (1985) inside traders, 
seeking to extract monopoly rent from their unique information. Chung and 
Chuwonganant (2010) examine the implementation of Reg NMS in the United States. 
Reg NMS, by prohibiting exchanges ‘trading through’ superior quotes, attempts to 
integrate satellite exchanges, ECNs, and traditional exchanges into a single market for 
liquidity. This is driven by the fragmentation debate, and especially the discussion on 
preferencing agreements, leading retail investors to be disadvantaged when active in 
the marketplace. Reg NMS explicitly mandates, through its Order Protection Rule, 
price priority in terms of execution, in that a dealer must ‘ship’ an order to the 
exchange at which she can receive the best price for the volume desired. Interestingly, 
Chung and Chuwonganant (2010) find that the effect of Reg NMS on NYSE and 
NASDAQ-listed stocks to not be statistically different, but find that spread increases 
and depth decreases. They attribute this to dealers interested in alternative dimensions 
of market quality, namely execution speed and execution probability. Following from 
the fragmentation theoretical literature, it is not improbable that Reg NMS catalysed 
additional fragmentation, leading market participants to enjoy lesser economies of 
scale. One could also conceive this as an additional fragmenting of the order book, 
which leads to higher execution costs as Gresse and Gajewski (2007) find.  Gresse 
(2010) finds that post-MiFID fragmentation increased spreads on local exchanges, 
although traders able to access multiple exchanges benefited from MiFID-spurred 
fragmentation by lower overall spreads. She also finds that depth decreases, but that 
may be an artefact of smaller trade sizes as traders seek to minimize overall trading 
costs by utilizing multiple venues as well as internalisation (matching systems within 
banks and other brokers).   
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Bessembinder (2003) analyses execution costs in NYSE stocks both on NYSE and on 
competing exchanges and determines that off-NYSE trades are executed when off-
NYSE liquidity providers offer competitive quotes for large trades, and that 
competitive quotes serve as a means by which non-NYSE liquidity providers indicate 
their willingness to trade. He states that non-NYSE exchanges use quotes as a means 
to attract order flow when they wish to trade. While the NYSE is always at one side of 
the NBBO (national best bid-offer, which is the consolidated tape’s tightest bid and 
ask spread), off-NYSE exchanges tend to match or offer a smaller (greater) bid (ask) 
on the alternate side of the spread. When non-NYSE liquidity providers offer 
competitive quotes, execution costs are not significantly statistically different from 
NYSE.  
Grossman (1992) models an interaction between an upstairs and downstairs share 
market. He concludes that both the cost of search and differential needs of market 
participants (examples may include price and liquidity) will cause the development of 
an upstairs market to supplement traditional markets. The additional liquidity 
provided comes with the drawbacks that upstairs traders are likely to be more 
informed about both overall order flow (in that while they can observe the downstairs 
market, upstairs markets may be opaque to downstairs participants), and a potential 
risk of trading with informed counterparties. In this nature, Grossman’s model mirrors 
empirical findings by Barclay, Hendershott, and Jones (2003).  
Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988), examining options, cite two basic schools of 
thought on the determination of bid-ask spreads – in the Demsetz (1968) and Ho and 
Stoll (1981) framework, as a dealer cannot hold the market portfolio and diversify 
away the idiosyncratic risk, the inventory risk, the risk that constitutes a dealer’s 
holdings in a particular security deviating from the optimal level, is a key determinant 
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of the bid-ask spread. In the Copeland and Galai (1983) and Easley and O’Hara 
(1987) models, the specialist contends with the presence of informed traders in the 
market, to whom it is expected that he will make a loss. Therefore, the bid-ask spread 
theoretically maximizes the net gains from liquidity traders’ presence in the market 
and the specialist’s losses from trading with informed traders. Choi et al (1988) 
modify the Roll (1984) model to adjust for serial correlations in returns and find it is a 
proper estimator for options markets.  
Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001) empirically test five models of adverse 
selection using volatility, volume, and corporate finance variables, and find a degree 
of variation among them in measuring adverse selection. As they state that adverse 
selection proxies ought to measure the amount of asymmetric information in the 
market, they assert that these proxies may be capturing other trading costs, especially 
as three of the models generate a significant amount of theoretically impossible values 
(negative components of adverse selection). In addition, they are confused by the lack 
of correlation between the adverse selection models with corporate finance variables, 
such as analyst forecast error, that may also represent the presence of asymmetric 
information in the marketplace.  
Zhao and Chung (2007) study the SEC’s introduction of Rule 605, a regulatory action 
which requires exchanges to disclose execution quality in equities. Rule 605 was 
implemented in two phases, where it first applied only to nationally listed equities, but 
later was widened to include all listed equities.  The goal of the rule is to allow public 
investors to compare execution costs across exchanges, and it mandates the display of 
effective spreads, execution speed, and fill rates.  In a finding related to the 
competition literature, Zhao and Chung (2007) discover that spreads decreased by 
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roughly 20% in NYSE-listed and AMEX-listed stocks after Rule 605, with a slightly 
greater decrease in the spreads of NASDAQ-listed stocks.   
Chung, McInish, Wood, and Wyhowski (1995) suggest that market makers can assess 
the risk of adverse selection by examining a share’s coverage by analysts in the 
banking industry, as industry coverage is a useful proxy for publicly available 
information held, and that the greater the number of analysts, the greater the extent of 
asymmetric information in the shares. Chung et al (1995) use industry profit forecasts 
to further determine that, ceteris paribus, a greater number of analysts follow stocks 
with larger spreads.  
5.2 Alternative Trading Systems and Trading Costs 
The transformation of the equity markets may affect both characteristics of spread and 
trade size. A number of recent studies9 show that the average size of a NYSE order 
has fallen three times in the past five years. In addition, the proliferation of 
algorithmic/high-frequency traders has led to an increased sensitivity to pre and post-
trade costs. With these changes in the attributes of orders, conclusions in previous 
studies may not hold for traders seeking decreased latency, anonymity through order-
splitting, and other competitive advantages offered by electronic communications 
networks (ECNs).  
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2010) show that the introduction of algorithmic 
trading on the NYSE in 2003 increased liquidity and significantly decreased the 
adverse selection component of the spread. Riordan and Storkenmaier (2009) show 
that a decrease in latency from 50 milliseconds to 10 milliseconds on Deutsche 
Borse’s Xetra platform led to a dramatic decline in the adverse selection component 
of the spread. This must be distinguished from Barclay, Hendershott, and 
                                                            
9
 Grant (2010) cites a number of empirical studies on average order sizes. 
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McCormick’s (2003) conclusion that ECNs offer a more suitable platform for 
informed traders due to anonymity and lower latency. Hendershott and Moulton 
(2009) demonstrate that NYSE’s introduction of a hybrid trading system (where 
orders can either seek automatic execution or specialist prices - the automated system 
is likely to lead to speedier executions, but specialists may be able to provide 
improved prices) leads to increased spreads, and they attribute that to an increase in 
the ‘cost of immediacy’, as time-sensitive traders offer more. Hendershott and 
Moulton (2009) find that an increase in adverse selection drives the spread increase. 
Therefore, while algorithms increase liquidity and decrease adverse selection, they 
tend to migrate to ECNs, despite the higher likelihood of finding an informed 
counterparty. One must weigh this against the possibility, as suggested in price 
discovery literature, that algorithmic traders may be informed. Barclay et al (2003) 
find that small trades (below 1,000 shares) have a lower effective spread on 
exchanges with market makers than on ECNs, concluding that market makers 
perceive a greater adverse selection issue on the anonymous ECNs.  
Fragmentation between ECNs and exchanges can influence transaction prices. 
Hendershott and Jones (2005) show that when the Island ECN ceased to display its 
limit order book, trading costs of its competitors declined, while Island trading costs 
increased. However, the overall trading costs of the instrument increased. They 
attribute this effect to the migration of Island liquidity providers to its competitors and 
conclude that the additional liquidity on non-Island ECNs generates more liquidity in 
a feedback effect. In addition, they posit that competing exchanges or ECNs may lead 
to liquidity suppliers being more responsive to liquidity demanders due to competitive 
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pressures. Gresse (2010) finds that the introduction of Multilateral Trading Facilities
10
 
(MTF) reduces spreads by the amount of competition between the traditional 
exchange and the MTF. She proceeds to describe MiFID as a ‘catalyst’ for the growth 
of MTFs, so the effect of MiFID may not be fully separable from MTFs’ introduction. 
She draws attention to a market-structure debate over fragmentation – although prior 
literature (Bennett and Wei 2006, Gresse and Gajewski 2007) finds that a centralized 
order book has lower transactions costs, the fragmentation literature argues that this 
may be more than offset by competitive pressures leading dealers to vie for order flow 
on the basis of price.  
                                                            
10
 MTF is a legal definition in the EU’s MiFID directive, comparable to the US definition of ECN. 
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Chapter Three: 
Insider Trading in Transaction Time: Impacts and 
Profits 
 
1. Introduction 
The market turmoil following the Global Financial Crisis has reignited focus on the 
extent to which illegal behaviour may be occurring in markets. This behaviour can 
constitute a violation of fiduciary duty on behalf of the broker or represent a form of 
manipulation of the securities markets that results in a misleading price of the asset. 
The United States’ equity market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), statutorily possesses the lead regulatory role in detecting and prosecuting 
forms of market abuse. Recently, the SEC has come under heavy scrutiny regarding 
the effectiveness of its fulfilment of its mandate, which originated from the public 
policy necessity for markets to be perceived as efficient and fair.  The most noted 
form of market abuse – which includes fraud, market manipulation, and bucket shops 
– is insider trading. Insider trading11 increases the cost of capital and distorts the 
capital rationing function of the markets (Bhattarchaya and Daouk, 2002). Insider 
trading occurs when a party privy to information that will affect an asset’s price trades 
before public disclosure of that information. Insider trading violates a fiduciary duty 
that the insider has to the owners of a company’s securities. It also contravenes the 
International Organization for Securities Organizations’ (IOSCO) guidance for 
regulators to ensure a ‘fair’ and ‘efficient’ market.  
This chapter tests the impact of insider trading on market performance and price 
distortion. It examines whether changes can be measured that capture the presence of 
                                                            
11
 A brief overview of US legislation and legal opinions on insider trading is found in Appendix 1 of this 
chapter. 
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an insider in the market, and how the market responds to the insider’s activity. The 
data is analysed on macro (daily) and micro (intraday) levels. This chapter uses a 
series of time-stamped trades prosecuted by the SEC to generate data files for both 
daily trading and intraday trading intervals.  This data provides a natural experiment 
to examine the effects of insider behaviour as the prosecution provides an ex post 
identification of insider trading within the larger pool of liquidity trades. In all the 
cases, the defendants traded on the basis of inside information, contravening US 
federal law. The defendants either are ‘insiders’ - corporate officers who received 
private information in the course of their duties, or those who had been informed by 
corporate officers but do not have a duty to the corporation. The latter are known as 
tippees, as they received ‘tips’ from insiders. The sample is composed of shares from 
NASDAQ, AMEX, the New York Stock Exchange, and over the counter (OTC) 
markets, which allows for an examination of insider behaviour within different market 
structures. Daily analysis is initially performed to examine whether conclusions 
drawn in previous literature are idiosyncratic to samples. The analysis is then 
extended to intraday data to permit examination of trader behaviours both by insiders 
and uninformed traders as the trades occur. Existing literature contends that in the 
presence of an insider, market participants will increase the spread to compensate for 
adverse selection, and this may lead to increased price movement on a trade-by-trade 
level as market orders absorb this increased cost12. 
The key findings of this chapter is that at the micro level, insider trades are 
significantly different from surrounding trades in both trade to trade price impact and 
trade lot volume, when compared with trades executed in the same thirty minute 
interval by other traders.  The size and volume effect is most pronounced on the two 
                                                            
12
 Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), and Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) theorize on 
the specialist’s reaction to the presence of an insider in the market.  
 50
specialist exchanges of the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). Trade to trade price movements are statistically significant 
at the 1% level for the panel of NYSE and AMEX shares. This result offers support 
for the anonymity hypothesis advocated by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and others. 
In respect to NASDAQ, price effects are due only to insider trades that are of similar 
lot size with surrounding trades on NASDAQ. These findings would suggest that 
price formation responses to insider activity may differ across various market 
structures.  
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2 presents how this chapter follows with 
the existing threads of discussion in insider trading and market microstructure, while 
section 3 discusses the chapter’s data and design. Results are discussed in section 4 
with the conclusion in section 5. An appendix sets out the history of United States 
insider trading laws and their historical application by the SEC.  
2. Models and Hypotheses  
This chapter expands the existing literature on insider trading by examining a varied 
sample in transaction time to provide a general assessment about the impact of insider 
trades – previous studies have aggregated data into intervals of either 15 minutes or an 
hour13. A first pass analysis is based on daily data in concert with prior studies, such 
as Cornell and Sirri (1992), Meulbroek (1992), and Chakravarty and McConnell 
(1997,1999). Then an intraday analysis examines how market participants conduct 
themselves trade-by-trade when an insider is in the market. 
                                                            
13
 Fishe and Robe (2002) use 15 minute intervals, while Chakravarty and McConnell (1997, 1999) use 
hourly data. 
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The regression estimated examines the daily impact of insider trading while 
controlling for other events14. It is posited that the regression will identify whether 
returns are noticeably higher on days insiders are trading than on days when they are 
not (while controlling for interim news announcements):  
Rit=α + β1Indext + β2Announcementit + β3Insiderit + Σβ4Newsit +ε it  (3.1) 
where Rit is the daily return on a security,  
Indext is the daily return on the Frank Russell 3000, a value-weighted market 
index,  
Announcementit is an indicator variable equal to 1 on the day of the public 
disclosure of the information upon which the insider traded,  
Insiderit is an indicator variable equal to 1 on days the insider transacts,  
and Newsit comprises a series of indicator variables equal to 1 on days of 
confounding news announcements over the estimation period. As the insider 
occasionally trades mere hours in advance of the public release of information, 
Insider and Announcement can be (and are frequently) on the same day. News is 
subjectively defined in the insider trading literature (no paper gives strict criteria 
for what constitutes a confounding news announcement as opposed to an 
immaterial news announcement). However, due to the prevalence of almost daily 
news, analysis, and analyst recommendations on major corporations, an arbitrary 
filter must be set to estimate this regression. For the purposes of this chapter, any 
day with a news announcement and a return of 4% will constitute a day with a 
news dummy. 
                                                            
14
 Regressions 3.1 and 3.2 are adapted from Meulbroek (1992). 
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A second model is used to capture abnormal volume effects that may occur around 
insiders: 
ln(volit) = α + β1ln(volmt) + β2ln(volit-1) + β3ln(volit-2) + β4Mondayit + β5Tuesdayit+ 
β6Wednesdayit + β7Thursdayit+ β8Announcementit + β9Insiderit + β10NetInsiderit  + 
Σβ11Newsit + εit          (3.2) 
where ln(volit) is the natural logarithm of the daily volume of shares traded in a 
security, 
ln(volmt) is the natural logarithm of the daily market volume for the exchange on 
which the share is listed, 
 ln(volit-1)  is the natural logarithm of the total shares traded lagged one day,  
ln(volit-2)  is the natural logarithm of the total shares traded lagged two days,  
Mondayit through Thursdayit are indicator variables equal to one on the relevant 
day of the week,  
Announcementit is an indicator variable equal to one on the public disclosure of 
the information on which the insider traded,  
Insiderit equals one on the day the insider traded,  
NetInsiderit  is the daily volume traded in the security minus the volume the insider 
traded,  
and Newsit is the collection of individual news variables, each equal to one on the 
day of a confounding public news announcement in the traded company. 
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The use of Meulbroek’s (1992) equations is because hers is the only cross-sectional 
study of insider trading behaviour to date. Other studies, such as Cornell and Sirri 
(1992), Chakravarty and McConnell (1997, 1999), and Fishe and Robe (2004) are 
case studies of individual firms. Meulbroek’s empirical tests use data that she 
associated with identified insider trades by employing Securities and Exchange 
Commission private files merged with daily trading prices and volumes. She found 
that there is a statistically significant abnormal return on days of insider trading and a 
statistically significant abnormal volume on days of insider trading. She also tested to 
see if the abnormal volume on days of insider trading was solely attributable to the 
presence of the insider in the market, and found that it was. This diverges from 
Cornell and Sirri (1992), who find that ‘falsely informed traders’, traders who think 
they are trading on information but are misled, flock into the market on days of 
insider trading. An example of falsely informed traders could be trend followers or 
technical analysts.   
Meulbroek’s sample was heavily skewed by insider trading in advance of mergers, 
which constituted 79% of her sample. She asserts that insider trading is responsible 
for this abnormal return in advance of mergers. However, Jarrell and Poulson (1989) 
document that on average there is a nearly 40% run-up in share prices prior to  merger 
announcements. As it is unlikely that insiders trade before every merger, it is possible 
that Meulbroek’s (1992) sample is upwardly biased and may not accurately represent 
a cross-section of marketplace events or the actual impact of insider trading on price 
patterns.  Whether this run-up is due to insiders or standard market activity prior to 
merger announcements is debatable. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) also document 
activity prior to mergers and the concurrent phenomenon of price run-ups prior to the 
announcements and culminations of mergers. However, further tests are needed, as a 
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price run-up is a common factor in merger target firm trading, and may be attributable 
to risk arbitrageurs, who could be considered informed traders, instead of insider 
traders trading on the illegitimate leakage of corporate information. 
The present sample is more heterogeneous with a plurality of merger-related 
information (45%), as well as miscellaneous bad news, 21.57% of the sample. Table 1 
documents the information announcements traded upon in the present sample. The 
majority of insider trading episodes examined in this chapter take place in NASDAQ-
listed shares(68.6%). This differs from previous studies, such as Meulbroek (1992) 
and Cornell and Sirri (1992), which focus on NYSE-listed shares. This chapter’s 
sample characteristic allows for the analysis of the impact of market style on insider 
trading.  
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Table 1: Information On Which Insiders Trade 
Table 1 displays the nature of the information on which insiders traded. 
 
Type Total Percent 
Merger 23 45.10% 
Negative Earnings 5 9.80% 
Positive Earnings 6 11.76% 
Miscellaneous good news 6 11.76% 
Miscellaneous bad news 11 21.57% 
Total 51  
 
Theory argues that insider trading on the NYSE is fundamentally different from the 
NASDAQ due to market structure issues
15
. A focus on NASDAQ-listed shares versus 
those of the NYSE leads to greater diffusion of information, as the specialist is not  
counterparty to all trades and is therefore not privy to all order flow information. Per 
academic literature, this lack of order flow concentration leads to a greater difficulty 
on behalf of market participants to detect anomalous behaviour, as on NASDAQ, an 
insider can split his orders between many dealers and market makers. However, in 
this chapter analysis is performed both on the entire sample as well as the 
NYSE/AMEX (specialist market) sample and NASDAQ to elucidate whether there is 
a differential effect. In summary, firstly, the data is examined to see if existing 
findings (Meulbroek, 1992, Cornell and Sirri, 1992, Chakravarty and McConnell, 
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 For example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) contend that the presence of a specialist will lead to 
higher spreads, as the specialist uses the spread to protect against adverse selection. 
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1997, 1999) are idiosyncratic to their data or can be found in out-of-sample tests. 
Secondly, the effects of exchanges’ market design are analysed to determine if insider 
trading affects asset prices differently in different market types.  
This section’s hypotheses are thematically structured. Because existing theoretical 
literature describes the expected reaction to the presence of an insider in the market 
without specifying differential behaviour whether the insider transactions within a day 
or over a longer time horizon, hypotheses are constructed for both daily and intraday 
data using the same theoretical justifications. Kyle (1985) discovers identical activity 
whether the insider is trading on an intertemporal or a continuous basis.  
Therefore, ceteris paribus, it is hypothesized that: 
H1.10: Daily returns will be no different on days when insiders trade than on 
other days. 
H1.1A: Daily returns will be statistically greater on days when insiders trade than 
on other days. 
H1.20: Volume net of insider trading will be no different on days when insiders 
trade than on other days. 
H1.2A: Volume net of insider trading will be different on days when insiders 
trade than on other days. 
Hypothesis 1.1 suggests a positive direction as Glosten and Milgrom (1985) notes that 
the presence of an insider will lead the specialist to compensate for her adverse 
selection problem by increasing the spread. Consequently, prices, when adjusting for 
signs (multiplying returns by -1 for a sell) should be expected to have higher returns. 
Hypothesis 1.2 is one-directional as volume cannot be lower than zero.  
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Easley and O’Hara (1987) model behaviour of markets in the presence of an informed 
trader, and suggest that uninformed, or liquidity, traders refrain from trading when 
they perceive informed traders to be present in the market. Therefore, according to 
their model, when insiders trade, volume will be lesser than normal. However, Cornell 
and Sirri (1992) suggest that in the presence of insider traders, ‘falsely informed 
traders’ flood the market perceiving a change in valuation fundamentals. Chakravarty 
and McConnell (1997, 1999) find in a case study of Ivan Boesky’s trades in Carnation 
that Boesky was only responsible for half of the increased volume. Cornell and Sirri 
(1992) document that insiders use a statistically significant amount of limit orders, 
which may account for lesser returns. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) theorize that 
execution certainty is most important to insiders, so they will use market orders, 
which may lead to increased daily returns. Kyle (1985) models an inside trader 
seeking to extract maximum rent from his information, and posits that insiders will 
trade over a prolonged period. He further notes that this behaviour and the use of limit 
orders will help the insider trader avoid detection by authorities, as limit orders have a 
lesser price impact than market orders. Meulbroek (1992) finds no increase in 
abnormal volume net of insider trading activity in her sample, and Fishe and Robe 
(2004) document only a marginal increase in volume (9.2%) on days insiders trade. 
Meulbroek (1992) finds that days on which insiders trade account possess abnormal 
returns relative to days when insiders are not present in the market (while accounting 
for confounds such as news announcements). Therefore, the first hypothesis expects 
that abnormal volume will be statistically significant on days the insiders trade, as the 
‘falsely informed traders’ described by Cornell and Sirri (1992) enter the market. As 
there is no theoretical agreement as to how insider trades should be different from 
non-insider trades (on one hand, the insider may seek to trade stealthily to avoid 
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detection, but the insider may also need to immediately execute his trade), the 
hypotheses do not suggest a direction, as depending upon the results, different 
economic outcomes are implied. 
H2.10: Insider trades are statistically different from surrounding trades in the 
same 30 minute interval in terms of price movements. 
H2.1A: Insider trades are not statistically different from surrounding trades in 
the same 30 minute interval in terms of price movements. 
H2.20: Insider trades on specialist (NYSE/AMEX) exchanges will not be 
statistically different from surrounding trades in the same 30 minute interval in 
terms of trade-to-trade price movements. 
H2.2A: Insider trades on specialist (NYSE/AMEX) exchanges will be statistically 
different from surrounding trades in the same 30 minute interval in terms of 
trade-to-trade price movements. 
H2.30: Insider trades on dealer (NASDAQ) exchanges will be statistically 
different from surrounding trades in the same 30 minute interval in terms of 
trade-to-trade price movements. 
H2.3A: Insider trades on dealer (NASDAQ) exchanges will not be statistically 
different from surrounding trades in the same 30 minute interval in terms of 
trade-to-trade price movements. 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model price setting in a specialist market and theorize 
that when the specialist perceives an adverse selection problem, usually driven by 
information asymmetry, she will increase the bid-ask spread to compensate for the 
presence of any undetected insiders. Therefore, liquidity is more costly under such 
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terms. The specialist is able to do this as all trades on the exchange flow through her, 
so she has a total awareness of order flow. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) note that this 
issue is not present in a dealer market, as order flow is fragmented through numerous 
counterparties and therefore detection of unusual behaviour is difficult. Benveniste, 
Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) find that through repeated interaction between 
specialists and traders, the specialist will be able to detect informed trading, as the 
specialist’s counterparty has no incentive, and may even be sanctioned (such as by the 
specialist’s failure to update quotes), by the specialist if she detects that the trader is 
behaving in a way contrary to her interests. Therefore, on a specialist exchange, the 
specialist will increase the spread when she suspects insiders are present in the market 
to compensate for her adverse selection problem. Fishe and Robe (2004) only 
document that the dealer can infer that unusual behaviour is occurring through order 
imbalances, and conduct a natural experiment using traders illegally trading upon an 
advance copy of a stock-picking column. They find that spreads after the insider 
trades increased and depth decreased on NYSE and AMEX (specialist) markets, but 
do not change on NASDAQ.  Chakravarty, Harris, and Wood (2009) determine that 
information first appears in depths, so liquidity providers may be adjusting their 
positions by increasing or decreasing the volume available at the best bid-offer due to 
the perception of an insider active in the market. Garfinkel and Nimelandran (2003) 
use a sample of legal corporate insider traders to find that spreads and price impacts 
on NASDAQ, due to its anonymity as a dealer market, are lower than that of NYSE, 
as there is no specialist to detect an informed trader’s presence. Chakravarty and 
McConnnell (1997) find only a size effect correlation in price movements around 
insider trades that arbitrageur Ivan Boesky made – only when Boesky made a ‘large’ 
trade (as per the categories of Barclay and Warner, 1993), did prices move. Therefore, 
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they cannot conclude that the price movements were due to the presence of an insider 
because they could also be due to any parties execution of large trades. Therefore, 
hypothesis two holds that the insider will be stealthy in the NASDAQ market, as no 
party is able to deduce his presence, and thus, insider trade-to-trade price movements 
will not differ from surrounding trades. However, on NYSE/AMEX, the specialist is 
expected to detect the presence of the insider and increase her spread to compensate 
for the adverse selection problem. Therefore, insider trade-to-trade price movements 
are expected to be statistically different from surrounding trades on NYSE-AMEX. 
As this chapter’s sample is primarily composed of NASDAQ trades, the aggregate 
trade-to-trade price movement is expected to be statistically insignificant, so no 
difference between insider trades and non-insider trades is expected. As abnormal 
volume can only be positive, these hypotheses are directional. 
H3.10: Insider trades are not statistically different from surrounding trades in the 
same 30 minute interval in terms of shares traded. 
H3.1A: Insider trades are statistically different from surrounding trades in the 
same 30 minute interval in terms of shares traded. 
H3.20: Trades on specialist (NYSE/AMEX) exchanges will not be statistically 
different from surrounding trades in terms of lot sizes. 
H3.2A: Trades on specialist (NYSE/AMEX) exchanges will be statistically 
different from surrounding trades in the same 30 minute interval in terms of lot 
sizes.   
H3.30: Trades on dealer (NASDAQ) exchanges will be statistically different from 
surrounding trades in the same 30 minute interval in terms of lot sizes. 
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H3.3A: Trades on dealer (NASDAQ) exchanges will not be statistically different 
from surrounding trades in the same 30 minute interval in terms of lot sizes. 
H3.40: Insider trades will not be statistically different from surrounding trades of 
the same initiation in the same 30 minute interval in terms of trade-to-trade 
return. 
H3.4A: Insider trades will be statistically different from surrounding trades of the 
same initiation in the same 30 minute interval in terms of trade-to-trade return. 
The academic literature modelling price determination in specialist and dealer markets 
focuses on the ability of parties to detect the presence of an informed trader and either 
protect against predation or mimic the patterns of an informed trader. Although 
Cornell and Sirri (1992) note that there will be an influx of falsely informed traders, 
there has been little analysis in terms of the size of trades of the insider versus that of 
a non-insider. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm 
(1992) provide evidence that a specialist is able to detect the presence of an informed 
trader in the market as opposed to the anonymity of a dealer market. As a result, 
parties may behave differently when they can detect the presence of an insider as 
opposed to when they cannot. Kyle (1985) models insider trading as a number of 
repeated interactions with the markets in order to maximize rent and ensure avoidance 
of detection. An observer might expect the insider to trade strategically to ensure he is 
not caught. However, this is grounded in the assumption that the insider acts 
strategically. As this chapter’s data set consists of cases that the SEC successfully 
prosecuted for insider trading, insiders may not be behaving in a rational manner.  
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H40: Insider trades will not be statistically different from surrounding trades of 
the same initiation in terms of lot volume. 
H4A: Insider trades will be statistically different from surrounding trades of the 
same initiation in terms of lot volume. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Kyle (1985) posit that informed traders will use 
market orders to ensure maximum likelihood of execution. Therefore, as informed 
traders are sensitive to both time and execution failure, insider traders, as a subset of 
informed traders, will use market orders. Resultingly, they will walk the limit order 
book. Glosten and Milgrom (1987) and Garfinkel and Nimelandram (2003) theorize 
and show that informed trading on specialist markets has a stronger effect than that on 
dealer markets. Hypothesis 4 of this chapter examines buyer-initiated trades by 
insiders with buyer-initiated trades by non-insiders, and seller-initiated trades by 
insiders with seller-initiated trades by non-insiders. One should expect informed 
(insider) trading to be more noticeable than other trades on specialist markets, even 
compared to trades initiated by the same party. 
It is worth noting that there is a detection bias inherent in the sample, because it 
consists of insider trades that the SEC successfully prosecuted. Thus, results may not 
be fully representative of all insider trades that occur. 
3. Data and Method 
3.1 Data 
This study utilizes a sample of insider trading in common stocks assembled from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) litigation releases
16
 from 1 November 
1998 to 1 November 2007. This is a set of all legal complaints filed by the SEC when 
in cases against defendants accused of market abuse. For the cases in which the SEC 
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 Found at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtml. 
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accuses the defendant of insider trading, information extracted includes: defendant 
(such as name, whether he is a tippee or insider, date of prosecution), security name, 
volume traded, price traded, profit accumulated, date of trade, time-stamp of the trade, 
and date of the public disclosure of the news on which the insider trades. However, 
the SEC’s legal complaints are occasionally incomplete, and do not always include 
each descriptor. These files contain solely trades identified by the SEC as performed 
by illegal insiders. After filtering to exclude incomplete, potentially corrupt, or 
confounding data, the sample consists of a set of 4,031 separate transactions, each 
defined as a single trade in a security. As this study solely focuses on equities, the 
chapter further omits cases that concern only futures or options, and do not include 
option trades in cases when the insider transacts in both equities and options reducing 
the sample to 3,055 trades. A further filter excludes all trades where the SEC does not 
provide a time-stamp for the insider transaction narrowing the sample to 430 trades. 
All newly listed shares which lack a 150-day period of daily returns have also been 
removed from the sample, as there is not enough data to sufficiently estimate 
regression 3.1 and 3.2. Finally, this chapter excludes those episodes for which there is 
no intraday data obtainable from the Securities Industry Research Centre of the Asia-
Pacific (SIRCA)’s Reuters DataScope Tick History (RDTH17). This leaves a final 
sample of 51 episodes. An episode is defined as a single defendant transacting in a 
single security, no matter how many times the defendant trades in that security. There 
are 101 different thirty-minute intervals within which insiders transact. Daily data 
(including opening price, closing price, and volume) was sourced from the Bloomberg 
Professional service, with gaps (for merger targets now delisted) supplemented with 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. In addition, Thomson Reuters Datastream provided 
                                                            
17
 RDTH is now renamed as TRTH, Thomson Reuters Tick History. 
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daily values for the Frank Russell 3000 index, used to compute regression 3.1. 
Exchange volume was obtained from the NYSE and NASDAQ fact books18. Intraday 
trade and quote data was acquired from the Securities Industry Research Centre of the 
Asia-Pacific’s (SIRCA) TAQTIC (now TRTH) service using Reuters data.  
The insider trade lots are identified using the SEC’s reported volume and price for 
transactions – while the SEC notes the time, average price, and aggregate volume of 
transactions, it does not go so far as to identify the individual transactions. These are 
matched against trades with the same price and volume stamp. Meulbroek (1992) 
notes that the SEC opts not to disclose the full details of insider transactions to better 
mask their detection methodologies, so this method may have its limitations. The Lee 
and Ready (1992) algorithm is used to determine the party initiating the trades, both 
for the insider trade as well as for the entire sample of transactions in the same 30 
minute interval as the insider trade.  
While individual regressions are estimated in the case of each insider trading episode, 
parameter estimates are averaged (after multiplying trading on negative information 
by -1, as this test estimates the magnitude of returns) and t-statistics are constructed
19
. 
One drawback of this methodology is that a smoothing effect takes place. Keim 
(1983) suggests a number of benefits that can accrue from averaging coefficients, 
including adjustments for size effects and seasonal returns. As a significant portion of 
the sample examined consists of stocks listed on AMEX and lower-cap NASDAQ 
stocks, averaging corrects for any biases introduced by low-frequency trading. 
Insider trades are examined in transaction time – allowing for the examination of the 
differential impact of insider trades to non-insider trades in the market. By comparing 
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 The factbooks are found on the exchanges’ respective websites. 
19
 Meulbroek (1992) uses this methodology. 
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the impact of insider trades to non-insider trades only in the same 30 minute trading 
interval, market characteristics and time of day effects are minimized. After 
segmenting the 30 minute trading interval into insider trades and non-insider trades, 
trade to trade price changes are calculated as the natural logarithm of the last trade 
divided by its predecessor.  
The final sample is slanted towards both NASDAQ shares (69%) and to news 
announcements involving mergers (45%). In addition, the sample has a bias towards 
‘good news’, that is, news that is expected to bolster a company’s share price20. The 
NASDAQ bias in the sample composition may lead to more ‘anonymous’ insider 
trades, due to market structure21.  
An insider trading ring in 2005 constitutes half of the sample. This ring (henceforth 
referred to as the LHV ring) was comprised of several Estonian financial market 
professionals who intercepted news releases prior to their public disclosure. 
Therefore, robustness tests are performed to ensure that the 2005 ring does not bias 
the results obtained for analysis. An additional cross-sectional regression is performed 
to examine the interaction of the ring with variables of interest. As none of the 
interaction variables is statistically significant, it is concluded that the ring does not 
affect the daily results22. The LHV ring traded on a variety of types of information 
(earnings, product announcements, mergers), and intraday analysis is not performed, 
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 This information encompasses merger offers, improvement on earnings forecast, and development 
of new products and contracts. In addition, as Meulbroek (1992) does, short sales’ abnormal return is 
multiplied by -1 to standardize returns. 
21
 Due to the competitive market maker system in NASDAQ, an oligopoly exists between a diffuse 
number of dealers, some of whom may be acting as quasi market-makers. Competitive effects 
between dealers/market makers and the diffusion of order flow and information is likely to cause 
NASDAQ market makers to react less dramatically than the specialist on NYSE/AMEX. Insiders may 
also split orders between various market makers.  
22
 Regression results are displayed in Appendix 2, showing that none of the LHV ring’s interactions are 
statistically significant.  
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because it is assumed that intraday analysis is not distorted by LHV trades due to the 
varied composition of LHV announcements.  
Separate analysis is not performed on direct insiders and tippees, the latter defined as 
those who received the insider information on which they traded from another party. 
As the nature of the information on which insiders and tippees traded is not different, 
results are not expected to be divergent, as the economic impact of the arrival of both 
types of information to the market is the same.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 displays the characteristics of the sample of examined insider trades, showing 
how many insider trades occurred in each year and how many securities in the sample 
were traded. 
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Table 2: Frequency of Insider Trading and Prosecution 
Table 2 sets out characteristics of the sample of insider trades examined in 
this chapter. Column 1 is the year of the trade, columns 2 and 3 are the 
number of trades and the percentage of the total sample of trades. The last 
two columns are the number of securities trades and their percentage of 
total securities. The trading ring of 2005 can be clearly seen in the trade 
spike23.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Year Number of 
securities 
traded 
Percentage of 
total securities 
traded 
Number of trades Percentage of 
total trades 
1998 1 1.96% 1 0.40% 
1999 3 5.88% 30 12.10% 
2000 6 11.76% 38 15.32% 
2001 4 7.84% 8 3.23% 
2002 3 5.88% 4 1.61% 
2003 2 3.92% 11 4.44% 
2004 4 7.84% 6 2.42% 
2005 22 43.14% 124 50.00% 
2006 6 11.76% 23 9.27% 
2007 2 3.92% 3 1.21% 
Total: 53  248  
 
Table 3 sets out the financial returns to trading by the insider, the number of securities 
traded, the average profit per security, and the profits of tippees and insiders. Profit 
gained is distinguished from loss avoided in that profit is defined as the acquisition or 
short sale of shares in which the insider did not have a prior position, and loss avoided 
is defined as an insider liquidating his existing position in shares due to 
                                                            
23
 Column 2 sums to 53, although 51 unique securities were traded, as two shares had multiple 
insider-trading episodes. 
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foreknowledge of negative news
24
. In the case when an insider liquidates his holdings 
and then sells shares short due to negative information, such behaviour can be 
categorised as both averting loss (on existing holdings in a firm) and gaining a profit 
(in further shorts after holdings sold). In general, losses averted were larger than profit 
gained due to the nature of the cases – while the minimum profit gained was $340, the 
minimum loss averted was $35,088.08. The high standard deviation reflects variation 
in the sample, as several insiders traded into the millions. Where the SEC did not 
decompose profits of an insider trading ring individually, it is treated as one episode. 
While the mean number of securities traded is 1.67, the median insider trades 1 
security, primarily due to the fact that most insiders are privy only to material non-
public information on the nature of their own company. The most prolific insider 
traded in 14 securities. Insiders generated more financial gain than tippees, but that is 
driven by two outliers in the sample driven by parties with a multi-million dollar 
position in the securities gaining profit or liquidating positions.  
 
                                                            
24
 Some transactions include both an avoidance of a loss on shares (selling existing shares in a 
company with a pending negative news announcement) and a profit (short selling more shares on the 
same announcement). Table 3 pools those proceeds separately for purpose of analysis. 
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Table 3: Insiders' Returns per Episode 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the sample examined in this chapter. As some insider rings involve multiple trades in a single 
security, the 60 events examined occur in 51 securities, and N represents the number of incidents in each category. Profit gained 
encompasses both buy-and-hold as well as shorting strategies for capitalizing on insider information, while loss avoided represents an 
insider who sold existing shares to avoid a decrease in price. Therefore, some episodes include multiple trades which are both avoidance 
of loss and a gain of profit. Number of Securities Traded represents how many securities were traded by an insider. Average profit per 
security represents the average profit gained or loss avoided by an insider in a single security.  Trades are categorized as insider profit if 
they were executed by a corporate insider privy to confidential information, or as tippee profit if they were executed by someone who was 
informed by another inside the corporation. 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N 
Total Profit Gained $178,951 $59,380 $369,446 $340 $2,425,000 53 
Total Loss Avoided $528,140 $122,086 $765,274 $35,088 $1,938,465 7 
No. of Securities Traded 1.67 1.00 2.33 1.00 14.00 51 
Average Profit/Security $278,020 $86,612 $553,313 $16,683 $2,425,000  
Tippee profit $100,401 $58,066 $96,395 $1,969 $259,525 22 
Insider profit $269,082 $72,594 $522,243 $340 $2,425,000 38 
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Table 4 presents the incidence of insider trading days relative to news announcements 
and the public disclosure of the information traded upon. In this case again, several 
cases involving insider trading ‘rings’ (constituting a group of defendants who shared 
privileged information) lead to a median number of days on which insiders trade as 
1.8 days per episode, although the median number of trading days is one. Similarly, 
insiders trade on average nine days before the announcement, although this is skewed 
by some corporate insiders trading as far as 117 days in advance. Insiders who trade 
repeatedly in the same episode tend not to trade on subsequent days – instead, they 
split their trades three to nine days apart in most cases. One cannot discern as to 
whether this is a masking strategy on the part of the insider or whether he needs to 
raise further capital to effect purchases. On average, there are five news days per 
insider case, but due to the lack of objective definition of news days in the insider 
trading literature, it is hard to compare this result with prior literature. 
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Table 4: Incidence of Insider Trading and News Announcements 
Table 4 details the frequency of trading around news announcements. Panel A displays how many days on which the insider traded of the 
150 days prior to the public announcement of the information, and how many news days existed in those 150. Panel B shows the timing 
on insider trades, both how many days prior to the public announcement of the news the insider traded on, and in the case of multiple 
trades, the number of days between insider trades. Minimum and Maximum represent the minimum and maximum values for each 
category. 
 
 Panel A: Number of Days Panel B: Timing of Trade 
 
Insider Trading 
Days 
News Days 
Number of Days before 
Public Announcement 
Number of Days 
between Trades 
Mean 1.80 5.45 9.16 7.14 
Standard Error 0.26 0.44 2.35 1.20 
Median 1.00 5.00 1.00 3.00 
Minimum 1 1 88 1 
Maximum 10 17 0 71 
 72
4. Results  
4.1 Daily Analysis and Results 
This chapter initially tests hypothesis 1.1 that returns on days insiders trade are not 
statistically different from those on which the insiders do not trade, when accounting 
for news days. Table 5 illustrates that returns on the days insiders trade are 
significant at the 1% level, with a t-statistic of 3.3, and thus, hypothesis 1.1 can be 
rejected, because returns on days insiders trade are significantly different than on 
other days. However, whether this is attributable to the insider or to ‘falsely informed 
traders’ who enter the market perceiving the presence of an informed trader is at 
issue, and will be evaluated in the intraday analysis. One must examine whether 
volume is different on the days that insiders trade to discern whether abnormal 
returns are due to insiders or to a higher trading volume on those days. When looking 
at types of information on which insiders traded, returns on negative earnings is the 
only statistically significant subset, with a t-statistic of 1.89, indicating significance 
at the 10% level, as insiders sell shares on the expectation of a decline in share value 
upon the public announcement of the information. Due to the lack of significance for 
certain subsets of news on announcement days such as positive earnings, the 
statistical significance of returns on negative earnings appears to be an artefact of the 
data. Interestingly enough, the days on which insiders trade on takeover 
announcements is not statistically significant. This is potentially due to insiders 
trading sufficiently in advance of mergers that there is no media speculation, or due 
to the fact that any subsequent price run-up due to information leakage is in fact 
triggered by their trades. As this study finds that merger announcements lead to the 
most statistically significant returns (at the 5% level), it is surprising that insiders 
trading on merger information do not move the price, and may indicate that they are 
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trading in a stealthy manner to minimise market impact. Other forms of news 
announcements did not produce a statistically significant result in terms of returns. 
This chapter proceeds to test hypothesis 1.2 - that volume net of insider trading is not 
statistically different on days when insiders trade than on other days using regression 
2.2. Volume net of insider trading is defined as the natural logarithm of the 
difference between daily volume and the number of shares in which the insider 
transacted, and is represented by NetInsider.
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Table 5 – Daily Returns on Insider Trading 
Table 5 shows parameter estimates for Rit=α + β1Indext + β2Announcementit + β3Insiderit + Σβ4Newsit  + εit. News coefficients are not reported. Negative 
events were multiplied by -1 to assess directional impacts of insider trading. The dataset was winsorized for outliers at the 5% level. Averages for the entire 
sample as well as segments based upon the news traded on are displayed. T-Statistics are in brackets. The values reported are averages for individual 
regressions pooled on type of announcement. 
 
All 
Takeover 
Related 
Negative 
Earnings 
Positive 
Earnings 
Miscellaneous good 
news 
Miscellaneous bad 
news 
Intercept 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.01 
 
(1.08) (0.61) (-0.02) (0.35) (-0.86) (0.44) 
Index 0.89 1 0.17 0.95 0.01 0.92 
 
(1.24) (0.69) (1.04) (0.39) (0.13) (0.5) 
Announcement 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.13 
 
(5.46)*** (2.90)** (1.86)* (1.68) (1.92)* (2.19)* 
Insider 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 
(3.30)*** (1.77) (1.89)* (1.03) (1.66) (1.33) 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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This chapter finds highly statistically significant volume and volume net of insider 
trading on days when insiders are present in the market, as volume on days insiders 
trade has a t-statistic of 4.59, indicating significance on a 1% level, while volume net 
of insider trading has a t-statistic of 3.57, indicating significance on a 1% level. Table 
6 displays the results of the test. Therefore, hypothesis 1.2 - that volume net of insider 
trading is not statistically significantly different on days when insiders trade than on 
other days - is rejected. As expected, volume is statistically significant on the day of 
the announcement of the news on which the insider traded. Volume on the day on 
which the insider traded is statistically significant for all sub-categories of insider 
information except for negative earnings. The lack of statistical significance in that 
subcategory may be driven by its composition involving a number of cases where the 
insider traded the day before the announcement. 
Volume net of insider trading could be interpreted as Cornell and Sirri (1992)’s 
falsely informed traders entrance into the market upon the perception of an order 
imbalance instigated by the insider, and interpreting that as a change in the 
fundamental value of the firm.  These results contrast with previous studies in that 
Meulbroek (1992) shows significance in every scenario except for abnormal volume, 
when neither insiders are trading nor news is released, and uses that to argue that 
insiders are the marginal traders directly accountable for abnormal volume on days of 
insider trading. However, in the current sample, as abnormal volume net of insider 
volume is significant at the 1% level, clearly the insider is not the sole party 
demanding additional liquidity on days on insider trading days. This may reflect 
greater trend following or an increased sophistication in financial participants’ 
perception of incremental volume, creating a herding effect. Interestingly, abnormal 
return is not significant in the current sample, whilst it is in Meulbroek’s. This may be 
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accountable to the difference in market structure, as a majority of this chapter’s 
sample is comprised of NASDAQ (dealer) shares, while Meulbroek’s sample is 
driven by specialist market shares. This is in line with Glosten and Milgrom (1987); 
Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992); and Garfinkel and Nimelandran (2003), 
who argue that the specialist uses the spread as a means to protect against predation 
from informed traders. The results straddle the discoveries of Meulbroek (1992) and 
Cornell and Sirri (1992) because although insider activity is responsible for a large 
proportion of the marginal volume on insider trading days (30%), there remains an 
additional 8% of trading activity above that on days lacking insider trading or news 
that is unexplained. These may be the ‘falsely informed traders’ attracted to the 
market by the prospect of high returns and the perception of momentum in the market. 
Alternatively, these could be other informed traders trading on their judgment as to 
the nature of forthcoming news in the target company.
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Table 6: Volume Changes around Insider Trading 
Table 6 shows parameter estimates of ln(volit) = α + β1ln(volmt) + β2ln(volit-1) + β3ln(volit-2) + β4Mondayit + β5Tuesdayit+ β6Wednesdayit + β7Thursdayit+ β8Announcementit 
+ β9Insiderit +β10NetInsiderit  + Σβ11Newsit + εit.. Lag1 and Lag2 represent ln(volit-1) and ln(volit-2) respectively. The dataset was winsorized for outliers at the 5% level. 
Averages for the entire sample as well as segments based upon the news traded on are displayed. T-statistics are in brackets. The values reported are averages for individual 
regressions pooled on type of announcement. 
 
All 
Takeover 
Related 
Negative Earnings 
Positive 
Earnings 
Miscellaneous good 
news 
Miscellaneous bad 
news 
Intercept 1.01 -9.38 5.34 -2.05 2.47 16.10 
(0.19) (-1.24) (0.95) (-0.46) (0.41) (0.75) 
Exchange 
volume 
0.53 0.38 0.59 1.02 0.66 0.32 
(3.87)*** (1.52) (7.32)*** (9.38)*** (3.90)*** (0.65) 
Lag1 0.07 0.28 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 
(0.62) (1.46) (0.01) (-1.28) (0.02) (-0.26) 
Lag2 -0.03 0.32 -0.23 0.00 -0.19 -0.37 
(-0.38) (1.72) (-1.94)* (0.00) (-1.19) (-1.64) 
Monday 
-0.04 -0.12 -0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.03 
(-1.51) (-1.75) (-2.0)* (1.21) (-0.63) (0.60) 
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Tuesday 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.10 
(0.21) (-0.24) (-2.24)* (0.68) (-0.23) (0.76) 
Wednesday -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 
(-1.62) (-0.81) (-1.44) (0.68) (-0.80) (-0.88) 
Thursday -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
(-0.81) (-0.33) (-2.19)* (0.49) (-0.47) (-0.23) 
Announcement 1.94 3.22 1.24 0.69 1.35 1.59 
(9.33)*** (7.55)*** (2.90)** (4.15)*** (4.93)*** (4.95)*** 
Insider 0.66 0.72 0.43 0.64 0.46 0.93 
(4.59)*** (2.40)* (1.74) (6.60)*** (1.89)* (2.23)** 
NetInsider 0.47 0.26 0.34 0.63 0.38 0.88 
(3.57)*** (1.17) (1.25) (6.76)*** (1.44) (2.13)* 
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
0.24 0.26 0.17 0.28 0.21 0.26 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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4.2 Intraday Analysis 
Having investigated the daily impact of insider trading, this chapter progresses to 
examine the intraday impact of insider trades. As per the data section, trades are 
identified from intraday trade and quote files by time stamps as cited in the SEC’s 
complaint. Trade to trade returns are computed, and then t-tests are performed to 
measure the difference of insider trade lot sizes and trade to trade returns from their 
non-insider peers in the same 30-minute interval. T-tests are also used to determine 
statistical significance of means of insider trades lot sizes and returns. The Lee and 
Ready (1993) algorithm is used to determine whether a trade was buyer-initiated or 
seller-initiated. The mean and median trade values for the pooled sample of insider 
trades, as well as the mean and medians for NYSE insider trade lot sizes, fit into 
Barclay and Warner’s (1993) definition of ‘medium sized trades’, trades in lot sizes 
between 500 and 1,000 shares. As Barclay and Warner found that category to be 
instrumental to price formation, the insider trades  are thus ‘stealth trades’, those 
trades that move prices but are not immediately noticeable. The results of the test of 
hypothesis 2.1- that insider trades are not statistically different from surrounding 
trades in terms from price movement - are displayed in table 7.  
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Table 7: Intraday Returns to Insiders and Non-insiders 
Table 7 presents trade-to-trade returns on both insider trades and non-insider trades in 
the same 30-minute interval measured as point estimates. It presents the average returns 
for insiders and non-insiders, their difference, and a t-statistic from a Wilcoxon rank sum 
test. Table 7 also presents the average price at which the insider traded as a percent of 
the price at the opening point of the 30-minute interval. Trade-to-trade returns are 
calculated as the log differential of prices.  
Panel A: Trade-to-Trade Returns to Insiders  
 Average Trade to 
Trade Return for 
Insider 
Average Trade to  
Trade Return for  
Non-insiders 
Difference T-stat 
Mean 0.002 0.000 0.002 3.42*** 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Standard Error 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 
Panel B: Trade to Trade Returns (Percentage of Opening Price) 
 Average Trade to 
Trade Return for 
Insider as %age of 
opening price 
Average Trade to  
Trade Return for  
Non-Insiders as a 
%age of  
opening price 
Difference T-stat 
Mean (percent) 100.10% 100.07% 0.03% 2.04** 
Median (percent) 100.00% 100.01% 0.00%  
Standard Error 0.19% 0.21% -0.02%  
** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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With a t-statistic of 3.42, hypothesis 2.1 is rejected, as 3.42 is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. In terms of percentage of the average daily volume, a t-statistic of of 
2.06 is still significant at the 5% level, implying that insider trades are statistically 
significantly different from surrounding trades in terms of trade-to-trade price 
movement. Despite the statistical significance of returns, there is no economic sign in 
this outcome, given the very marginal trade-to-trade price changes, as the average 
insider trade-to-trade return is 0, when rounding to 2 decimal points. Results for 
hypothesis 3.1 are in table 8, to discern whether insider trades are statistically 
different from surrounding trades in the same 30-minute interval in terms of both lot 
sizes traded as well as trade to trade price movements. Aggressive insiders would be 
expected to utilize market orders to ensure maximum likelihood of execution, 
therefore, between theory that a specialist reacts by increasing the spread in the 
presence of an informed trader and the nature of a market order to ‘walk the book’ to 
execute, Table 8 displays median and mean values for trade lots for insider and non-
insider transactions25 within the 30-minute interval in which the insider transacts.  
                                                            
25
 These are not order sizes, but trade lot sizes; an order can be executed in several sequential (or 
non-sequential, in the case of limit orders) trades.  
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Table 8 : Intraday Trading Volume 
Table 8 provides aggregate statistics for insider trades and non-insider trades that 
occurred in the same 30-minute interval.  It catalogues both the absolute number of 
lot sizes for insider trades and those not executed by insiders. It also displays the 
difference between the statistics as well as a Wilcoxon t-test to indicate difference. 
Panel A : Trade Size (Shares) 
Trade Size (Shares) Average Trade 
Size by Insider 
Average 
Trade Size 
by Non-
Insiders 
Difference T-Statistic 
Mean 1030.76 657.45 373.30 1.71* 
Median 411.20 348.36 62.84  
Standard Error 273.85 165.42 108.43  
     
Panel B :Trade Size (% of Average Daily Volume) 
 Average Trade 
Size by Insider 
Average 
Trade Size 
by Non-
Insiders 
Difference T-Statistic 
Mean as % of Average 
Daily Volume 
0.115 0.073 0.042 1.71* 
Median as % of 
Average Daily Volume 
0.046 0.039 0.007  
Standard Error as % of 
Average Daily Volume 
0.030 0.019 0.011  
* indicates significance at a 10% level. 
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The difference in the median size of trade lots is not significant at the 10% level. 
However, the difference in the mean lot is significant at the 5% level. This indicates 
that while most trades are not noticeably different from surrounding trades, insiders 
occasionally transact in disproportionately large lots. Therefore, hypothesis 3.1 is 
rejected, as insider trades are statistically significantly larger than surrounding trades, 
on average.  One could attribute this to naive or foolish insiders skewing the result, 
although the average insider trades in a more sophisticated manner. However, as a 
proportion of average daily volume (calculated over the 30 days prior to the insider 
trade), insiders’ mean transactions represent one-tenth of 1%, so although insiders 
may occasionally transact in large lots, they by no means represent a large amount of 
the daily turnover, and thus, it is unlikely that any order imbalance that may spur the 
influx of falsely informed traders seeking to capitalise on what they perceive as a 
change in valuation fundamentals is unlikely. Combining this finding with the 
discovery that 8% of abnormal volume net of inside volume on insider days is 
unexplained may be consistent with Cornell and Sirri’s (1992) hypothesis that falsely 
informed traders enter the market when inside traders are present. This is also 
consistent with Fishe and Robe’s (2002) finding that there is a marginal increase in 
volume on days that insiders are present – 9.2% in their case, 8% in the case of this 
chapter.  This behaviour may also be due to daily trend followers and momentum 
traders entering the market when perceiving that there is increased activity.  
Hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3 test the nature of trade-to-trade returns on both NYSE/AMEX 
and NASDAQ relative to peer trades in the same 30-minute interval to discern 
whether insiders spur price changes in an abnormal fashion or if they are 
indistinguishable from liquidity traders. Glosten and Milgrom (1987) and Benveniste, 
Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) infer that a specialist will increase the spread in the 
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presence of an informed trader, and therefore, one would expect specialist-based 
exchanges such as the NYSE and AMEX to have a higher price change than a dealer 
exchange such as NASDAQ, as the specialist is able to detect the presence of the 
informed trader and will thus raise the spread.  
An overall look at intraday returns in Table 9 displays that the returns to insider trades 
are highly significant only in the case of NYSE, with a t-statistic of 2.85, leading to 
significance at a 1% level. Therefore, hypothesis 2.2 is not rejected - that insider 
trades on NYSE are statistically significantly different from surrounding trades in 
terms of trade to trade price movements. Hypothesis 2.3 is also not rejected - that 
NASDAQ insider trades are not statistically significantly different from surrounding 
trades in terms of price-to-price movement. As lot sizes are statistically insignificantly 
different from surrounding trades under all market structure regimes, hypothesis 3.1 
and 3.2 are not rejected.
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Table 9 : Intraday Volume and Returns by Market Structure 
Table 9 presents trade sizes and trade-to-trade returns segmented by the type of exchange on which they trade. Specialist exchanges 
(NYSE and AMEX) are examined separately from dealer exchanges. It presents the average returns for insiders and non-insiders, as well 
as their difference and a t-statistic from a Wilcoxon rank sum test. Table 9 also examines trade lot sizes by market structure, displaying 
descriptive statistics and the result of a Wilcoxon rank sum test for the difference in lot size. Trade-to-trade returns are calculated as the 
log differential of prices. 
Panel A: Trade Sizes by Market Structure 
Trade Size (Shares) - NASDAQ Average Trade Size/Insider Average Trade Size/Non-Insider Difference T-Statistic 
Mean 947.36 425.38 521.98 0.34 
Median 363.64 348.85 14.78  
Standard Error 225.55 92.04 133.51  
Mean as % of Average Daily Volume 0.089 0.039 0.05  
Median as % of Average Daily Volume 0.034 0.033 0.001  
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Trade Size (Shares) - NYSE & AMEX Average Trade 
Size/Insider 
Average Trade Size/Non-
Insider 
Difference T-Statistic 
Mean 1143.66 1069.53 74.14 1.52 
Median 500.00 329.76 170.24  
Standard Error 327.39 278.99 48.40  
Mean as % of Average Daily Volume 0.191 0.179 0.012  
Median as % of Average Daily Volume 0.084 0.055 0.029  
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Panel B: Trade-to-Trade Returns by Market Structure 
Returns (NASDAQ) Average T2T 
Return/Insider 
Average T2T Return/ Non-
insider 
Difference T-Statistic 
Mean 0.002 0.000 0.002 1.62 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Standard Error 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Returns (NYSE & AMEX) Average T2T 
Return/Insider 
Average T2T Return Non-
insider 
Difference T-Statistic 
Mean 0.001 0.000 0.001 2.85*** 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Standard Error 0.000 0.000 0.000  
*** indicates significance at a 1% level.     
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Two possible explanations can be drawn from for the significance of trade-to-trade price 
movements on NYSE/AMEX – in models of informed trading, the specialist raises the cost of 
liquidity when he believes an informed trader may be present in the market – in this 
circumstance, the insider is accepting the additional cost of liquidity (in terms of higher 
spreads) and is therefore causing a larger price impact. As mentioned, this holds with Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985), Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) and Garfinkel and 
Nimelandran (2003). However, this could be an artefact of trade size, although the lack of 
significance for the difference between NYSE insider trades and non-insider trades argues 
against that, as NASDAQ trade lot sizes resemble surrounding trades, yielding a t-statistic of 
0.34. Therefore, the specialist may be adjusting his spread based on the size of the trade 
alone, as opposed to any other characteristics which may allow him to determine that it may 
be an informed trade. On the other hand, the lack of significance of NYSE/AMEX insider 
trades to non-insider trades argues against that phenomenon. Due to the relative anonymity 
on NASDAQ, the insider does not generate statistically significant abnormal returns relative 
to non-insider trades when he opts to trade. However, specialist system (NYSE + AMEX) 
insider traders have a return significant at the 1% level, which either indicates aggression or 
willingness to move through several levels of the order book to purchase the quantity desired 
and pay the requisite liquidity premium, or indicates that the specialist is adjusting the spread 
to compensate for the perception of an insider in the market. An exogenous factor that cannot 
be tested for is the relative use of limit versus market orders. Cornell and Sirri’s (1992) case 
study shows that in their sample, 10 out of 78 (12.8%) of orders are limit orders. As limit 
orders will presumably have a lesser price impact than market orders, it is possible that 
differential use of orders on both exchanges impacts trade-to-trade price returns.  
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This chapter proceeds to test hypotheses 3.4 and 4, whether the insider trades differ from 
other parties with similar trade initiators (that is, comparing insider buyer-initated trades with 
non-insider buyer-initated trades, and insider seller-initated trades with non-insider seller-
initated trades). The Lee and Ready (1992) algorithm is used to determine the party initiating 
trades – this analysis is performed in case the insider traders, potentially using market orders, 
are compared against limit orders. The algorithm uses three methods to classify trades as 
either buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. If a trade takes place above the midpoint of the bid-
ask spread, it is classified as buyer-initiated (likewise, if the trade takes place below the 
midpoint, it is seller-initiated). If a trade takes place at the midpoint, it is either buyer (seller) 
initiated depending upon whether it is higher (or lower) than the previous transaction price. 
Similarly, if the trade both equals the midpoint price as well as the previous transaction price, 
it is classified as buyer (seller) initiated depending on whether it is greater (or lesser) than the 
last different trading price.  One can conceive a buyer-initiated insider trades as a market 
order and seller-initiated trades as limit orders. Hypotheses 3.4 and 4 compare buyer-initiated 
trades by insiders with uninformed buyer-initiated trades and seller-initiated trades by 
insiders with uninformed sell-initiated trades, to determine whether insider trades are singular 
in this respect. Table 10 shows t-tests of insider trades against non-insider trades paired with 
the same initiating party. Of the sample of trades, 49 are buyer-initiated by an insider, 11 are 
seller-initiated by an insider (limit orders), 31 are buyer-initiated, but not-initiated by an 
insider, and 10 are seller-initiated, but not initiated by an insider. 
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Table 10 - Buyer/Seller Initiated Trade Characteristics 
Table 10 displays insider trades compared with non-insider trades of the same initiation within the same 30-minute interval. The Lee and 
Ready (1992) algorithm is used to determine whether trades are buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. Initiated by Insider details the 
characteristics of the insider trades which the algorithm determines are buyer-initiated in the case of insiders buying, and seller-initiated in 
the case of insider selling. These can be conceived as market orders. The returns and volume under Not Initiated by Insider are insider 
trades that are either seller-initiated buys or buyer-initiated sells, which can be conceived as limit orders. Non-insider displays returns to 
non-insider trades in the same 30-minute interval. 
 Initiated by Insider Not Initiated By Insider 
Returns Buying T-stat Selling T-stat Buying T-stat Selling T-stat Non-
insider 
Mean 0.002 3.33** -0.001 -1.05 0.002 1.83 0.00 0.41 0.000 
Median 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.00  0.000 
Standard Error 0.000  0.001  0.001  0.00  0.000 
          
Difference Between Opening Price 
and Trading Price (in percent) 
Buying T-stat Selling T-stat Buying T-stat Selling T-stat Non-
insider 
Mean 0.32% 1.59 -1.23% -0.96 0.04% 0.17 0.14% 0.51 0.07% 
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Median 0.04% 0.20 0.00%  -0.08% -0.30 -0.01% -0.04 0.01% 
Standard Error 0.20%  1.29%  0.27%  0.28%  0.21% 
          
Intraday Volume          
Trade Size (Shares) Buying T-stat Selling T-stat Buying T-stat Selling T-stat Non-
insider 
Mean 985.68 5.14*** 2614.26 1.17 635.75 3.53*** 734.31 1.54 657.45 
Median 500.00 2.60*** 434.38 0.19 341.94 1.90 231.45 0.49 348.36 
Standard Error 191.59  2238.94  180.10  475.49  165.42 
Trade Size (% of Average Daily 
Volume) 
Buying T-stat Selling T-stat Buying T-stat Selling T-stat Non-
insider 
Mean as % of Average Daily Volume 0.21% 5.14*** 0.37% 1.17 0.04% 3.53*** 0.12% 1.54 0.0733 
Median as % of Average Daily Volume 0.11% 2.60*** 0.06% 0.19 0.02% 1.9 0.04% 0.49 0.0389 
Standard Error as % of Average Daily 
Volume 
0.04%  0.31%  0.01%  0.08%  0.0185 
N 49  11  31  10   
*** indicates significance at a 1% level. 
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Out of these categories, the only significant one is trade size for buyer-initiated insider trades 
and seller-initiated insider trades, with respective t-stats of 5.14 and 3.53, significant at the 
1% level.  Therefore, hypothesis 3.4 and 4 can be rejected, as insider trades are distinct from 
trades with the same initiating party. This would imply that the insiders move prices 
disproportionately, to a degree that that non-insider aggressive buy and sell orders do not 
move prices.  One can conclude that aggressive insiders trading in significant volume will 
stand out from the crowd sufficiently to be potentially detected, but other insiders may not 
strongly affect price changes, as seen in Chakravarty and McConnell (1997, 1999). 
For the entire sample, mean returns to insider trades are positive and significant at the 1% 
level (see Table 7). Table 10 segments the sample and finds that this return is driven by 
buyer-initiated insider ‘buy’ trades, and that buyer-initiated insider ‘sell’ trades and seller-
initiated insider trades are not statistically significant in terms of trade-to-trade price 
movement. This may be linked to buyer-initiated insider ‘buy’ trades executing in larger lot 
sides than comparative non-insider trades (significant at the 1% level, with a t-statistic of 
5.14). However, seller-initiated insider ‘buy’ trades also execute in a statistically significantly 
larger size than comparable trades (significant at the 1% level, with a t-statistic of 3.53), but 
do not move prices in a statistically significant sense. It is also worth noting that the median 
buyer-initiated ‘buy’ trade is significant at the 1% level, with a t-statistic of 2.60. 
Intraday analysis is used to assess whether insiders have a differential impact from non-
insider trades sharing their characteristics, and assists, as it both controls for market 
conditions and allows one to see the immediate impact of insider entrance into the market. 
While Chakravarty and McConnell (1997,1999) found that Ivan Boesky’s insider trades had a 
relationship with volume two hours after he traded, that finding could be idiosyncratic. Using 
a sample of 53 trades allows for robust examination as to the intraday impact of insiders’ 
activity in markets, as it controls for time of day effects and any economic activity that may 
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take place throughout the day in the market. In addition, intraday analysis allows one to test 
whether Glosten and Milgram’s (1985) theoretical findings of specialists compensating for 
the adverse selection problem posed by insider activity in the markets is found in empirical 
results. As this chapter has shown very pronounced activity (both in terms of volume as well 
as trade-to-trade price returns) around the presence of an insider, one can see this as empirical 
support for Glosten and Milgram (1985).
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The data is admittedly an imperfect set, due to the inherent selection bias in examining only 
the trades in which the insider is detected. There is furthermore an inherent evidentiary bias 
because the aspects of insider trading that the SEC detects must meet a certain threshold for 
successful prosecution – examples of suspicious behaviour in which the insider was not 
ultimately prosecuted, such as consent decrees, are unavailable. 
An additional note is that those insiders who were financial markets professionals (broadly 
defined as brokers, lawyers, and bankers) performed transactions that were not as noticeable 
in daily and intraday behaviour as individuals less familiar with financial markets. This may 
be due to financial markets professionals’ awareness of surveillance and insider trading 
regulation, so they may trade more strategically to attempt to avoid detection. 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter discovers that on average, insider trades do possess attributes that differentiate 
them from surrounding trades, but a great deal of those attributes depend on the trade 
characteristics – aggressive market orders will draw scrutiny due to their price impact, 
whereas limit orders are less noticeable. Insiders trade lot sizes that are also larger than other 
market participants at the time, thereby potentially drawing attention from regulators and 
surveillance departments.  
The results confirm the anonymity hypothesis of Glosten and Milgram (1985) and Garfinkel 
and Nimelandran (2003), displaying the strong impact of the specialist in regulating fluid 
market performance. However, insider trading on NASDAQ is significant, yet not to the 
degree that it is on specialist markets, due to the ability of the specialist to protect herself 
against uncontrolled loss to the insider. An investigation of this impact using foreign markets 
with similar structures would be of interest. The results further imply that order type matters, 
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but without a database of illegal insider trades sorted by order time, one cannot confirm this 
hypothesis. In addition, characteristics of the insider, such as profession, may affect their 
trading practices.   
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Appendix 1: A Historical Overview of US Insider Trading Legislation 
The Securities Act of 1933 and its companion, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
inaugurated enforcement of market abuse in the United States. Originally crafted to focus on 
bucket shops and stock promoter rings, the Act was modified by Rule 10-b5 to respond to 
market practices the SEC judged as prejudicial. Rule 10-b5 (1942) targeted fraudulent 
practices by insiders. Most of the cases the SEC has litigated on insider trading have resulted 
from Rule 10-b5’s authority. However, subsequent judicial holdings by courts have expanded 
this prohibition from insiders to anyone in possession of ‘material non-public information’. 
Materiality of the information is most commonly defined as information that would influence 
any potential purchase or sale of securities, while non-public information is that which is 
unavailable to the general public26. Courts have established a rather subjective and 
encompassing view of materiality, and most of the discussion has hinged upon the obligation 
of defendants to either refrain from trading or to disclose the information to the public, as 
determined in SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Corp (1968). 
Legal thought on insider trading rests on two key principles: the misappropriation principle 
and unjust enrichment. The former treats information as a form of property, and accordingly, 
an insider using information as the pretext for trading is ‘stealing’ that information from his 
employer, to whom he owes a duty. Courts affirmed this principle in United States v 
O’Hagan (1997), a case in which an attorney advising a company in the pursuit of a takeover 
bought shares in the target. Despite O’Hagan’s assertion that he was not engaged by the 
target, and therefore did not owe it a duty, the Supreme Court found that he had 
misappropriated the information from his client by using it for a purpose that it was not 
                                                            
26
 Regulation FD has subsequently changed this by prohibiting the selective release of non-public information 
to individuals such as securities analysts and institutions.  
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intended. This overturned the precedent set by United States v. Chiarella (1980), where a 
prospectus printer’s possession of material non-public information was not held to be 
criminal27. The misappropriation doctrine also brings tippees under the cover of the law, as 
they are in receipt of improperly acquired ‘property’. Meanwhile, unjust enrichment doctrine 
holds that if one gains assets through no effort of his own, he should repay those assets to the 
rightful owner. Insider trading can be viewed as unjust enrichment because the insider’s 
benefit at the cost of the counterparty to his trade, who is oblivious of the impact of this 
information on the securities’ future value. Unjust enrichment is used as a legal basis for 
requiring disgorgement of any gain on insider trading.  
The SEC’s enforcement of insider trading allows for bounties to be paid to informants from 
civil penalties assessed to guilty insider traders up to 10% of the penalty. This form of 
detection is supplemented by referrals from both exchange operators and the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA). As the successor of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, FINRA has authority under the Securities Exchange Act to function as a 
self-regulatory organization supervising all firms and individuals engaged in business with 
the public. As part of that function, FINRA monitors securities markets for suspicious 
behaviour, which it reports to the SEC for further investigation that may lead to prosecution. 
 
 
                                                            
27
 The Supreme Court did not entertain the misappropriation theory, because it had not been put forth by 
prosecutors. See  ‘Insider Trading and the Duty Analysis’, a speech by SEC Commissioner James Treadway 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1980/1983_0602_TreadwayChiarella.pdf 
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Appendix 2: Robustness Test for 2005 and LHV Results 
Appendix 2 examines whether the composition of the sample biases the results found in regression 3.1. Regression 3.1 is estimated twice, with 
an additional dummy variable for cases occurring in 2005, and then with a dummy variable representing those cases in which the LHV ring 
transacted in. Parameter estimates for each of the coefficients are presented. 
Panel A: 2005 
Intercept Index News1 News2 Announcement Insider Not2005 R-Squared 
Parameter 
Estimate -0.0004 1.1211 0.0140 0.0264 0.1418 -0.0171 0.0206 0.0004 
Standard Error 0.0121 1.0325 0.1059 0.1108 0.1060 0.0847 0.0166 
p-value (0.9765) (0.2776) (0.8951) (0.8115) (0.1809) (0.8400) (0.2147) 
Panel B: LHV Ring 
Intercept Index News1 News2 Announcement Insider Not2005 R-Squared 
Parameter 
Estimate 0.0001 1.1522 0.0173 0.0289 0.1407 -0.0187 0.0226 0.0004 
Standard Error 0.0114 1.0324 0.1059 0.1107 0.1060 0.0847 0.0166 
p-value (0.9958) (0.2644) (0.8700) (0.7942) (0.1843) (0.8251) (0.1739) 
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Chapter Four: 
Price Discovery in Liquid British Stocks after the Advent of 
MiFID and Chi-X28 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2007, the European Commission instituted the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID), a public policy measure intended to establish a pan-European market for shares.  
Introducing a ‘passport’ function for clearing and settlement plus a best execution mandate, 
MiFID proved to be a catalyst for the growth of new multilateral trading facilities (MTFs). 
MTFs are designed to serve a fast-growing breed of technological traders who rely heavily on 
computer algorithms and other techniques demanding low latency. As MTFs proliferated in 
2007-2008, European order flow fragmented on those national exchanges previously subject 
to a concentration rule. When fragmentation occurred in response to Reg NMS in the US, 
price discovery migrated away from the central exchange.  In contrast, the introduction of 
MiFID had no such comparable effects on the price discovery process in London, as the 
majority of price discovery remained on the London Stock Exchange.  Instead, seven months 
later, after a clearing and settlement fee schedule change by Chi-X, the bulk of price 
discovery moved to Chi-X. This is due to the migration of informed trades attributable to the 
transfer of high frequency traders to Chi-X from the London Stock Exchange.    
In preparation for MiFID, Chi-X, an exchange developed from the private institutional 
network Instinet Europe, launched seven months prior to the implementation of MiFID.    
Chi-X aimed to capitalise on investors’ abilities to trade on non-national exchanges after the 
                                                            
28
 A version of this chapter focusing on the empirical methodology of Harris, McInish, and Wood (2009) is 
currently a working paper with Frederick DeB. Harris and Michael J. Aitken. A copy of this paper is in Appendix 
1 of this chapter. 
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abolition of the concentration rule. Furthermore, MiFID’s regulatory obligation to make 
traders find ‘best execution’ stimulated competition in the provision of liquidity, and thus in 
the order flow fragmentation across exchanges (European Commission, 2004). MiFID’s 
changes to European public policy provided a business case for Chi-X, as prior to that, 
trading was either on the national exchange (London Stock Exchange) or on upstairs 
institutional platforms. In addition to capitalizing on the potential opportunities offered by 
new cross-border trading within Europe, Chi-X focused on capturing market share by 
offering trading services better suited to a growing number of technological and 
computerized traders focused on both low latency (thus, a higher speed of transaction with 
the concurrent lower probability of failure to execute or being front-run by a competitor) and 
the related reduction in execution and transactions costs resulting from the entrance of a 
competitor into the trading services market. With the public interest necessity offering a 
higher standard of protection to retail investors as opposed to institutional investors, Chi-X 
had lower operative costs due to lower compliance burdens. Additionally, Chi-X perceived an 
opportunity to compete with existing exchanges through not only transactions costs, but also 
‘implicit’ trading costs such as clearing and settlement costs. Chi-X targeted market 
participants like High Frequency Traders, whose business models tend to involve 
accumulating very small inefficiencies in market pricing and frequently trading on them to 
produce a significant aggregate profit. As High Frequency Traders must pay trading costs in 
terms of both explicit execution costs and implicit trading fees, they are highly sensitive to 
these marginal costs. This chapter investigates how Chi-X’s entry into the market, catalysed 
by MiFID, as well as how the concurrent emergence of this style of traders, altered the 
formation of prices among European exchanges. 
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MiFID was officially implemented throughout the European Union by national authorities on        
1 November 2007. Prior to that date, the concentration rule in many European countries 
mandated exchange-located trading.  Although there was no concentration rule in the UK, the 
Netherlands, or Germany, fragmentation prior to MiFID in these three markets was 
minimal29. The diminution of existing monopoly power took two forms – increased 
competition via competitive liquidity provision on other existing European exchanges (for 
example, German insurers made a market in UK equities on Deutsche Borse – Xetra) and the 
launch of new MTFs aiming both to capitalise on a new breed of increasingly technological 
traders and national parties wishing to trade European equities outside their countries of 
origin. By abolishing the concentration rule and creating a regulatory requirement, a gap 
emerged in the market for a low cost competitor to the London Stock Exchange. Meanwhile, 
MiFID created a gap in the market for competitive liquidity provision. Chi-X, with its low 
latency and competitive fee structure, was poised to take advantage of changes in the 
marketplace to compete with established exchanges. 
A recent study commissioned by the World Federation of Exchanges, the umbrella body for 
securities exchanges, offers insight into how fragmentation spurred by MiFID affected 
securities markets. Gresse (2010) finds that spreads have narrowed after the introduction of 
MiFID, although depth has decreased, and that traders with access to both the local exchange 
and the MTF have benefited from a reduction in costs, an advantage not shared by traders 
with only access to the local exchange.  This empirical finding substantiates Hamilton’s 
(1979) thesis that fragmentation may increase costs, thus diminishing liquidity by limiting the 
economies of scale that result from a single liquidity provider. 
                                                            
29
 Oriol (2008) and Riordan, Storkenmaier, and Wagener (2010) provide studies of fragmentation before and 
after MiFID. 
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Industry publications report Chi-X has over 90% algorithmic order flow, as opposed to 40% 
on Deutsche Borse –Xetra, and lower levels for the London Stock Exchange. Gresse (2010) 
finds that Chi-X quickly assumed 10% of the order-flow in FTSE 100 stocks, and finds that 
FTSE stocks are the only European index components that have increased short-term price 
volatility, another empirical finding suggested by the fragmentation literature. Therefore, as 
the theoretical effects of order flow fragmentation appear to have taken hold in London, 
London is the ideal venue with which to examine the effects of fragmentation on price 
discovery. 
Recent research similar to this chapter is Hendershott and Riordan (2009), who examine 
algorithmic trading and Hasbrouck (1995) Information Shares in price discovery on Deutsche 
Borse – Xetra, an exchange which has unique identifiers for algorithmic trades due to 
German tax treatment of algorithmic trades. This chapter expands upon Hendershott and 
Riordan (2009) by examining a different market, the UK, and using Gonzalo Granger (1995) 
Common Factor Shares to supplement the interpretation of price discovery channels through 
Information Shares. While Hendershott and Riordan (2009) partition their sample into 
algorithmic trades on Deutsche Borse – Xetra and non-algorithmic trades on the same 
exchange, this chapter examines several exchanges as execution channels. These 
exchanges/MTFs have differing fee schedules, and this chapter also examines the difference 
in price formation patterns between trades and quotes. The contribution of this chapter is how 
fragmentation spurred by regulatory changes in Europe has affected the formation of prices - 
a key welfare function of exchanges in ensuring that capital markets are efficient, as per the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) guidance to regulators and 
exchange operators. 
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MiFID allows for shares traded on a regulated market within the European Union to be listed 
on any other European Union regulated exchange. In this respect, MiFID’s arrangements 
differ from the extant literature on Dual Listed Companies (DLCs), because DLCs are firms 
with two different classes of share with ultimate claims on the same corporate entity, but with 
different claims on that firm’s cash flows, whether due to corporate history or for purposes of 
tax arbitrage (Froot and Dabora, 1999). Under MiFID, a share listed in the UK, such as 
Vodafone, may be traded on any other European exchange. As a result, the no-arbitrage 
principle is expected to be held under MiFID while not for DLCs, as DLCs are 
heterogeneous, while the shares traded under MiFID are identical.  
This chapter initially examines the interaction in prices between the London Stock Exchange, 
its chief domestic competitor, Chi-X, and the other leading European exchange, Deutsche 
Borse – Xetra, while using fluctuations in the British pound/Euro exchange rate. Prices are 
anticipated to error correct between London and Frankfurt to the foreign exchange rate, as 
well as changes in fundamental news and stochastic shocks created by order imbalances on 
each of the three exchanges. This chapter proceeds to examine price discovery between the 
London Stock Exchange and Chi-X, the two venues primarily competing for UK order flow. 
As fragmentation has lowered execution costs for traders able to access multiple markets, has 
it led the price discovery process to migrate from the London Stock Exchange, the ‘home’ 
exchange for FTSE 100 shares, to competitor exchanges such as Chi-X and Deutsche Borse – 
Xetra? 
2. Hypotheses and Theory 
Markets are presumed to have one efficient price, and only brief random disturbances will 
cause security prices to fluctuate from the true price. Therefore, when new information 
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arrives in the market, prices will adjust to reflect it. The methodology of price discovery in 
this chapter examines a homogenous asset in several different markets, and therefore the 
price of the asset should not deviate from its true price, because otherwise a lack of price 
efficiency in markets would exist. In addition, as the prices of a homogenous asset should 
reflect similar fundamentals regardless of the market in which it is traded, this informational 
linkage should cause the two series of prices to be cointegrated
30
.   
As mentioned, MiFID permits market participants to trade securities already regulated by 
other EU securities market authorities on any other EU exchange. As a result, securities 
traded on alternate exchanges under MiFID are identical and thus fungible. Therefore, no-
arbitrage equilibrium is expected to hold. 
In order to evaluate the dynamics of price adjustment, the model of Engle and Granger (1987) 
is used. To implement price discovery methodology, the following constructs are assumed to 
exist in the data: It is assumed that security prices are generated by a random walk process   
Pt = Pt-1 + wt  , where Pt is the unobservable implicit efficient price, Pt-1 is the unobservable 
implicit efficient price in the period prior to observation, and wt is the permanent innovation 
in valuation fundamentals. When the identical security is traded in multiple exchanges, these 
prices are expected to be cointegrated at order one C(1,1) across exchanges and will error 
correct to changes between the prices in home Ph and foreign Pf exchanges or in competing 
Pi, Pj execution channels. Observed prices can be written as Pht = Pht-1 + wt  + εht  and therefore 
Pht = Σwt + εht ,where εht  is any one of the various liquidity shocks (e.g., order imbalances due 
to sector rotations, redemptions, portfolio rebalancing, etc.).  These liquidity shocks are short-
                                                            
30 Fama (1998) reviews the development of the theories on market efficiency.  From the perspective of 
sceptics in efficient markets theory, Shleifer (2000) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) discuss market efficiency. 
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term in nature and reflect transitory deviations in price, as opposed to permanent changes in 
valuation fundamentals.  
By the Engle-Granger Representation Theorem (1987), any such C(1,1) series has adjustment 
dynamics described by the Vector Error Correction Model always being specified to include 
an error correction term zt-1:  
∆Pht =  αh + Σ βht-s∆Pht-s + Σ βft-s∆Pft-s +  zh(Pht-1 – Pft-1) + ∆εht      (4.1) 
∆Pft =  αf  + Σ βht-s∆Pht-s + Σ βft-s∆Pft-s +  zf(Pht-1 – Pft-1) + ∆εft   (4.2) 
 In equation 4.1, the terms are as follows:  
βht-s∆Pht-s represents price innovations on channel h in share t, 
βft-s∆Pft-s  represents price innovations on channel f in share t, 
zh(Pht-1 – Pft-1) represents the correction of prices on channel h to the lagged difference 
of prices of channel h in share t with the lagged prices of channel f in share t,  
zh on its own represents channel h’s contribution to price adjustments in share t,  
(Pht-1 – Pft-1) is a cointegrating vector that represents the size of the arbitrage 
opportunity available, 
and ∆εht is a white noise residual term that can represent liquidity shocks, such as 
short term order imbalances. 
Equation 4.2 and the coefficients of the resulting VECMs (4.3 - 4.6) are defined in the same 
way as 4.1, with differing subscripts representing different channels. zh and zf  are the 
parameters estimated by Information Shares (Hasbrouck, 1995) and Common Factor Shares 
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(Harris et al, 1995), and represent the share of price discovery attributable to channels h and f 
respectively.  
As security prices traded in two currencies are examined, the dynamic of the pound/euro 
exchange rate provides another factor to be considered, because the exchange rate process 
itself is a random walk process, with its own transitory shocks due to order imbalances 
caused by intraday supply and demand of currencies, as well as with innovations in valuation 
fundamentals such as trade flows and changes in interest rates. As a result, the model tested 
including a foreign exchange channel is: 
∆PLSEt= αLSE+ΣβLSEt-s∆PLSEt-s+ΣβDEt-s∆PDEt-s +ΣβCHI-Xt-s∆PChi-Xt-s  
+ ΣβFXt-s∆FXt-s+zLSE(PLSEt-1–PDEt-1- PChi-Xt-1–FXt-1)+ut    (4.3) 
∆PChi-Xt= αChi-X+ΣβLSEt-s∆PLSEt-s+ΣβDEt-s∆PDEt-s +ΣβChi-Xt-s∆PChi-Xt-s  
+ ΣβFXt-s∆FXt-s+ zChi-X(PLSEt-1–PDEt-1- PChi-Xt-1–FXt-1)+nt    (4.4) 
∆PDEt= αDE +ΣβLSEt-s∆PLSEt-s+ΣβDEt-s∆PDEt-s +ΣβChi-Xt-s∆PChi-Xt-s + 
 ΣβFXt-s∆FXt-s + zDE(PLSEt-1–PDEt-1- PChi-Xt-1–FXt-1)+vt    (4.5) 
∆FXt= αFX+ΣβLSEt-s∆PLSEt-s+ ΣβDEt-s∆PDEt-s +ΣβChi-Xt-s∆PChi-Xt-s  
+ΣβFXt-s∆FXt-s+ zFX(PLSEt-1–PDEt-1- PChi-Xt-1–FXt-1)+zt    (4.6) 
where ∆PLSEt , ∆PChi-Xt , ∆PDEt , ∆FXt represent price changes on the London Stock 
Exchange, Chi-X, Deutsche Borse – Xetra, and in the foreign exchange market, respectively. 
When examining price dynamics of a homogenous asset, cointegration is required, because it 
shows that the time series examined has common stochastic trends. If the series lacks a 
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common trend, it can be inferred that it is not responding in a similar fashion to the arrival of 
information into the marketplace. In keeping with the existing literature, two metrics are used 
in the examination of price discovery. Each of these methods estimates the coefficients of the 
respective channels proposed in equations 4.1 through 4.6, thereby estimating each channel’s 
contribution to the permanent price trend.  Hasbrouck (1995) proposes a vector 
autoregressive model that decomposes price volatility into the variance of innovations in the 
common factor. This model, known as Information Share (IS), represents each market’s 
contribution to the innovations in the common factor. Hasbrouck’s Information Share 
contrasts with Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) Common Factor Share (CFS) approach, which 
is a proportion of the common factor innovations that is driven by adjustment of the price 
series from each of the exchanges.  
Both methodologies are used as in Harris, McInish, and Wood (2009), in addition to Yan and 
Zivot (2010), who show that CFS is needed to interpret an ambiguous IS. IS can be large if a 
channel (in this case, an exchange) is impounding permanent information, or if its 
competitors are chasing transitory shocks. Meanwhile, a CFS of a channel (exchange) will 
only be large if it avoids chasing transitory shocks. Therefore, use of CFS in conjunction with 
IS allows the determination which channel is the source of information impounding. 
To study fragmentation’s effects on price discovery within this sample, the following events 
are examined: the impact of the launch of Chi-X, the implementation of MiFID, and the 
central counterparty fee cut on Chi-X. In light of Hamilton (1978) and Madhavan (1995), 
fragmentation may have competitive effects or reductions in economies of scale that drive 
order flow. As Harris, McInish, and Wood (2009) find, the advent of a regulatory change 
(Reg NMS), combined with the launch of a new exchange focused on technological traders, 
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caused price discovery to migrate to the new exchange, NYSE ARCA. These events are 
paralleled in the launch of Chi-X and MiFID, analogous to the SEC’s Reg NMS. Analysing 
the launch of Chi-X separately from the implementation of MiFID allows for an experiment 
to test whether the presence of an alternate trading venue without regulatory directives affects 
transactions costs, or whether MiFID catalysed competition in European equities markets. 
The examination of the effect of Chi-X’s central counterparty fee cut shows the implications 
of changes in market access costs (implicit costs, in that they are not set by market 
participants, but by infrastructure providers).  
From this basis, several hypotheses regarding cointegration and relative shares of price 
discovery are tested: 
H10: Deutsche Borse – Xetra will not contribute in a statistically significant manner to 
the process of price discovery in liquid UK shares. 
H1A: Deutsche Borse – Xetra will have a statistically significant impact on price 
discovery in liquid UK shares. 
Hypothesis 1 tests the marginal effect of fragmentation on price discovery by looking at 
whether any non-UK exchange contributes to price discovery in British shares. Prior to the 
advent of MiFID, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and its electronic component Deutsche Borse 
– Xetra represented the largest forum for trading UK shares outside of the London Stock 
Exchange.31 This is due to the pre-eminence of the German economy and German fund 
managers within Europe. While Deutsche Borse – Xetra trades a small fraction of the 
turnover in respective shares in London, it is expected that any fundamental knowledge 
                                                            
31 World Federation of Exchanges Factbook (2007).  
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derived by German-based fund managers would find its way into UK shares traded on 
German platforms, not London. Ding, Harris, Lau, and McInish (1999) examine a similar 
scenario in the case of Sime Darby Berhad, a Malaysian company traded on both the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange and the Singapore Stock Exchange. They find that Sime Darby 
Berhad’s price fundamentals are discovered in Singapore by an amount greater than 
Singapore’s proportion of Sime Darby Berhad’s order flow. As there is no evidence to 
support that Singapore’s order flow has a higher proportion of informed traders than 
Malaysia’s, this is an unexpected finding.   
The Hasbrouck (1995) and Harris (1995) methodologies test what proportion of permanent 
innovations in price fundamentals (as to be distinguished from transitory price shocks, caused 
by intraday order imbalance) comes from each exchange. Therefore, this is a directional test, 
as values below zero cannot be obtained.  
H20: The launch of MiFID will not change the absence of cointegration in the price 
series of UK liquid shares between Deutsche Borse – Xetra, London Stock Exchange, 
and Chi-X. 
H2A: The advent of MiFID will introduce cointegration in the price series of UK liquid 
shares between Deutsche Borse – Xetra, London Stock Exchange, and Chi-X. 
Prior to the advent of MiFID, cointegration did not exist in many homogenous assets between 
the British exchanges (London Stock Exchange and Chi-X) and Deutsche Borse – Xetra. The 
absence of this phenomenon means that there is no co-movement between the two time 
series, implying that the two series are unlikely to be informationally linked. The failure to 
cointegrate can be seen as a situation where fundamental information is not finding its way 
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into share prices on both exchanges. As, under MiFID homogenous shares are examined, 
their long-term values will be determined by fundamental information, and thus, a share of 
Vodafone in London and a share of Vodafone in Frankfurt should respond equally to changes 
in information.  Therefore, it would be unusual if the same asset in two different markets 
were not responding in the same way to innovations in fundamental information. 
Since MiFID, in integrating European securities markets, mandated market participants to 
seek ‘best execution’ when routing client orders, making market participants heavily invested 
in systems that would allow them to find the best prices (among other factors) upon which to 
execute client (and their own) orders. This obligation, together with the abolition of the 
concentration rule, implies that previously segmented or imperfectly integrated securities 
markets may become integrated (European Commission, 2004). Integration can be interpreted 
as a signal that MiFID has contributed towards a single European securities market, as 
evidenced by the introduction of cointegration between prices of the same asset traded on 
different European exchanges. If homogenous assets lack cointegration, then they are not 
responding in a similar way to the arrival of new information in the market, and one can infer 
that the market is not integrated. Therefore, if cointegration exists in the same asset listed on 
European securities markets after the implementation of MiFID, it can be interpreted as 
leading to an integrated pan-European securities market. 
Gresse (2010) shows that spreads are diminished (and depth affected) with the introduction of 
fragmentation and the consequent competition between exchanges and liquidity providers 
caused by MiFID. Hence, price discovery patterns should fluctuate around the advent of 
MiFID, as price sensitive market participants respond to the changes in transactions costs and 
select between the multiple exchanges for the minimal transactions price. Prior to MiFID, UK 
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market participants only had the ability to obtain a minimal amount of liquidity on other 
exchanges. Hamilton (1979) theorizes that the fragmentation of equity trading will induce 
short-term volatility into price patterns in the home market. Madhavan (1995) suggests that 
fragmentation additionally reduces liquidity and may lead to inefficient prices. Mendelson 
(1987) dissents, claiming that the competition effect will outweigh diseconomies of scale and 
lead to lower price volatility. Despite differing conclusions regarding the effect of 
fragmentation, both Mendelson (1987) and Madhavan (1995) propose a disturbance from the 
status quo. Accordingly, price discovery patterns should be changed with an increasing 
amount of fragmentation. Even if a unitary amount of price impounding as a proportion of 
order flow were assumed, the fluctuation of order flow percentage should change price 
discovery. Therefore, the introduction of competitive venues for liquidity ought to change the 
proportion of price discovery performed on each of the venues, even in the absence of 
competitive pressures through exchange fee (implicit) cost changes. 
H30: The advent of MiFID will not affect price discovery patterns in Information Shares 
and Common Factor Shares in liquid UK shares between the London Stock Exchange 
and Chi-X. 
H3A: The advent of MiFID will affect price discovery patterns in Information Shares 
and Common Factor Shares in liquid UK shares between the London Stock Exchange 
and Chi-X by shifting more price discovery to Chi-X, due to the directive of best 
execution. 
MiFID, with its goal of integration securities markets, imposes an instruction that market 
participants seek ‘best execution’ in their orders. MiFID defines ‘best execution’ in a variety 
of ways, including price, time (fastest execution of the order), execution likelihood, and size 
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of order (in which one exchange may be offering a preferable price at the best bid-offer, but 
given the size of the order, the value-weighted average price can be found at a different 
exchange). One can expect MiFID’s implementation to dissolve existing client relationships 
in the financial services field that may not be of optimal value to the end-user client. A 
contrast to this is the multi-faceted definition of best execution under MiFID, and although a 
treatment of an order may not obtain best execution in terms of one attribute, for example, 
price, the broker may argue that best execution is obtained in another dimension, for 
example, probability of execution of the full order.  
This may be anticipated by its analogue in the United States, Reg NMS. Harris, McInish, and 
Wood (2009) show that the introduction of Reg NMS, which ordered best execution 
specifically by price and altered price discovery flows, increasing the Information Share of 
NYSE ARCA, a new exchange focused on attracting traders with a sensitivity for speedy 
execution. The interplay between ARCA traders walking the limit order book and NYSE 
floor traders following those stochastic shocks as indicative of future price movements led to 
the post-Reg NMS increase in the Common Factor Share of NASDAQ.  Chi-X entered the 
European market with a similar strategy of attracting technological traders as NYSE ARCA. 
Hence a similar dynamic may take hold, with time-sensitive traders migrating to the new 
electronic-focused exchange. Bennett and Wei (2006) provide further theory on the role of 
fragmentation altering liquidity patterns. Hendershott and Moulton (2009) display how a 
reduction in latency on the NYSE leads to greater information impounding in stock prices, 
something that may be mirrored by the presence (and potentially mandated use) of Chi-X in a 
post-MiFID environment. Moulton and Wei (2009) show that when American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs) are traded contemporaneously with European underlying equities, spreads 
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decrease and depth increases. This is either due to additional liquidity in the market with both 
exchanges open, or represents competition for order flow. Menkveld (2008) extends 
Chowdry and Nanda’s (1991) model to dual listed securities in Amsterdam and London and 
finds substantial evidence of order-splitting. As the literature seems to have determined that 
liquidity is affected by fragmentation, price discovery patterns should also change.  
H40: Chi-X’s central counterparty fee cut did not affect price discovery patterns in 
Information Shares and Common Factor Shares in liquid UK shares between the 
London Stock Exchange and Chi-X. 
H4A: Chi-X’s central counterparty fee cut affected price discovery patterns in 
Information Shares and Common Factor Shares between the London Stock Exchange 
and Chi-X by causing price discovery to shift from the London Stock Exchange to    
Chi-X. 
Chi-X, as previously mentioned, was designed to capture two growing segments of market 
participants: those looking for a pan-European platform on which to trade and those 
technological traders highly sensitive to speed and the marginal costs of trading inclusive of 
both explicit execution costs (the bid-ask spread) and implicit trading costs (platform access 
fees, co-location fees, and clearing and settlement fees). Demsetz (1968) models liquidity as a 
supply and demand interaction, and both he and Benston and Hagerman (1974) mention 
competition as a factor that alters the supply and demand of liquidity. Taking this into 
account, competition in implicit costs should galvanize fragmentation just as competition in 
explicit costs leads to greater fragmentation of order flow. The clients Chi-X targeted with 
the central counterparty (CCP) fee cut includes high frequency traders and algorithmic traders 
highly sensitive to implicit fee costs, as those are fixed costs they pay each time they trade. 
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As high frequency and algorithmic traders have based a business model around rapid and 
frequent trading, they should be extremely responsive to a cut in CCP fees, and thus flock to 
whatever forum the ‘all-in’ (implicit and explicit costs inclusive) costs of trading are lowest. 
3. Data and Empirical Model 
Five British shares - HSBC, BP, GlaxoSmithKline, Rio Tinto, and Vodafone, were selected 
based on their trading liquidity on both Instinet/Chi-X and Xetra. They are also some of the 
most heavily weighted constituents of the FTSE 100, and consequently they can be regarded 
as being representative of large-cap UK shares.32  
Synchronous monthly trade and quote files are produced from the TRTH feed for the five 
securities as traded on the London Stock Exchange, Deutsche Borse’s Xetra System, and Chi-
X. The observation period runs from April 2007, with the launch of Chi-X, to December 
2008. However, due to the relative lack of activity in trades on Chi-X in the early months, 
analysis of trades is performed from July 2007 to December 2008. As the price discovery 
methodologies need roughly 150 observations, or tuples, to arrive at a stable estimate, the 
lack of synchronous trade-based activity during the launch of Chi-X leads to an insufficient 
number of tuples for April 2007 to June 2007.  The analysis of quote-based activity 
encompasses the entire observation period.  Separate quote and trade files are created per 
security. These files include prices on Chi-X, the London Stock Exchange, and Deutsche 
Borse – Xetra, as well as the pound/euro exchange rate. Due to London reporting rules, the 
files filter out off-book trades (dealer negotiated, manually reported, and upstairs trades), as 
they can be reported to the tape up to 3 minutes later than their execution. Similarly, worked 
                                                            
32 Data is from Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH), an academic licence of the commercial Reuters data feed 
service provided through SIRCA (The Securities Industry Research Centre of the Asia-Pacific). 
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principal agreements may not be printed at representative prevailing prices in the London 
Stock Exchange, as they represent negotiated block trades. 
From these constituent files, MINSPAN files in trades and quotes are assembled as per Harris 
et al (1995). The MINSPAN methodology captures synchronous adjustments in price across 
each ‘channel’ examined. In this chapter, the channels are defined as the three trading venues 
and the exchange rate. MINSPAN looks both forwards and backwards in time to capture 
simultaneous price changes in all the channels33. For example, the MINSPAN number of 
trade observations for BP ranges from 791 in July 2007 to 112,073 in September 2008. For 
quotes also in BP, MINSPAN ranges from 384 in April 2007 to 187,787 in September 2008. 
Not all of the 5 stocks possess a similar number of observations - Rio Tinto’s maximum 
number of trades and quotes are 79,199 trades and 172,930 quotes in September 2008. For 
preliminary investigations of Hasbrouck’s (1995) Information Share price discovery metric, a 
FILL FORWARD procedure is used as per Hasbrouck, which creates tuples (ordered lists of 
values) of observations at 4 specified time intervals (every 1 second, every 10 seconds, every 
1 minute, and every 2 minutes). FILL FORWARD uses the most recent (stale) price until a 
new trade or quote arrives. One potential drawback is that due to stale prices, some 
observations can be relatively misleading. MINSPAN, by focusing on synchronous 
observations (See Diagram 4.1) censors stale price fill-ins that may distort the adjustment 
dynamics. As a result, the common factor share analysis is performed on the MINSPAN 
intervals, as well as the Information Share tests, to ensure investigation is performed on 
homogenous files. 
             
                                                            
33 Booth et al (2002) and Kurov and Lasser (2004) discuss methodological issues in data sampling and provide a 
more detailed description of the MINSPAN procedure. 
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Figure 4.1 
Figure 4.1 presents the difference in MINSPAN and FILL FORWARD sampling 
methodology. P0
A and P0
B represent observations on channel A and B respectively. 
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Price adjustment dynamics are tested across the three exchanges to examine how 
fragmentation affects the methods of price discovery. Chi-X targets pan-European and 
technological traders, the London Stock Exchange is an established stock exchange with 
lesser technological traders, while Xetra sits between the two, with 40% reported algorithmic 
order flow, due to both institutional design features and special German tax treatment for 
algorithmic trades34. This contrast in exchange characteristics allows for the analysis on the 
level of stock characteristics as well, providing further opportunities to examine both 
exchange-level effects and stock-level effects.  This cross-sectional differential provides for a 
natural experimental setting to test whether key exchange attributes will affect price 
discovery. The implementation of MiFID provides a test for how regulation impacts price 
discovery, given idiosyncratic exchange attributes. 
Although five of the most traded FTSE 100 shares were selected for examination, they have 
different aspects. Glaxo SmithKline (GSK), British Petroleum (BP), and Vodafone (VOD) 
                                                            
34 http://www.automatedtrader.net/news/algorithmic-trading-news/12383/deutsche-boerse-to-cut-xetra-
transaction-fees details the relative algorithmic order flow shares of Chi-X and Deutsche Borse – Xetra. 
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have sole primary listings in London, while the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC) has a primary listing in London as well as one in Hong Kong. Rio Tinto 
(RIO) has a primary listing in Sydney. As this chapter examines how the fragmentation 
spurred by MiFID and the launch of Chi-X affects the patterns of price formation, only the 
London listing prices of HSBC and Rio Tinto are examined.  
The first analysis of the data requires identification of the presence of cointegration between 
markets before the 1 November 2007 introduction of MiFID. The Johansen (1991) test is 
used to test for the presence of cointegration, and its trace test is used to determine whether 
cointegration is present. 
4. Results 
4.1 Results with Four Channels – the UK and Germany 
Based on the FILL FORWARD data files, no securities are cointegrated in September 2007, 
prior to the advent of MiFID. However, as of May 2008, the middle of the sample period, for 
each security, all four channels are cointegrated with one cointegrating vector and two 
common factors, which represent valuation fundamentals for the security as well as the 
fundamental of the exchange rate (See Table 1). In addition, prior to the advent of MiFID, a 
large theoretical arbitrage opportunity (tens of pence) exists between the three channels 
(obtained by summing the eigenvectors). 
The theoretical arbitrage opportunity between the four channels disappears with the 
integration of European securities markets after MiFID, as the prices in the London Stock 
Exchange, Chi-X, and Deutsche Borse - Xetra error correct to each other while including 
fluctuation in foreign exchange between the UK and Germany. Table 1 shows how a 0.7 
pence (BP) to 1.2 pence (Vodafone) arbitrage opportunity reduces to .04 pence (BP) and .02 
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pence per share (Vodafone). As the range after MiFID is less than transactions costs, no 
arbitrage opportunity exists. Both BP and Vodafone are representative of the results for the 
sample of 5 stocks, as all experience the absence of cointegration prior to MiFID with a 
theoretical arbitrage opportunity. After the implementation of MiFID, these characteristics 
disappear.  
From the results in Table 1, it appears apparent that MiFID is responsible for building a 
unitary, cointegrated pan-European securities market. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is rejected.  
However, in the next section, an examination of monthly files before and after MiFID shows 
that it was not MiFID, but another event, that both induced cointegration in the FILL 
FORWARD files and changed the price discovery dynamic. Therefore, one can fail to reject 
Hypothesis 1, that the cointegration of European securities of markets is unaffected by 
MiFID, as another event is the stimulus. However, the price discovery estimates show a steep 
fall in Common Factor Shares for Vodafone (from 15.2% in September 2007 to 8.4% in May 
2008) and for BP (from 13.3% in September 2007 to 8.1% in May 2008) in the interim. Table 
1 displays several important findings for the four channel empirical model. The shares with 
dual primary listings mirror this behaviour. First, Frankfurt does not have a statistically 
significant element in price discovery for the UK stocks. Although results for only Vodafone 
and BP are displayed, this fact holds for all stocks in the sample. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is 
not rejected, that Deutsche Borse – Xetra does not contribute a statistically significant amount 
of price discovery in UK shares, with maximum values of price discovery contribution under 
1%. Also, the FX rate dominates price changes, accounting for 80% of price changes that 
persist, while the securities exchanges are in the noticeable minority. Furthermore, with the 
Frankfurt Common Factor Share statistically indistinguishable from zero, it is evident that 
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permanent price changes do not occur on Frankfurt – rather Frankfurt responds to price 
changes on Chi-X, the London Stock Exchange, and in the FX rate. Therefore, after this test, 
further analysis was performed solely on the London-based duo of Chi-X and the London 
Stock Exchange, given that the European exchange with the largest share of order flow in 
FTSE 100 shares outside of the UK does not contribute to FTSE price innovation. The rest of 
this chapter focuses on the bilateral dynamics between the London Stock Exchange and 
Chi-X.  
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Table 1: Johansen Cointegration Statistics and Common Factor Shares 
 
Panel A displays Johansen Statistics, Eigenvalues, and Common Factor Shares prior to 
MiFID’s implementation. 
Panel B displays Johansen Statistics, Eigenvalues, and Common Factor Shares after MiFID’s 
implementation. 
Table 1 presents Johansen Cointegration Statistics and each channel’s share of the Common 
Factors exhibited in the model tested. The Common Factors display what percentage of the 
common factors driving the system of prices (in the case of these 4 channels, valuation 
fundamentals as well as innovations in the foreign exchange rate) are attributable to each 
channel. The sum of the four eigenvalues exhibits whether there is a structural discrepancy in 
the price, which may indicate a theoretical arbitrage opportunity if it is larger than 
transactions costs involved in executing the arbitrage. Maximum trace statistics for 
hypotheses testing the number of cointegrating vectors are displayed, as well as the test 
values (Johansen 1991), to determine whether cointegration exists. Prior to MiFID, in 
September 2007, the hypothesis that there are zero cointegrating vectors cannot be rejected 
for both BP and Vodafone, while it can be rejected afterwards.  
Panel A: September 2007 
   Common Factor Shares  
  Xetra London Chi-X FX  
BP  0.07% 13.30% 4.60% 81.40%  
Vodafone 0.06% 15.20% 6.70% 77.50%  
GlaxoSmithKline 
      
0.70%  5.30%       0.50%    93.50% 
 
 
HSBC 
2.16% 5.86% 1.09% 90.88% 
 
Rio Tinto 1.62% 
 
6.42% 
 
2.94% 
 
89.01% 
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   Eigenvalues  Sum 
BP  1.061408 0.038523 -1.429058 1.1049959 0.775869 
Vodafone 1.210779 0.206172 -1.398605 1.241882 1.260227 
GlaxoSmithKline -0.01594     -0.00084 0.001026 -0.004342 - 0.021 
 
HSBC 
0.001294 0.00052 1.36E-05 0.00011 0.0019377 
Rio Tinto 
0.00021 3.14E-05 -0.04096 7.36E-05 -0.040645 
       
   Cointegration Test Statistics  
     H0  Max Trace Statistic Test value at 5% 
BP R<2  0.02051  3.84  
 R<1  0.05553  11.44  
 R=0  1.656659  17.89  
       
Vodafone R<2  0.017549  3.84  
 R<1  0.511542  11.44  
 R=0  1.713737  17.89  
       
GlaxoSmithKline R<2  0.035  
3.84 
 
 R<1  0.631  11.44  
 R=0  0.903  17.89  
       
HSBC R<2  0.0341489  3.84  
 R<1  0.5662193  11.44  
 R=0  1.5501929  17.89  
       
Rio Tinto R<2  0.0106459  3.84  
 R<1  0.3456643  11.44  
 R=0  0.7538649  17.89  
 
 
 
Panel B: May 2008 
   Common Factor Shares  
  Xetra London Chi-X FX  
BP  0.04% 8.1% 2.5% 89%  
Vodafone 0.0% 8.5% 2.0% 89.2%  
GlaxoSmithKline  1.0% 43.5% 1.9% 53.6%  
HSBC 3.64% 49.03% 17.84% 29.49%  
Rio Tinto 1.84% 42.20% 31.24% 24.72%  
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   Eigenvalues  Sum  
BP  0.029202 -8.24412 8.2313017 0.0251025 0.041482 
Vodafone 0.014098 -5.30953 5.3069377 0.0152306 0.026732 
GlaxoSmithKline  0.0002714     -0.00616 0.006176 -0.000664 - 0.0004 
HSBC 0.0276508 -7.75217 7.7119502 0.0341941 -0.0060297 
Rio Tinto 0.0008167 0.000122 0.0000388 -4.52E-06 0.000973681 
       
Cointegration Test Statistics 
 H0  Max Trace Statistic Test value at 5% 
BP R<2  0.107975 3.84  
 R<1  0.590451 11.44  
 R=0  33.43509 17.89  
       
Vodafone R<2  0.052242 3.84  
 R<1  0.296498 11.44  
 R=0  20.20316 17.89  
       
GlaxoSmithKline R<2  0.083212 3.84  
 R<1  0.621891 11.44  
 R=0  25.32812 17.89  
      
HSBC R<2  0.030843 3.84  
 R<1  0.362558 11.44  
 R=0  24.41113 17.89  
      
Rio Tinto R<2  0.032688 3.84  
 R<1  0.217228 11.44  
 R=0  18.90962 17.89  
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4.2 Empirical Results: Price Discovery in the London Stock Exchange /Chi-X Order 
Flow 
After concluding that Deutsche Borse – Xetra is not responsible for a statistically 
significant percentage of price discovery in UK Shares (as seen in Table 1), the remaining 
hypotheses are tested only on Chi-X and the London Stock Exchange, two venues with a 
statistically significant amount of price discovery. Since Chi-X and the London Stock 
Exchange both quote share prices in pence, the pound-euro foreign exchange rate is also 
removed from the analysis. 
A number of key discoveries result from examining monthly files and computing monthly 
price discovery shares from April 2007 to December 2008 for quotes and July 2007 to 
December 2008 for trades. All the analysis is performed on MINSPAN files, as 
FILLFORWARD files are used solely for cointegration testing, to ensure that Common 
Factor Shares (CFS) and Information Shares (IS) can be used jointly for finer 
interpretation (Yan and Zivot, 2010).   
The following model is examined: 
∆PLSEt =  αLSE + Σ βLSEt-s∆PLSEt-s + Σ βChi-Xt-s∆PChi-Xt-s +  zLSE(PLSEt-1 – PChi-Xt-1) + ∆εLSEt    
           (4.7) 
∆PChi-Xt =  αChi-X  + Σ βLSE-s∆PLSEt-s + Σ βChi-Xt-s∆PChi-Xt-s +  zChi-X(PLSEt-1 – PChi-Xt-1) + ∆εChi-Xt
           (4.8) 
4.2.1 London Stock Exchange’s Plunge in Trade-Based Price Discovery 
The initial finding is that after April 2008, London Stock Exchange’s impounding of 
information plunges, as London Stock Exchange trades see temporary price movements on a 
thin Chi-X order book as reflective of innovation and pursue those transitory price 
movements. As demonstrated by Figure 4.2, Panels A and B, BP trades show CFS for Chi-X 
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rising from a mean of 0.01 (range 0.00-0.07) prior to April 2008 to a mean of 0.63 (range 
0.49-0.77) afterwards. However, as IS rose from a mean of 0.02 (range 0.00-0.07) prior to 
April 2008 to a mean of 0.87 (range 0.83-0.95) after April 2008, informative trades migrated 
to Chi-X as well. The market participants adopting a similar intuition may explain why the 
London Stock Exchange’s shock chasing increased, as London Stock Exchange trend-
followers saw the ‘smart money’ of the high frequency traders moving to Chi-X and saw 
temporary shocks as permanent trends. Glaxo has a similar pattern in both metrics, as its 
monthly IS before April 2008 is 0.03 (range 0-0.1), and its IS after April 2008 of 0.54 (range 
0.45-0.68). CFS surges from a mean of 0.09 (range 0.02 to 0.2) to 0.62 (range 0.47 to 0.74). 
Figure 4.2 Panel A - Trading price discovery in Information Share in UK 
primary listings  
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Figure 4.2 Panel B - Trading price discovery in Common Factor Share in UK 
primary listings  
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Due to the ambiguous nature of IS (it can be high either due to permanent information 
impounding occurring on a channel, or the opposing channels chasing relatively more 
stochastic shocks than it), CFS are needed for a full interpretation. As the CFS increases in 
conjunction with the IS, it can be concluded that the London Stock Exchange’s collapse in 
price discovery is both due to the chasing of stochastic shocks and to less information 
impounding. As the chasing of transitory shocks on a competing stock exchange will only 
take effect with (and is largely influenced by) fragmentation, this is a direct result of the 
increasingly split order flow in major FTSE 100 shares. 
Other shares have a similar pattern as BP and GSK. Vodafone’s trades on the London Stock 
Exchange take a month longer to decline in their informativeness, as April 2008 Chi-X 
Information Share is 0.29, compared to an average of 0.5 for BP and GSK. For the entire 
sample, April 2008 is an inflection point, as the majority of price discovery begins to switch 
from the London Stock Exchange to Chi-X. With the IS of 0.29, some information is 
impounded in Vodafone on Chi-X in April 2008, but Chi-X’s CFS spike from 0.12 to 0.59 
displays the London Stock Exchange’s increasing chase of Chi-X temporary price 
movements.  
While quotes show a similar IS and CFS pattern for GSK, BP, and Vodafone after the Chi-X 
fee cut in April 2008, the transition is not complete, and the average falls from 0.98 in 
February to 0.44 (GSK) and 0.82 (BP) after Chi-X’s central counterparty fee cut. However, 
as shown in Figure 4.3, the London Stock Exchange quickly recovers almost total primacy in 
quote-based informativeness, as after August, Chi-X has only 10% IS/CFS at most. This may 
reflect the nature of quotes as not binding obligations to trade, and thus not subject to the 
London Stock Exchange fee schedule, especially as regards to algorithmic players. Thus, it is 
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meaningless to talk about quote-based fragmentation, as decision makers see no advantage of 
one exchange to the other in posting quotes, and may opt to post on the exchange with the 
greatest order flow in order to obtain the maximal potential of execution. 
Figure 4.3 Panel A Quote price discovery in Information Share in UK primary listings 
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Figure 4.3 Panel B Quote price discovery in Common Factor Share in UK primary 
listings 
 
This chapter formally tests the proposition that the fee schedule caused a change in trade-
based price discovery using a Wilcoxon rank sum test to assess the difference in IS and CFS 
for the 8 months before and after March 2008, the month on which the change in fee 
structures occurred. Table B shows the results of the test, using July 2007 to February 2008 
as the period before the fee cut, and April to November 2008 as the period after the fee cut. 
Z-statistics are significant at the 1% level for the UK primary listed stocks. Z-statistics are 
slightly less robust for dual listed stocks, notably the CFS in Rio Tinto, which is only 
significant at the 2.5% level. This differential may be attributable to a number of factors with 
regards to market participants.  
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Table 2: Wilcoxon test on Price Discovery around Chi-X fee schedule cut in March 2008 
Table 2 presents a Wilcoxon rank-sum test on Information Shares (Hasbrouck, 1995) and 
Common Factor Shares (Harris et al, 1995) on BP, GlaxoSmithKline, Vodafone, HSBC, and 
RIO to test the statistical significance of the differences in IS and CFS before and after    
Chi-X’s fee schedule cut. Z-statistics are used to test for whether IS and CFS prior to March 
2008 are different from IS and CFS after March 2008.  
London Stock Exchange 
Share 
BP GLAXO VODAFONE HSBC RIO 
Average IS Prior to Fee Cut 0.977 0.966 0.984 0.954 0.938 
Average IS After Fee Cut 0.444 0.465 0.489 0.554 0.532 
      
Z-statistic 3.31 3.31 3.31 3.31 2.68 
p-value 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 
      
Average CFS Prior to Fee 
Cut 
0.911 0.905 0.931 0.847 0.888 
Average CFS After Fee Cut 0.431 0.402 0.419 0.539 0.474 
      
Z-statistic 3.31 3.31 3.31 3.2 2.47 
p-value 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.013** 
** and *** indicate significance at the 2.5% level and 1%  level respectively. 
 
 
130 
 
 
4.1.2 Dual Listed Stocks – a Differential Price Discovery Path 
Shares with two primary listings, in this sample, HSBC and Rio Tinto, behave differently 
from the shares with only a UK primary listing (Glaxo, BP, Vodafone). As Figure 4.4 shows, 
in the initial months of the trade-based sample (July to September 2007), LSE’s CFS is lower 
than its IS by roughly 20%, which indicates that at the launch of Chi-X, London Stock 
Exchange trades chased some shocks on the emerging exchange. This is not surprising, as 
electronic market participants may have still been calibrating trading algorithms to exploit 
transitory price differentials between the London Stock Exchange and Chi-X. The differential 
can also be explained by Rio Tinto and HSBC’s dual primary listings, as both shares have 
primary listings in both London and Sydney (Rio Tinto) and Hong Kong (HSBC). This 
would imply that order flow and fundamental pricing information for Rio Tinto and HSBC 
exist in Hong Kong and Sydney as well as London, and thus, transitory shocks on Chi-X may 
be seen as more reflective of fundamental innovations as opposed to order imbalances. 
  
131 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Panel A Quote price discovery in Information Share in foreign primary 
listings 
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Figure 4.4 Panel B Quote price discovery in Common Factor Share in foreign primary 
listings 
 
 
Trade-based IS and CFS for the London Stock Exchange on the UK primary listed shares 
(Vodafone, BP, and Glaxo SmithKline) exhibit parallel patterns, falling to 0.8 at the lowest 
point of the inception of Chi-X, and as high as 0.98 in October 2007, remaining at this level 
until the Chi-X central counterparty fee cut. This initial informativeness of Chi-X implies that 
informed traders initially used Chi-X experimentally during its advent, and then returned to 
the London Stock Exchange in October, remaining there until Chi-X trading costs undercut 
those of the London Stock Exchange. 
Quote-based informativeness for dual-listed shares exhibits a different pattern than primary-
listed shares as well. In the first three months of Chi-X, Rio Tinto’s CFS on the London 
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Stock Exchange ranged from 0.23 to 0.33, far lower than its IS, which ranged from 0.89 to 
0.95. From this, it can be inferred that suboptimal quotes were posted on the London Stock 
Exchange following patterns on Chi-X that likely reflected order imbalances but were falsely 
interpreted as price innovations. However, this behaviour does not exist for HSBC quotes for 
the April to July 2007 time range on Chi-X. 
Contrastingly, the quotes for UK primary listings exhibit a high information share for the 
London Stock Exchange but a low common factor share. As an example, Vodafone’s April to 
June 2007 IS on the London Stock Exchange is 0.82, while its CFS is 0.2. The low CFS 
combined with the high IS indicates that the London Stock Exchange is chasing a large 
number of stochastic shocks, but July 2007 shows the London Stock Exchange’s CFS in 
Vodafone to rebound to 0.9, indicating that traders adapted to Chi-X behaviour, and have 
restrained their pursuit of transitory shocks. BP possesses an IS of 0.78 and 0.93 for May and 
June 2007, but low CFS scores of 0.31 and 0.29, showing that traders in BP, the largest 
capitalised primary listed UK share on the London Stock Exchange, tend to chase shocks on 
the London Stock Exchange far more than on Chi-X. 
With the conclusions from sections 1 and 2, hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected, that the advent 
of MiFID will not affect price discovery patterns between the London Stock Exchange and 
Chi-X. It appears that the Chi-X central counterparty fee cut was the event that catalysed the 
migration of the majority of price discovery to Chi-X from the London Stock Exchange. As 
the central counterparty fee cut is the proximate cause of the movement of price discovery to 
Chi-X, Hypothesis 3 is rejected, that the Chi-X central counterparty fee cut did not affect 
price discovery patterns between the London Stock Exchange and Chi-X. 
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4.1.3 London Stock Exchange Fight Back 
By September 2008, the London Stock Exchange regains its supremacy in price discovery 
metrics, arguably due to the composition of traders on Chi-X, previously described as 
potentially of two categories – those seeking a pan-European platform and technological 
traders, including high frequency traders. By September 2008, a year after MiFID, and six 
months after the dramatic change in informative trades’ venues from the London Stock 
Exchange to Chi-X, the London Stock Exchange regains the majority of price discovery for 
HSBC, albeit only for a month. Representative of UK primary-listed shares, Vodafone and 
Glaxo Smith Kline show quotes migrating back to the London Stock Exchange mere months 
after Chi-X’s CCP cut allows it to temporarily seize primacy in quote-based price discovery 
that attracted price-sensitive clients, both high frequency traders and large institutional clients 
bound by best execution principles when trading on behalf of retail investors. As CFS 
decreases on Chi-X for Glaxo and Vodafone and the London Stock Exchange’s share 
increases, additional stochastic shock chasing on Chi-X can be observed, potentially 
attributable to algorithms establishing Chi-X as their London-based venue of preference. 
4.1.4 Second Inflection Point Affecting Quotes  
In August to September 2008, BP and Glaxo quote informativeness is equally split between 
the London Stock Exchange and Chi-X, nine months after MiFID. A potential explanation is 
that the London Stock Exchange, as the main exchange for both institutional and especially 
retail investors, is ripped by the turmoil in the financial markets due to the global financial 
crisis. In that time range, BP and Glaxo possess IS in the 0.6 to 0.7 range, while CFS the in 
0.4 to 0.7 range. As the global financial crisis led to a flight to cash, market participants 
sought to convert their inventories into cash. As a result, liquidity demanders chase more 
transitory shocks as time, not price, is their priority, so they ensure that their holdings will not 
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diminish in value any more. As a result, Vodafone’s CFS for the London Stock Exchange 
falls from 0.83 to 0.52 and then to 0.2, whilst IS increases from 0.65 to 0.7 to 0.95 in quotes. 
This indicates that more information is finding its way into prices through quotes on the 
London Stock Exchange in the last three months of the sample, October to December 2008. 
4.1.5 Role of Foreign Primary Listings in Quotes 
HSBC and Rio Tinto, two stocks with dual primary listings in Asia, show more quote-based 
price discovery on the London Stock Exchange. An initial suggestion is that this is 
attributable to Asian and Australian fund managers, who are more comfortable trading on the 
more established London Stock Exchange than the insurgent Chi-X when seeking UK 
exposure. Exemplifying this is that Rio Tinto’s quote-based price discovery is relatively 
unchanged by the Chi-X central counterparty fee cut change in April and May 2008, an 
inflection point for trades and UK primary-listed share quotes. Chi-X IS in Rio is beneath 
0.31 (from 0.11 to 0.31) in those months. Likewise, HSBC quotes have 0.27 share in Chi-X 
on May 2008, only for the London Stock Exchange to regain its overwhelming advantage the 
next months, with a June IS of 0.06, July IS of 0.02, August IS of 0.16, September IS of 0.12, 
October IS of 0.1, November IS of 0.33, and December IS of 0.19. The diminution in UK 
primary-listed share quote-based informativeness starting in April 2008 does not occur on the 
dual listed shares HSBC and Rio Tinto, whose IS exhibit a slow decline. Meanwhile, the CFS 
on the London Stock Exchange for Rio shows variability as opposed to the static IS on the 
London Stock Exchange. A conclusion is that information is impounded extremely frequently 
on the London Stock Exchange for Rio. HSBC’s CFS fluctuates, displaying transitory shock 
chasing on Chi-X.   
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Although the United Kingdom has historically lacked the concentration rule (prevalent in all 
EU countries except Germany, UK, and the Netherlands), the London Stock Exchange had 
the lion’s share of order flow in UK securities for large-cap FTSE 100 shares. Even after the 
launch of MiFID and the Chi-X central counterparty fee cut, Chi-X does not exceed 20% of 
order flow by December 2008, and in January 2010, had only 29.9% of the FTSE 100 order 
flow. Among explanations for the London Stock Exchanges in order flow may include: 
London Stock Exchange relationship-based brokerage; a tiered fee schedule in which repeat 
customers received smaller fees; the ability of internalisers, OTC traders, and crossing 
networks to report to any exchange post-MiFID and most reported to the primary exchange, 
the London Stock Exchange; higher resiliency of the order book for large orders, and worked 
principal agreements.  
Similarly to the NYSE, London Stock Exchange market participants continued to trade on the 
London Stock Exchange even if better prices were offered elsewhere. However, MiFID’s 
focus on best execution combined with Chi-X’s reduction in the price of trading made it 
unwise from a regulatory perspective, as well as uneconomical, to trade on platforms with 
suboptimal prices, even in the presence of established relationships.  
MiFID did not affect price discovery between the London Stock Exchange and Chi-X. For 
five months, until April 2008, the hub of price discovery remained at the London Stock 
Exchange. MiFID neither produced a role for non-UK European exchanges in price discovery 
in FTSE shares nor affected price discovery dynamics within London between the London 
Stock Exchange and Chi-X. However, MiFID was successful at its aim of integrating 
European securities markets with regards to transactions costs and short run price volatility 
(Gresse 2010). As there was no concentration rule in the UK, fragmentation existed prior to 
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MiFID, even if only in a nugatory form – the market attribute that changed was first the 
launch of Chi-X, then Chi-X’s central counterparty fee cut, which, for the first time, provided 
a cheaper trading alternative than the established London Stock Exchange. Unlike Reg NMS, 
MiFID does not require routing of an order to the best prices quote (this is partially due to a 
variety of definitions for ‘best execution’ under MiFID, while Reg NMS strictly defines it by 
price), and as order flow does not migrate, price discovery does not. If routing to optimal 
quotes was required, one would expect retail and algorithmic traders to move to the exchange 
with the best bid-offer spread and block traders move to institutional platforms.  
A change in the Chi-X fee schedule on 1 March 200835 reduced clearing fees by 11.8% (from 
17 to the minimum 15 Euro cents per share) for London Stock Exchange-listed stocks and by 
32% for somewhat higher-fee Dutch, French, and German stocks. This fee reduction 
massively altered the order flow and the resulting price discovery process in London.  
The stark effects detected on price discovery indicate that institutional market participants 
view the concept of best execution as inclusive of clearing fees.  When spreads are roughly 
equivalent, order flow is highly sensitive to 2 cent clearing fee changes. Oxera (2009) surveys 
the cost of trading and post-trade services and draws attention to the fact that when brokers 
supply post-trading services to funds, the brokers take this cost out of their pre-set 
commission. Oxera estimates the net clearing cost as 37 to 50 euro cents per transaction 
(which are individual transactions – so a large order split into 5 trades will pay the clearing 
cost 5 times). Therefore, algorithmic traders and execution platforms will be very sensitive to 
changes in this flat cost per trade, and therefore may migrate to venues with marginally 
clearing fee schedules, because spreads on Chi-X and the London Stock Exchange are 
                                                            
35 http://www.chi-x.com/trading-notices-pdfs/TradingNotice0045.pdf displays the central counterparty fee 
cuts on Chi-X. 
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comparable. Therefore, London dealers would possess heightened sensitivity to even 
marginal cuts in post-trade service costs.   
Three major conclusions can be drawn from analysis of monthly price discovery files. For 
one, a different dynamic exists between shares with dual-primary listings and shares with a 
sole London primary listing. For BP, Glaxo SmithKline, and Vodafone, all shares with only a 
London listing, the London Stock Exchange’s Common Factor Share metric crumpled from 
0.8 to 0.98 to 0.25 to 0.5 after Chi-X slashed its counterparty fees. Chi-X improved its order 
flow at the same time by offering more liquidity for trades at and inside the best-bid offer, as 
well as lower latency than the London Stock Exchange. These attributes attracted traders 
extremely sensitive to both marginal costs of trading and execution speed, and include, but 
are not limited to high frequency and algorithmic traders.  However, dual-listed HSBC and 
Rio Tinto, firms with both primary listings in Asia as well as London as well as a 
significantly diversified and international revenue base behaved differently.  Prior to MiFID, 
the London Stock Exchange only had a Common Factor share in Rio Tinto of 60%, versus 
the 90% in BP, Glaxo SmithKline, and Vodafone. Additionally, unlike the shares solely listed 
in the UK, the London Stock Exchange was able to fight back in terms of price discovery 
after Chi-X’s fee cut, as opposed to the stable level to which London Stock Exchange price 
discovery metrics found in UK-only shares. As an example, the London Stock Exchange’s 
Common Factor Share in HSBC moves from 0.39 in May 2008 to 0.78 in September. 
Potentially, this reflects HSBC trading on behalf of both Asian fund managers as well as 
European market participants who perceive investing in HSBC as a proxy for Chinese 
fundamentals. 
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Second, quotes do not frequently cointegrate and error correct to each other. However, trades 
always cointegrate. The most logical explanation for this is that quotes may not be intended 
as affirmative obligations to trade, but rather strategically used in order to elicit liquidity from 
counterparties. With low latency and high cancellation, fleeting quotes (Hasbrouck and Saar, 
2009) may not represent a desire to trade, but could be a ploy. Algorithms may strategically 
quote, rarely in the expectation that they will cross with another order. In addition, quotes at 
the best-bid and offer posted in such a manner often have negligible depth, so may not 
realistically imply the price of trading a meaningful quantity. Chakravarty, Harris, and Wood 
(2009) show that information first appears in depths. 
The last major finding is that London’s Information Share in price discovery fell after 
April/May 2008 and did not recover. As Information Share may either indicate permanent 
information impounding or competing channels chasing stochastic shocks, one needs to use 
Chi-X’s Common Factor Share to interpret it. As Chi-X’s CFS moves in the same direction 
as IS, the unambiguous interpretation is that information impounding on the London Stock 
Exchange has fallen, allowing one to infer that high frequency informed (institutional) order 
flow has migrated from the London Stock Exchange to Chi-X, attracted by reduced trading 
costs. 
Information Share in 2007 for the London Stock Exchange averages 0.95 to 0.98.  After the 
Chi-X fee schedule cut, IS for the London Stock Exchange falls in April and May 2008 to 
0.42 to 0.5, and by June collapsed to 0.12 to 0.15.  Fewer bad trades that chase transitory 
shocks on Chi-X (measured by the CFS for the London Stock Exchange) can explain a 
decline in IS for LSE (Yan and Zivot, 2010 and Harris et al, 2009).  However, the CFS of 
Chi-X throughout April to June 2008 averaged 0.48, down from 0.91 in 2007.  Therefore, a 
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collapse of the London Stock Exchange’s IS to 0.15 is not explained by the better trading 
patterns on Chi-X alone.  Instead, information impounding must be declining on the London 
Stock Exchange by June 2008.  These patterns or altered price discovery then stabilize at the 
lower level. 
5.  Conclusion 
Economically significant price discovery in leading British stocks has moved from the 
London Stock Exchange to the alternative trading system Chi-X.  A fee schedule change on 
Chi-X, not the introduction of MiFID, was the catalyst for this transition.  In the absence of 
an order migration rule, MiFID’s best execution mandate, inclusive of pre- and post-trading 
services, did not trigger any substantive change in price discovery.  Instead, an 11% cut in 
clearing fees on Chi-X 7 months after MiFID went into effect attracted large informed traders 
from the London Stock Exchange to Chi-X.  Chi-X's low latency suits algorithmic traders 
with information about state of the market or valuation fundamentals.  The results document 
an accompanying reversal of the dominant price discovery role in trades involving the 
leading British equities from the London Stock Exchange to Chi-X.    
However, as quotes are unaffected by the fee schedule for clearing and settlement, the vast 
majority of quote information impounding remains on LSE.  Quote adjustment on the London 
Stock Exchange remains highly informative but the trades then execute on Chi-X.  In the 
most liquid stocks, fragmentation between the London Stock Exchange and Chi-X has 
demonstrated the sensitivity of traders to clearing and settlement fee schedule changes as well 
as the effect on price discovery of low latency trading environments that facilitate algorithmic 
trading. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2007, the European Commission instituted the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID), a public policy measure intended to establish a pan-European market for shares.  
Introducing a ‘passport’ function for clearing and settlement plus a best execution mandate, MiFID 
proved to be a catalyst for the growth of new multilateral trading facilities (MTFs).  MTFs are 
designed to serve a fast-growing breed of technological traders who heavily use computer algorithms 
and other techniques requiring low latency. As MTFs proliferated in 2007-2008, European order flow 
quickly fragmented.  When fragmentation occurred in response to Reg NMS in the U.S., price 
discovery migrated away from the central exchange.  In contrast, we demonstrate that the introduction 
of MiFID had no such comparable effects in London; the LSE continued to dominate the price 
discovery process.  However, seven months later, following a sharp reduction in clearing and 
settlement fees by Chi-X, we document a large shift of price discovery to the high frequency traders 
on Chi-X.    
Chi-X is the successor to Instinet Europe.  Instinet originated as a private electronic trading 
system in 1969 to facilitate institutional trading.  On 16 April 2007, Instinet launched Chi-X, an MTF 
for non-exchange venues. Such MTFs grew quickly in market share with the increase in low latency 
opaque trading through algorithmic bots and the related general reduction in execution costs.  Chi-X 
offered more competitive bid-ask spreads, though at lower depth, as well as more aggressive fee 
schedules for order submission and clearing. MTFs also faced lower regulatory costs due to the 
exclusivity of their participants (solely institutional, not retail) and the absence of the usual 
surveillance services.  In 2008-2009, Chi-X’s fee structure and latency advantage attracted to the 
equity markets additional algorithmic-trading participants who were highly sensitive to total 
transactions costs.  Figure 1 shows that some of the lowest effective spreads worldwide (on Xetra and 
NYSE) rose slightly over this period but those on LSE, NASDAQ, and NYSE Euronext Paris all 
declined, the latter two below Chi-X.  Echoing these MTF developments, O’Hara and Ye (2009) 
argue that the initial stages of fragmentation need have no detrimental effect, and to the extent that 
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fragmentation leads to an increase in liquidity and lower execution costs, welfare increases for all 
participants.  In this paper, we explore how the emergence of these new MTFs, facilitated by the 
advent of MiFID, has altered price discovery efficiency. 
MiFID implemented two key mechanisms across the European Union on November 1, 2007.  
First, the passport rule allows for a brokerage firm regulated by any EU national entity to operate 
throughout Europe.  Second, the abolition of the concentration rule eliminated the mandatory shipping 
of trades to national exchanges.  Although the LSE had historically served as the listing and primary 
trading venue for British shares, there never had been a concentration rule in the UK (or Germany).  
Therefore, as early as 1992-93, agency brokers and crossing networks such as Instinet and ITG Posit 
Europe began to attract a small, but not insignificant, volume in UK stocks.  With the introduction of 
MIFID’s passport rule in late 2007, Pan-European trading and settlement by electronic crossing 
networks like Instinet and their successor Chi-X became full-fledged competitors in equities on the 
primary market.  Instinet/Chi-X quickly attracted 5.6% of the order flow in Euronext Paris, 6.9% in 
Euronext Amsterdam, and a startling 10.1% in London.  Chi-X’s success in fragmenting the order 
flow attracted imitators Turquoise and BATS in August and October 2009, respectively36, and by 
August 2010 55 MTFs were eligible to trade European equities. 
Although two recent studies have offered an analysis of execution costs and fragmentation 
attributable to MTFs (O’Hara and Ye 2009, Gresse 2010), our paper is the first to focus on price 
discovery and fragmentation resulting from an MTF-–namely, Chi-X whose order flow in London is 
reported to be 90% algorithmic.  We analyse the effect of Chi-X on price discovery in London 
because London is the key market in which to assess the potential trade-off between lower execution 
costs and the suspected informational inefficiency of fragmented markets.  Long before MiFID, 
pressure from the LSE’s SEAQ International systems induced many national exchanges across 
                                                            
36 Despite starting a little later, BATS has had more success than Turquoise in their initial quarters of 
European operations, reaching 5-6% share in some markets.  Nevertheless, both pale by comparison 
to Chi-X whose market share in Euronext-listed stocks, for example, has risen to 19%.  Hence, we 
focus attention in our empirical work on this earliest and most successful MTF. 
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Europe to adopt continuous trading, automated order disclosure, and electronic clearing networks.  
Petrella (2009) argues that the emergence of MTFs was the natural consequence of these earlier 
developments.  Gresse (2010) finds that increased fragmentation due to MTFs like Chi-X has raised 
short-term price volatility in London though not elsewhere across Europe.  Henderschott and Riordan 
(2010) find no increase in volatility from algorithmic trading in Frankfurt.  Madhavan (1995) and 
Bennett and Wei (2006) hypothesize that fragmentation would reduce liquidity and thereby disrupt the 
price discovery process.  Hence, London makes a perfect crucible in which to assess the effects of 
fragmentation on execution costs versus price discovery. 
Using MINSPAN data sampling technology and price discovery metrics, we are able to 
capture error correction between Frankfurt, London and the Chi-X MTF adjusting for FX rate shocks. 
That is, we begin by modelling four channels:  Xetra, LSE, Chi-X, and the foreign exchange rate £/€.  
This research design allows us in a first study to assess the integration of the European markets before 
and after MiFID. In so doing, we find that the London adjustment dynamics are integral (and Xetra is 
peripheral) to price discovery in the most liquid British-listed securities.  Our research question 
becomes therefore whether Chi-X has lowered execution costs but diminished price discovery 
efficiency in London itself in the 21 months of competitive dynamics surrounding the implementation 
of MiFID.  We employ the newest 4th generation price discovery techniques in this second part of the 
paper to reveal whether the sharply declining price discovery of LSE trading six months after MiFID 
is a reflection of less information impounding or more chasing of transitory order imbalance shocks as 
liquidity trades walk up and down a thinner LSE book.  The former facilitates price discovery 
efficiency while the latter inhibits it. 
2. Related Literature 
2.1. Fragmentation 
MiFID was intended to create a pan-European securities market by harmonizing securities 
market rules.  In fact under MiFID, European market participants are at liberty to define their own 
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meaning for best execution as long as they formulate a best execution model reflective of price, speed, 
order size, etc., and as long as the meaning of that model is well known to their clients.   In contrast, 
Reg NMS (also introduced in the Fall of 2007) instituted an order migration duty to achieve the best 
price immediately executable, and fragmentation of the U.S. order flow ensued.   MiFID’s avoidance 
of a uniform/one-size-fits-all framework may well be preferable given heterogeneous investor 
preferences (Blume 2007).  Nevertheless, increased pre- and post-trade transparency requirements 
introduced with MiFID by national regulators triggered fragmentation of the European order flow too 
(Lannoo 2007).  
Petrella (2009) details the fragmentation in major index components. After the advent of 
MiFID, Chi-X’s market share of FTSE 100 equities moved from 2% in November 2007 to 7% in May 
2008 and 12% in November 2008. Over the same period, LSE suffered a gradual decline in its market 
share.  Specifically, LSE’s share of the trading volume in listed securities slipped from 70% in 
November 2007 to 58% in May 2008 and 59% in November 2008.  Petrella connects this 
fragmentation to the establishment of new transaction fee schedules offered by MTFs often owned in 
part by major brokers and dealers. 
The empirical literature in fragmentation suggests that there is a trade-off between the effects 
of stronger competition, as reflected in lower fees and tighter spreads, and the increased price 
volatility that results from the thinning of liquidity as traders migrate to satellite exchanges. Hamilton 
(1979) finds that both effects of fragmentation exist, but that the competition effect outweighs the 
volatility effect. Chowdry and Nanda (1991) focus on information transmission, theorizing that 
competition between market makers will speed-up information impounding into prices, and that 
liquidity traders will split their orders.  Pagano (1989) argues that market participants may split their 
orders between venues in order to opportunistically capitalize on different fee schedules or price 
improvement for desired order sizes. A cream-skimming effect may then take place (Battalio 1997).  
O’Hara and Ye (2009) examine how the growth of non-exchange trading venues affects market 
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execution costs. They find that fragmentation occurs most frequently on small NASDAQ shares and 
least frequently on large NYSE shares. They conclude that fragmentation lowers transactions costs 
and increases transaction speed, which further verifies the competition hypothesis and augurs for 
further study of the price discovery effects.  
2.2. MTFs and algorithmic trading 
Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick (2003) demonstrate how lower latency and anonymity 
in ECNs can lead to greater adverse selection costs and higher spreads on the primary market. In such 
settings, they show that ECNs provide the majority of price discovery compared to traditional 
exchanges. Hendershott and Moulton (2009) find that lower latency leads to the greater incorporation 
of information into prices. They also outline how latency can lead to greater competition for liquidity 
providers putting downward pressure on spreads, and attribute an increase in effective spreads not to 
adverse selection but to the price of more immediate execution.  Hendershott and Riordan (2009) 
examine the information shares of algorithmic trading in the thirty shares comprising Germany’s main 
index, the DAX.  Using algorithmic orders from an audit trail of Deutsche Borse’s Xetra Platform, 
they find that algorithmic trading has an information share of 51%, demanding liquidity when it is 
inexpensive, and supplying it when liquidity’s cost increases. They do not find that algorithmic 
trading raises price volatility. 
The closest research to our study is Riordan et al. (2010) who analyse the effects of three 
MTFs (Chi-X, Turquoise, and BATS) on execution costs and price discovery in London for one 
month May 2009.   Differences between this paper or Henderschott and Riordan (2009) and our  
research on MTFs include 1) the use of Information Shares and Common Factor Shares in conjunction 
to distinguish the components of price discovery,  2) 21 months of price discovery metrics between 
LSE and the most successful MTF (Chi-X) with changing fee schedules, follow-on entry by BATS 
and Turquoise, and other competitive dynamics, and finally, 3) an analysis of the effects on price 
discovery in trades versus quotes that reveals a sharp distinction between them.  The focal 
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contribution of our research is to discern whether the reduced information shares on LSE (and by 
analogy FSE) attributable to algorithmic trading on MTFs reflect a reduced impounding of valuation 
fundamentals on the national exchanges or alternatively, simply less chasing of transitory shocks on 
the MTFs.  This distinction is pivotal to optimal market design and informed public policy.   
3. Price Discovery: A Primer 
Securities often trade in parallel markets and across multiple execution channels within 
markets. Through the no-arbitrage principle, it is reasonable to assume that trading follows error 
correction processes towards full-information efficient security prices.  As information is impounded 
into each market’s price, the question naturally arises as to which execution channel is contributing 
more to this on-going price discovery. The observable price can be conceived as a randomly-arriving 
information-based common factor plus an idiosyncratic transitory shock reflecting order imbalances 
on liquidity trades.  Two security prices that impound the common factor, we expect to be co-
integrated and error correct to one another.  
  Given cointegrated prices, two alternative econometric approaches seek to provide an answer 
to the question of contributions of the various execution channels to price discovery.  Hasbrouck 
(1995) proposes an Information Share (IS) approach that decomposes the variance of innovations in 
the common factor into those attributable to one execution channel versus another.  This contrasts 
with Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995)’s Common Factor Share (CFS) approach, which utilizes the 
adjustment dynamics to estimate a long-run (permanent) impact multiplier for each price series.    
 Specifically, write p cointegrated series as an additively separable function of k common 
factor(s) f t and r stationary error correction terms z t = α′ P t where α′ is an r x p matrix of the 
cointegrating vectors and z t is I(0), 
    P t   =  A1 f t  +  A2 z t      (1.1) 
            =  A1 γ⊥′ P t  +  A2 α′ P t-1.     (1.1’) 
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Let Pt be a p x 1 vector of cointegrated prices, A1 and  A2 are loading matrices, and  γ⊥′ is a k x p 
matrix of common factor weights on the contemporaneous prices in the k common factor vector(s)  f t 
where k =     (p - r).  Gonzalo and Granger (1995) show that under the above restrictions, the p x k 
matrix A1 =  α⊥( γ⊥′ α⊥) 
-1 and the p x r matrix A2 =  γ (α′ γ) 
-1
 where by definition γ⊥′γ = 0.   Since the 
vector of common factor weights γ⊥ is orthogonal to the coefficient vector γ on the error correction 
terms in a fully-specified VECM, the γi, j estimates in equations (1.1) provide a way to identify the 
permanent components γ⊥′Pt .  Harris, McInish and Wood (2002a) apply this GG approach to security 
price adjustment of Dow stocks across competing exchanges in the U.S. 
De Jong (2002), Lehmann (2002) and Baillie et al (2002), recommend using both approaches, 
each for its own purpose.  Yan and Zivot (2010) and Harris, McInish, and Wood (2009) show that 
CFS is needed to more effectively interpret the IS which can be large either because an exchange’s 
trades impound permanent information, or because its competitors’ trades are chasing transitory 
shocks. Meanwhile, the CFS for an execution channel will be large only if its prices avoid chasing 
transitory shocks relative to the competing channels. Therefore, using both measures serves to avoid 
an equivocal interpretation of the Information Share. 
3.1. Four generations of price discovery research using VECMs 
Price discovery methods build on Engle and Granger’s (1987) seminal study of co-
integration/error correction in vector error correction models (VECMs).  Among the hundreds of 
subsequent papers using VECM techniques, one exemplifying the first generation price discovery 
research in Finance is Harris, McInish, Shoesmith and Wood (1995) who specify a VECM of 
synchronous cross-traded equity prices to determine whether price discovery in the most thickly-
traded NYSE-listed security (IBM) was solely based on NYSE price changes.  Instead, they show an 
error correction dynamic between trade-based price adjustments in New York and those on the 
Midwest and Pacific (later ARCA) Exchanges.  Although NYSE had ten times the trades of the 
Midwest Stock Exchange (and 3.5 times the trades of the Pacific Stock Exchange), Harris et al. (1995) 
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were able to match 80 synchronous observations per day using a technique called MINSPAN analysis. 
Then performing a Johansen (1991) test for co-integration and estimating the adjustment dynamics in 
the VECM, they discovered that IBM prices on NYSE error correct to deviations from the Midwest 
and Pacific exchanges, albeit to a lesser extent.  In short, the satellite exchanges were contributing in a 
meaningful way to the price discovery process, foreshadowing the later dominance of ARCA in high 
speed electronic trading.  
After exploring variance decomposition for unrestricted VARs in Hasbrouck (1991), 
Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share (IS) concept of variance decomposition for cointegrated price 
series from competing venues trading NYSE-listed stocks defined the second generation of price 
discovery methods.  IS provides a range of estimates of the proportion of innovation variance 
attributable to each execution channel when the order of the series is rotated in a Cholesky 
factorization procedure.  Most IS studies report the midpoint of this range and provide bootstrapped 
parametric difference tests or Wilcoxon rank sum difference tests.  Easy to estimate but hard to 
interpret correctly, IS has been utilized in scores of subsequent studies (e.g., Huang 2002, Grammig, 
Melvin, and Schlag 2005, Moulton and Wei 2009, Henderschott and Riordan 2010).  
Contemporaneous correlation of the error terms between price updates in the various execution 
channels can render statistical inference about the IS midpoints indeterminate (Huang 2002).  In 
addition, Hasbrouck’s variance decomposition procedure inevitably entangles the informativeness of 
one channel with the chasing of transitory shocks attributable to order imbalances from liquidity 
trading by competing channels.   Using a plausible structural errors model, Yan and Zivot (2010) 
show that IS can be large for either reason.  
Booth, So, and Tse (1999), Ding, Harris, Lau, and McInish (1999), and Harris, McInish and 
Wood (2002a) introduce a third generation of price discovery methods, adapting Gonzalo and 
Granger (1995)’s common factor share concept to price discovery metrics for financial markets.  The 
common factor share (CFS) is an error correction measure of whether the price dynamics of 
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competing execution channels chase transitory order imbalance shocks more or less than the primary 
channel.  As such, the Gonzalo-Granger CFS concept provides an orthogonal representation of the 
permanent stochastic price trend caused by the incorporation of new information into asset prices.  
Lehmann (2002) shows that, unlike IS, CFS is robust to cross-equation correlation of the error terms 
in a VECM of competing execution channels.  Hasbrouck (2002) criticizes CFS as limited by the 
linearity of the cointegrating vector and biased by divergent error variances across the competing 
execution channels.  Harris et al. (2002b) show by simulation that this bias is small and 
inconsequential for statistical inference using the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) parametric tests of 
CFS.  Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) defend the linearity of arbitrage equilibrium conditions 
motivating the CFS metric of price discovery. 
In a fourth generation of price discovery methods, Yan and Zivot (2010) reconcile the IS and 
CFS approaches for determining price discovery by showing that although Hasbrouck’s IS approach 
measures informativeness, it also reflects the chasing of transitory shocks. Again, IS can be high 
either because a channel is impounding permanent information, or because its rivals are chasing 
transitory shocks. In contrast, the Gonzalo-Granger approach will produce a high CFS only if 
competing channels are chasing transitory shocks. Therefore, use of the two measures in conjunction 
is required to determine which channel is impounding new information and which is chasing 
transitory shocks.  Harris, McInish, Wood (2009) illustrate the use of IS and CFS in conjunction to 
assess the effects of RegNMS on price discovery. 
3.2. Price discovery across borders 
The international microstructure literature demonstrates the potential sensitivity of price 
discovery models to exchange rate shocks.  Ding, Harris, Lau, and McInish (1999) examined Sime 
Darby Berhad, one of Malaysia’s largest corporations, which trades on both the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange and the Singapore Stock Exchange. Noting that the rate is sufficiently stable that 
practitioners do not track FX prices on a real time basis, they converted all prices to a common 
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currency several times a day. Ding et al. demonstrate that a significant amount of price discovery 
(26% to 32%) occurs in the foreign (Singapore) market, a price discovery share much larger than 
Singapore’s proportion of trading volume.   
Grammig, Melvin and Schlag (2005) argue for modelling the exchange rate as a separate 
stochastic process.  They study price discovery in German shares and their ADRs and find that an 
overwhelming (80-90%) amount of the information is impounded in the German market.  
Nevertheless, they show that a firm’s foreign earnings can affect the price discovery process.  For 
example, they find the NYSE-based ADRs for Daimler-Chrysler (with significant earnings on both 
sides of the Atlantic) substantially influenced Frankfurt Stock Exchange price discovery in DCX, but 
not in Deutsche Telekom or SAP.  Using NYSE data, Moulton and Wei (2009) find that during 
overlapping ADR trading hours for European cross-listed securities, spreads decrease and quoted 
depth increases. This is attributed either to enhanced competition for order flow when trading 
fragments across borders or to an influx of liquidity from arbitragers during overlapping hours.   
4. Model Specification 
The price discovery concept is an efficiency measure of relative market quality across 
arbitrage-free execution channels.  Accordingly, we assume security prices in competing execution 
channels Pi, Pj or in home and foreign markets Ph, Pf are given by a random walk data-generating 
process Pt = Pt-1 + wt   where  Pt  is the unobservable implicit efficient price, and wt is the permanent 
innovation in valuation fundamentals.  Such asset prices will be co-integrated at order one C(1,1) if 
they error correct to deviations between the prices in the competing execution channels.  Observed 
prices can be written Pht = Pt-1 + wt  + εht  and therefore PhT = Σwt + εhT  where εhT  are liquidity shocks 
(e.g., order imbalances due to sector rotations, redemption demand, or portfolio rebalancings).       
By the Engle-Granger Representation Theorem, C(1,1) series have adjustment dynamics 
described by a VECM made up of lagged difference equations specified to include an error correction 
term zt-1:  
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∆Pht =  αh + Σ βht-s∆Pht-s + Σ βft-s∆Pft-s +  zh(Pht-1 – Pft-1) + ∆εht     (1.2) 
∆Pft =  αf  + Σ βht-s∆Pht-s + Σ βft-s∆Pft-s +  zf(Pht-1 – Pft-1) + ∆εft  (1.3) 
If the candidate series are tested and found to be C(1,1), then at least one linear co-integrating vector 
such as (1Pht-1 – 1Pft-1) or (1Pit-1 – 1Pjt-1) or (2Pit-1 – 1Pjt-1 – 1Pft-1) will be operative. The sum of each co-
integrating vector indicates the size of the arbitrage opportunity prior to transactions costs, and the 
equilibrium error correction adjustment parameters zh , zf reveal the adjustment dynamics.   
A VMA representation of these co-integrated price series displays the valuation fundamentals 
Σwt as a common factor (a.k.a., a common stochastic trend), which may be partially impounded from 
one channel or the other: 
∆Pht =   βh Σ wt-s + βf Σwt-s +  ∆εht      (1.4) 
∆Pft =   βh Σ wt-s  + βf Σwt-s +  ∆εft       (1.5) 
From this VMA, Hasbrouck (1995) derived an information share (IS) metric of the price discovery in 
each execution channel based on variance decomposition.  The greater the proportion of the variance 
in the permanent innovations (σ2w) attributable to an execution channel, the higher the IS.  As long as 
Cov (∆εh, ∆εf) ≈ 0, the IS metric is quite precise -- i.e., the range of IS estimates from the Cholesky 
factorization is small.  And since εh and εf  are liquidity shocks, at high enough frequency this 
condition can be met.   
Alternatively, consider Gonzalo-Granger’s (1995) 3rd generation adjustment-dynamics 
concept of price discovery, the common factor share (CFS).  The Gonzalo-Granger approach involves 
a permanent-transitory decomposition, in effect estimating a transitory price adjustment vector (zh , zf) 
from the VECM (1.2) and (1.3) and then calculating an orthogonal vector of proportionate factor 
weights in the permanent trend attributable to each channel’s prices. When σ2εh = σ
2εf, the CFS metric 
is unbiased and precise.  As the variance of the order imbalance shocks in competing channels 
154 
 
 
diverges, the CFS metric displays mild bias, so CS is best applied across markets or channels with 
similar underlying price variance.  If σ2εh << σ
2εf   or vice versa,  and yet the cross-equation 
correlation of ∆εh and ∆εf  is near zero, the IS provides an unbiased measure of price discovery that 
nevertheless remains dependent on the CFS for unequivocal interpretation (see below).  Both 
measures therefore have their uses and serve to complement each other. 
To assist in refining the interpretation of ISh, think of impounding permanent innovations wt 
as “good trades” in channel h that facilitate price discovery, whereas chasing transitory shocks εh and 
εf  constitutes “bad trades” that inhibit price discovery efficiency leading to lower ISh because, again, 
IS incorporates both information impounding with “good trades” and price discovery inefficiency 
with “bad trades” in competing channels.   These are actual terms used routinely by senior traders to 
describe the concepts underlying the Gonzalo-Granger decomposition.  The CFS procedure can be 
thought about as a diagnostic technology to identify and assess the chasing of transitory shocks.  And 
this concept has direct application in trading practices.  Specifically, managers of trading desks 
monitor the “state of the market” in each liquid security and the more active institutional clients 
paying higher fees are advised when their orders would simply chase transitory shocks.  Execution 
channels that feature this type of active monitoring of the state of the market discover price very 
efficiently and have higher CFS.  In contrast, other execution channels with lower CFS exhibit large 
imbalances of liquidity trades and then follow-on trades that chase and accentuate these transitory 
shocks.   
In the 4th generation price discovery research, Yan and Zivot (2010) show under plausible 
assumptions that high ISh is equivocal in capturing both information impounding in the primary 
channel and “bad trades” chasing transitory shocks in competing channels,  
ISh  =  δ
P
h
 δ T
f
 / ∆    (1.6) 
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where δ P
h
 is the immediate response parameter of observable price innovations in channel h to 
permanent (information) shocks (w), δ T
f
is the immediate response parameter of observable price 
innovations in competing channel f  to transitory liquidity shocks (εf  ), and ∆ is the determinant (δ
P
h
 δ
T
f
- δ
T
h  δ
P
f ).  Hence, ISh can be large either because channel h impounds information shocks quickly 
with high sensitivity or because channel f chases transitory liquidity shocks quickly with high 
sensitivity.   
On the other hand, again using Yan and Zivot’s plausible assumptions about the structural 
shocks, Gonzalo-Granger’s (1995) price discovery concept CFS unambiguously measures the relative 
incidence of bad trades chasing transitory shocks in the competing channel: 
CFSh  =  δ
T
f
 /  ∆           and   

			
   =   

	


		.  (1.7)  
               
One can therefore think of the ratio of CFSs as a metric of price discovery inefficiency in 
channel f relative to channel h, and the product of the ratios of IS/CFS, 
   

			

			
  =    



	
	     (1.8)  
as a metric of permanent price impounding in channel h relative to channel f.   As a result, IS 
and CS can be used together to decipher these two dimensions of price discovery, and that is precisely 
what we do in this paper.   
With cointegrated exchanges across currency areas, the exchange rate may itself represent a 
random walk data generating process with its own FX rate fundamentals (interest rate shocks, trade 
flow shocks, commodity price cost-inflation shocks), adding another equation to the VECM system.  
Writing all the price levels in the logs, 
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∆Pht    =  αh + Σβht-s∆Pht-s+ Σβft-s∆Pft-s+ ΣβFXt-s∆FXt-s+ zh(Pht-1–Pft-1–FXt-1) + ut 
 (1.9) 
∆Pft     =  αf  + Σβht-s∆Pht-s+ Σβft-s∆Pft-s+ ΣβFXt-s∆FXt-s+ zh(Pht-1–Pft-1–FXt-1) + vt 
 (1.10) 
∆FXt     =  αFX + Σβht-s∆Pht-s+ Σβft-s∆Pft-s+ ΣβFXt-s∆FXt-s+ zh(Pht-1–Pft-1–FXt-1) + zt.       
 (1.11)  
4.1. Data  
We use the Thomson-Reuters Tick History (TRTH) service from SIRCA to generate monthly 
trade and quote files. We selected for this study three of the most liquid British stocks 
GlaxoSmithKline (Glaxo), British Petroleum (BP), and Vodafone (Vodafone) plus two LSE-listed 
securities with foreign primary listings (HSBC in Hong Kong and Rio Tinto in Australia).  These five 
British shares were chosen based on their more extensive trading on both Instinet/Chi-X and Xetra.   
We collect 21 transaction data monthly files for these five securities as traded on the London 
Stock Exchange, Deutsche Borse’s Xetra System, and Chi-X, screened for misprints.  In addition, we 
create continuous OTC quote files for the pound/euro exchange rate.  Our observation period starts in 
April 2007, around the launch of Chi-X, and ends in December 2008.  However, due to the relative 
lack of activity in trades on Chi-X, we perform analysis of trades from July 2007 to December 2008.  
Our analysis of quote-based activity encompasses the entire 21 month observation period.  Due to 
London reporting rules, we filter out off-book trades (dealer negotiated, manually reported, and 
upstairs trades), as they can be reported to the tape up to 3 minutes later than their execution.  In 
addition, in London, worked principal agreements (WPAs) are printed when they are agreed to, not 
when the WPA-based trades are actually worked into the order flow.  Therefore, WPAs are excluded 
as well. 
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From these constituent data files, we assemble 90 (18 months x 5 stocks) MINSPAN samples 
of trades by stock-month and another 105 (21 x 5) MINSPAN samples of quotes by stock-month.  
The MINSPAN procedure looks forward and backward from a focal price to identify the synchronous 
prices that minimize the time span between trades (or quotes) in all the competing channels (see 
Harris et al. 1995 and 2002).  The number of MINSPAN trade observations across the LSE, Chi-X 
and Xetra channels for BP ranges from 791 tuples in July 2007 to 112,073 in September 2008. For 
quotes, MINSPAN ranges from 384 tuples in April 2007 to 187,787 in September 2008.  In 
comparison, Rio Tinto’s maximum number of trades and quotes are 79,199 trades and 172,930 quotes 
in September 2008.   
To estimate Hasbrouck’s (1995) Information Share price discovery metric, we employ not 
MINSPAN but a FILL FORWARD procedure, which creates tuples of continuous observations at a 
specified time intervals of one second.  FILL FORWARD uses the most recent price in each channel 
(here, A and B) until a new trade or quote arrives. One potential drawback is that due to stale prices, 
some observations of fill-in prices can be quite misleading.  Figure 2 illustrates how MINSPAN, by 
focusing on synchronous observations {(P0
A,P0
B), (P3
A,P3
B), (P4
A,P4
B)} censors stale price fill-ins 
(P1
A,P0
B) and (P2
A,P0
B) that could distort the true adjustment dynamics.  This explains why the 
Gonzalo-Granger common factor share analysis should always be performed on MINSPAN 
synchronous prices.37 
4.2. Cointegration Tests 
Table 1 reports our evidence that European equity markets even in the most liquid securities 
were highly segmented prior to MiFID but fully cointegrated afterward.  Two months before final 
implementation of MiFID in September 2007, we find the three execution channels LSE, Chi-X, and 
Xetra traded BP, Vodafone, and GlaxoSmithKline without error correcting to price deviations 
                                                            
37 Other valid synchronous data collection procedures REPLACEOLDEST and REPLACEALL are 
investigated in Harris et. al.(1995).  
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between them.38  Intraday prices between London and Frankfurt do adjust to intraday changes in the 
exchange rate (and that factor itself explains 77.5% to 93.5% of the stock price  adjustment in the four 
channel VECM).  But summing the eigenvectors for the trading price sequences in September 2007 
reveals large persistent arbitrage opportunities of £0.77 and £1.24 (see Table 1, Panel A).  Consistent 
with this lack of no-arbitrage equilibrium, the Johansen test statistics imply a zero rank for the matrix 
of cointegrating vectors.  In BP the maximum eigenvalue test statistic is 1.657, in Vodafone 1.713, 
and in GlaxoSmithKline 0.903 against even a 90% critical value of 15.59 (Enders, 2008, Table E).  
Hence, r = 0 cannot be rejected meaning these markets did not error correct to erode away arbitrage 
opportunities prior to MiFID. 
In contrast, after the MiFID implementation, we find the three execution channels LSE, Chi-
X, and Xetra become cointegrated.  For example, in December 2008 (see Table 1, Panel B), the 
Johansen maximum eigenvalue test statistics for the first possible cointegrating vector (r = 1) and two 
common factors are 33.43 for BP, 20.21 for Vodafone, and 23.88 for Glaxo relative again to 95% and 
99% critical values of 17.89 and 22.99.  This single cointegrating vector and the resulting implication 
of two common factors is as expected in that a no-arbitrage equilibrium is being established  through a 
security valuation fundamental and an exchange rate fundamental, the two common factors.  
Summing the first possible cointegrating vectors in May 2008 for BP and Vodafone now reveals 
arbitrage opportunities thirty times smaller at 0.021 and 0.046 than in September 2007.  That is, in all 
three of the leading British equities cross-listed in Frankfurt, the two home market channels (LSE and 
Chi-X) plus the foreign market Xetra  and the FX rate between them, all error correct with zero 
arbitrage opportunity to two decimal places.  Therefore, MiFID appears to have accomplished the 
intended coordination and coalescence of a pan-European market for equity trading.   
                                                            
38 To economize on the space required to present these extensive cointegration/error correction results, 
we only report three securities in these tables, but our other securities exhibit this same result.  
Subsequent reporting in graphical format displays all stocks.  
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Unlike RegNMS and its accompanying order migration rule in the U.S., the transition in 
response to MiFID was gradual.  The most liquid British equities that are cross-listed in Frankfurt did 
not exhibit full error correction equilibrium two months after MiFID in December 2007.  Table 1, 
Panel B shows that although arbitrage opportunities in two of the three stocks (i.e., BP and Glaxo), 
summing the first possible cointegrating vector, eroded away to near zero by December, none of the 
stocks were cointegrated this soon after the November 1 implementation of MiFID.  Full error-
correcting adjustment dynamics required several months (into early 2008) to develop.  Some of this 
delay was surely infrastructure-related, but some simply reflects the absence of an order migration 
rule and the best execution model mandated by MiFID as opposed to the best price immediately 
executable mandate in RegNMS. 
Our analysis of these four execution channels representing pan-European equity trading 
uncovered several other insights about the specification of the model.  First, the FX rate shocks 
dominate pan-European price adjustment among these leading British stocks.  Specifically, the FX 
rate is responsible for the great majority of the price adjustment that proves permanent in all five 
stocks we study.  Moreover, one of the three execution channels (Xetra) has no statistically significant 
role in error-correction.  Testing CFSFrankfurt for BP, Vodaphone, and Glaxo, we find London prices on 
LSE and Chi-X, adjusted for the contemporaneous exchange rate, do not error correct to deviations 
from Frankfurt prices.  Specifically, using Gonzalo-Granger’s (1995) χ2 test, we find that the 
CFSFrankfurt factor weight measuring 0.07% for BP, 0.06% for Vodafone, and 0.50% for Glaxo in 
September 2007 both before MiFID (in Table 1, Panel A) and 1.3% for BP, 0.7% for Vodafone, and 
0.6% for Glaxo after MiFID in December 2007 (see Table 1, Panel B), and 0.4%, 0.1% and 1.9% in 
May 2008 (see Table 1, Panel C) never proves distinguishable from zero.  In contrast, the parameter 
estimates for CFSLSE and CFSFX are all statically significant at 95%, as are several of the CFSChi-X 
estimates.  Information that leads to permanent innovations in London prices of BP, Vodaphone, and 
Glaxo is reflected in local price differentials only; home bias predominates.  Accordingly, for our 
detailed analysis of month to month changes in the price discovery metrics reported below, we 
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dropped Xetra altogether and therefore the FX rate from our VECM, thereby reducing the number of 
channels under investigation to LSE and Chi-X alone. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Collapse of LSE price discovery in mid-2008 
The first finding is that a collapse in the price discovery attributable to London Stock Exchange trades 
has occurred, but it was not triggered by MiFID.  Figure 3, Panel A shows the LSE information share 
(ISLSE) over 18 months for BP, Glaxo and Vodafone.  ISLSE was essentially unchanged throughout the 
six months following the implementation of MiFID from November 2007 to March 2008.  Only then 
did ISLSE decline by half, at the time of a Chi-X settlement fee cut.   
On 1 March 2008, Chi-X announced a reduction by 11.8% in clearing fees (from 17 to the 
minimum 15 Euro cents per share) for LSE-listed stocks and by 32% for somewhat higher fee Dutch, 
French, and German stocks.39  All three iconic London stocks exhibit a very similar response with a 
prior mean monthly ISLSE of 0.97 (range 0.99 to 0.9), and an ex post mean monthly ISLSE afterwards 
of 0.54 (range 0.45 to 0.68).  We test the proposition that the fee schedule reduction caused a change 
in price discovery using a Wilcoxon rank sum test to assess the difference in IS and CFS for the 8 
months before and after March 2008.  Table 2 shows the results of the test, using July 2007 to 
February 2008 as the period before the fee cut, and April to November 2008 as the period after the fee 
cut.  Z-statistics are significant at the 1% level for all five of these most heavily-traded UK listed 
stocks.   
Remembering that the ISLSE metric is equivocal, reflecting both information impounding and 
relative avoidance of chasing transitory shocks, common factor share results are also needed.  In 
particular, Figure 3, Panel B shows the common factor share (CFSLSE) for these same stocks declining 
from a mean 0.91 (range 0.99 to 0.8) prior to April 2008 to a mean 0.37 (range 0.53 to 0.23) 
                                                            
39
 http://www.chi-x.com/trading-notices-pdfs/TradingNotice0045.pdf  displays the CCP fee cuts on 
Chi-X. 
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afterwards. This latter finding means that trades on Chi-X chased transitory shocks less, or trades on 
LSE chased transitory shocks more than before the Chi-X settlement fee reduction.   
One interpretation is that some informed trading switched to Chi-X to stealth trade amongst 
the price-sensitive liquidity traders who had migrated there, and LSE clients then chased the transitory 
order imbalances on Chi-X, believing them to be permanent innovations in the valuation fundamental.  
Only if there had been no decrease in the CFS on the LSE could we have inferred that all of the ISLSE 
collapse in Figure 3, Panel A was attributable to a loss of information impounding on the central 
market.  Instead, some of information share on the LSE is clearly attributable to “bad trades” that 
chase the transitory selling/buying pressure from increased liquidity trading in the satellite market.   
A second interpretation is that reduced CFSLSE after the Chi-X fee reduction simply reflects 
worsened order imbalances from liquidity trades walking up and down thinner books remaining on 
LSE once some of the price-sensitive liquidity trading migrates to Chi-X.  Either interpretation of 
increased chasing of transitory shocks worsening price discovery efficiency on the primary market 
represents an undesirable consequence of the fragmentation of order flow in response to the Chi-X 
settlement fee cut and the subsequent migration to an algorithmic trading-dominated MTF.  This 
suggests substantial reductions in execution costs (spreads) are needed to assure a net benefit from the 
more fragmented market structure.  
5.2. Quote information on the LSE 
Quote-based ISLSE and CFSLSE for UK primary-listed shares decline only temporarily after the 
Chi-X fee schedule cut (see Figure 4).  The ISLSE falls from an average of 0.98 in February 2008 to 
0.63 (range 0.46 to 0.82) in April but recovers to 0.93 (range 0.91 to 0.99) by June-July.  Since quotes 
are not affected by clearing and settlement fees, the LSE quote formation process remained highly 
informative and in some cases grew in importance after several months of trial experiences in setting 
the quotes using Chi-X.   
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To take a specific example illustrating the joint use of IS and CFS metrics to draw price 
discovery inferences, BP’s quote price discovery ISLSE metric from August to December 2008 (see 
Figure 4, Panel A) rose from 0.65 to 0.7 to 0.95 whereas BP’s CFSLSE metric fell from 0.9 in July 
2008 to 0.7 to 0.62 in November-December (see Figure 4, Panel A).  Using equations (1.6) and (1.7), 
this evidence is clearly interpretable as more information impounding in the quote formation process 
on LSE.  That is, because with CFSLSE declining, less chasing of transitory shocks is unambiguously 
taking place on Chi-X, the observed contemporaneous increase in ISLSE must be attributable to more 
information impounding on LSE.  
5.3. Dual-listed stocks 
The price discovery in dual-listed stocks, which we define as those stocks with a primary 
listing in another country as well as the UK, exhibits a different price discovery pattern.  This is not 
surprising given that stocks such as HSBC and Rio Tinto have substantial order flow and therefore 
“state of the market” information originating in Hong Kong and Sydney.  Even though valuation 
information and analysis may be homogeneous across continents, state of the market information may 
well not be. 
Figure 5 displays the price discovery metrics by month for dual-listed shares.  The most 
striking difference relative to our earlier findings is the LSE dominance of quote formation throughout 
all but one of the 21 months.  From September 2007 to September 2008, ISLSE is above 94%.  Only 
thereafter is there any decline and even then, ISLSE is still 0.71 to 0.9.  This maintaining of the price 
discovery dominance by the London exchange with all its decades of broker-dealer relationships 
worldwide reflects less dispersed information flows in stocks with foreign primary listings.  Again, 
we wish to suggest that “state of the market” information in Sydney and Hong Kong may be more 
central to this argument than valuation information about the fundamentals of Rio Tinto and HSBC. 
Also note that in the first three months of Chi-X operations in 2007, HSBC’s ISLSE  was 0.92, 
0.89, and 0.95 whereas CFSLSE  was much lower, only 0.23, 0.31, and 0.33.  This suggests that at the 
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advent of Chi-X, ‘bad quote’ formation in HSBC was taking place on LSE as anxious traders chased 
transitory (uniformed) price movements from trades that walked quickly  up or down the highly 
illiquid Chi-X book.  Once Chi-X had been in operation for a few months and began to process 
substantial numbers of liquidity trades, the order flow balances on Chi-X would have improved (while 
those on LSE would have worsened).  Thereafter, the incidence of chasing transitory shocks in HSBC 
triggered by order flow imbalances rotated back and forth between LSE and Chi-X.  This is the 
interpretation we place on the highly unstable seesawing of CFSLSE on the right-hand-side of Figure 5, 
Panel B. 
5.4. Clawback by LSE 
Another finding in our price discovery patterns shows LSE regaining primacy in the 
informativeness of trading, which may be due to the composition of traders on Chi-X.  Trades in 
HSBC show a clawback in price discovery at LSE by September 2008 approximately a year after 
MiFID and six months after ceding the price discovery to Chi-X.  Glaxo and Vodafone quotes show a 
ceding of price discovery to Chi-X on their fee schedule change in April-May 2008, followed by an 
immediate clawback the next month by LSE which then again dominates, as transitory shock chasing 
on Chi-X increases. We conjecture the initially plummeting  ISLSE for Glaxo and Vodafone  in April 
and May 2008 is attributable to Chi-X attracting  more informed institutional participants to their 
platform. The subsequent decrease in CFS on Chi-X and increase of CFS on LSE for Glaxo and 
Vodafone is consistent with dramatically increased transitory shock chasing on Chi-X.  This may be 
due to the emergence of intense algorithmic trading activity on Chi-X.    
5.5. Discussion of Results 
Even in the absence of a concentration rule in London, the LSE historically dominated the 
order flow volume in the most liquid British stocks, and this dominance continues.  Despite its 
obvious success, Chi-X’s share never exceeds one-fifth of the LSE’s share for any of the 21 months in 
our sample.  In part this reflects the fact that LSE prints reports of internalization, crossing network, 
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and OTC trades from all over Europe.  But other reasons exist.  First, like other market makers, LSE 
dealers charge known repeat-purchase customers lower pre-trade and post-trade fees.   We present 
stark evidence of the role these clearing and settlement fees can play in order placement strategy.  
Second, LSE has been able to execute size with less price impact than the ECNs.  Finally, LSE 
developed relationship-specific execution contracts for active-monitoring brokerages.  As a result, 
London dealers can be seen trading through with regular customer orders even though trades inside-
the-quotes are going on elsewhere.  In 2008, however, some of these historical advantages began to 
break down, and new patterns of price discovery emerged.  
Although MiFID did not require order routing to best price immediately available for 
execution, it did greatly facilitate the MTFs whose business model, not surprisingly, is oriented 
towards attracting away and building anew execution cost-sensitive order flow.  One would then 
expect liquidity traders with moderate-size orders to migrate to electronic platforms at the best bid-
offer, just as block traders migrate to upstairs submarkets designed for large transactions.  And if 
liquidity traders migrate, then informed traders would follow.  This is exactly what we observe with 
the migration from NYSE to ARCA throughout the gradual implementation of Reg NMS over six 
months in 2007.  Figure 6, Panel A displays the steadily declining ISNYSE, essentially flat ISNASDAQ, 
and steadily rising ISARCA.  Figure 6, Panel B reveals the price discovery efficiency obtained as 
NASDAQ’s CFS steeply rises.  This finding signifies NASDAQ dealers chasing fewer transitory 
shocks from liquidity trades that walk up and down the ever thinner NYSE book and the thin but very 
resilient ARCA book. 
Here our two interpretations of a rising CFS – as fewer “bad trades” that inhibit price 
discovery or thicker order books resulting in fewer and less severe order imbalance transitory shocks-- 
come into complete focus.  During this 2007-2008 time period in the U.S., NYSE’s share of order 
flow volume was falling steeply but ARCA was picking that up, such that NASDAQ’s volume 
remained essentially flat to only slightly rising.  Consequently, steeply rising CFSNASDAQ in Figure 6, 
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Panel B unambiguously implies not thicker order books but more efficient price discovery on 
NASDAQ.   Specifically, the more efficient price discovery is here attributable to less chasing on 
NASDAQ of transitory shocks appearing on NYSE and ARCA.   
This same phenomenon is at work in the London data.  Once NASDAQ or LSE dealers 
became convinced that best execution would win the uninformed business and that informed trades 
would then follow, there was little incentive to be whipsawed by trades that walk the books on other 
markets.  Those order imbalances are recognized for what they are – transitory shocks to an implicit 
efficient price that will soon mean revert.  Therefore, there is much less motivation by dealers, by 
trading desks actively monitoring the “state of the market” in various stocks, or by regular limit order 
placers themselves to place follow-on trades that accentuate the transitory shocks.  The consequence 
is that price discovery quickly improves. 
The stark effects we detect on trading price discovery patterns around the Chi-X fee schedule 
change indicate that institutional market participants view the concept of best execution as inclusive 
of clearing and settlement fees.  When spreads are nearly equivalent (as between LSE and Chi-X, 
again see Figure 1), order flow proves highly sensitive to the two cent clearing fee change.  Oxera 
(2009) surveys the cost of trading and post-trade services and draws attention to the fact that when 
brokers supply post-trading services to funds, the brokers take this cost out of their pre-set 
commission.  Oxera estimates the net clearing cost as 37 to 50 euro cents per transaction (which are 
individual transactions – so a large order split into 5 trades will pay the clearing cost 5 times).  
Consequently, algorithmic traders and other high frequency clients will be very sensitive to changes in 
this uniform cost per trade, and therefore may be expected to migrate to execution platforms with 
marginally lower clearing fee schedules.  
Our differential finding regarding the on-going dominance of the LSE in quote price 
discovery may be understood through several lenses.  For one, price quotes today are only fleeting 
indications of interest.. With cancellation privileges on a low-latency platform such as Chi-X, the 
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electronic quotes placed by algorithmic participants are not expressions of an affirmative obligation to 
trade. Rather, algorithmic ‘quote-boxes’ may be quoting strategically with no expectation of being hit 
by another order.  That is, they may be simply ‘pinging’ to calibrate algorithms or to engage in 
‘liquidity search’, a category of algorithms to elicit liquidity from other market participants.   
In addition of course, only trivial depth is available at many quotes.  Chakravarty, Harris, and 
Wood (2009) show that new information first appears in depths.  Depth quotes may be a better 
indication of interest in trading.   And public policies about information disclosure are giving more 
attention to depth at the quotes, appropriately in our view.    
6. Conclusion 
The implementation of MiFID appears to have accomplished the intended coalescence 
of European equity trading.  In the leading British equities we find evidence post-MiFID of 
cointegration across European venues whose trading had previously been segmented. 
Ironically, coalescence of trading information has aided fragmentation of order flow.  
In particular, price discovery in leading British stocks has partially moved from LSE to 
the MTF Chi-X.  A post-trade fee schedule change on Chi-X, not the introduction of MiFID, 
was the catalyst for this transition.  In the absence of an order migration rule, MiFID’s best 
execution mandate did not trigger any substantive change in price discovery.  Instead, a 12% 
cut in clearing fees on Chi-X,  five months after MiFID was introduced, attracted informed 
and liquidity trades from LSE to Chi-X.  Chi-X's low latency platform suits algorithmic 
traders with information about state of the market or to a lesser extent, valuation 
fundamentals.  Our results document an accompanying reversal of the dominant price 
discovery role in trades involving the leading British equities from LSE to Chi-X.    
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As quote formation is unaffected by the fee schedule for clearing and settlement, the 
vast majority of quote information impounding remains on LSE.  In short, quote adjustment 
on LSE remains highly informative but many trades then execute on Chi-X’s low latency 
platform that facilitates algorithmic trading.  Future research should jointly employ the IS and 
CFS price discovery metrics to explore insights about why optimal order placement migrates 
under some conditions of fragmentation but not others.  This raises two additional questions 
as to what will be the effect on competitive dynamics of follow-on entry by new MTFs.  And 
why dark pools and high frequency traders may prefer one type of market design and its 
accompanying price discovery over another. 
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Table 1 Johansen Cointegration Test Statistics and Gonzalo-Granger Common Factor Shares 
We display for a 4 channel VECM involving the London, Chi-X and Xetra exchanges as well as the                
FX rate, the Johansen cointegration test statistics, the first possible cointegrating vector to go with                 
two anticipated  common factors for the stock and exchange rate fundamentals, and finally the              
Gonzalo-Granger (1995) common factor shares for three of the most thickly-traded equities on the                
LSE in September 2007 (Panel A), December 2007 (Panel B), and May 2008 (Panel C).  The cointe-       
gration test fails in September and December 2007 at even 90% but passes at 99% beginning two             
months after MiFID in early 2008 and all months thereafter (e.g., May 2008 is displayed). * represents 
statistical significance for the Gonzalo-Granger common factors shares (CFS) at 5%. 
Panel A: September 2007      
   
 
       Cointegration Test Statistics 
   
 H0  Max Eigenvalue Critical values at 10/5%  
BP r=2  0.020     2.86/3.84   
 r=1  0.056  9.52/11.44   
 r=0  1.657  15.59/17.89   
        
Vodafone r=2  0.018  2.86/3.84   
 r=1  0.512  9.52/11.44   
 r=0  1.713  15.59/17.89   
        
GlaxoSmithKline r=2  0.035  2.86/3.84   
 r=1  0.631  9.52/11.44   
 r=0  0.903  15.59/17.89   
 
    Cointegrating Vectors   Sum  
BP  1.061408 0.038523 -1.429058 1.1049959 = 0.776  
Vodafone 1.210779 0.206172 -1.398605 1.241882  = 1.260  
GlaxoSmithKline -0.015943     -0.00084 0.001026 -0.004342  = - 0.021  
 
   
 
 
Common Factor Shares   
  
     
London   Chi-X      Xetra     FX   
BP  13.3%*     4.6%* 0.07%    81.40%*   
Vodafone 15.2%*     6.7%* 0.06%   77.5%*   
GlaxoSmithKline       5.3%  0.7%       0.50%    93.5%*   
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Table 1, Panel B: December 2007 
   
 
       Cointegration Test Statistics 
  
 H0  Max Eigenvalue Critical values at 10/5% 
BP r=2  0.046     2.86/3.84  
 r=1  0.723  9.52/11.44  
 r=0  0.886  15.59/17.89  
       
Vodafone r=2  0.072  2.86/3.84  
 r=1  0.574  9.52/11.44  
 r=0  0.935  15.59/17.89  
       
GlaxoSmithKline r=2  0.061  2.86/3.84  
 r=1  0.522  9.52/11.44  
 r=0  0.838  15.59/17.89  
 
    Cointegrating Vectors  Sum 
BP  0.3968182 0.1492888 -0.061727 0.0103075 = -0.005 
Vodafone 1.210779 0.206172 -1.398605 1.241882 = 0.402 
GlaxoSmithKline -0.021512      -0.000745 0.0010197 -0.004466 = - 0.026 
 
   
 
 
Common Factor Shares  
       London   Chi-X      Xetra     FX  
BP  6.9%*     1.1% 1.3%   90.7%*  
Vodafone 28.3%*     2.2%  0.7%   68.2%*  
GlaxoSmithKline           38.2%*     0.7%   0.6%   60.5%*  
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Table 1, Panel C: May 2008       
   
 
        Cointegration Test Statistics 
  
 H0  Max Eigenvalue Critical value at 5/1%  
BP r=2  0.108  3.84/6.51   
 r=1  0.590  11.44/15.69   
 r=0  33.44  17.89/22.99   
        
Vodafone r=2  0.052  3.84/6.51   
 r=1  0.296  11.44/15.69   
 r=0  20.21  17.89/22.99   
        
GlaxoSmithKline r=2  0.053  3.84/6.51   
 r=1  0.468  11.44/15.69   
 r=0  23.88  17.89/22.99   
        
   Cointegrating Vectors  Sum   
BP  0.029202 -8.24412 8.2313017 0.0251025 = 0.0414  
Vodafone 0.014098 -5.30953 5.3069377 0.0152306 = 0.0267  
GlaxoSmithKline 0.0002714     -0.00616 0.006176 -0.000664 = - 0.0004  
        
   Common Factor Shares   
  London   Chi-X        Xetra         FX   
BP  8.1%*     2.5%      0.4% 89.0%*   
Vodafone 8.6%*     2.0%        0.1%   89.3%*   
  GlaxoSmithKline     43.5%            1.0%        1.9%   53.6%* 
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Table 2 Wilcoxon test of price discovery metrics around Chi-X fee schedule cut 
We perform a Wilcoxon rank sum difference test of the mean IS and CFS metrics over 
an eight month before-after period for five of the most heavily-traded stocks listed on 
the London Stock Exchange.  The event of interest is a 12% reduction in Chi-X’s 
clearing and settlement fees in March 2008. 
  
 BP GLAXO VODAFONE HSBC RIO 
Average IS Prior to Fee Cut 0.977688 0.966375 0.984188 0.954688 0.937625 
Average IS After Fee Cut 0.443688 0.465 0.488938 0.55425 0.532188 
      
Z-Stat 3.31 3.30 3.31 3.31 2.68 
P-value 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0074 
 
 
 
 
      
Average CFS Prior to Fee Cut 0.9112 0.904838 0.931286 0.847194 0.887526 
Average CFS After Fee Cut 0.431031 0.402336 0.418625 0.538542 0.473571 
      
Z-Stat 3.31 3.30 3.31 3.20 2.47 
P-value 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0014 0.0135 
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Figure 1 Lowest Effective Spreads Worldwide (2002-2009) 
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Figure 2 Two approaches to synchronous data sampling 
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Figure 3, Panel A Trading price discovery in UK primary listings  
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Figure 3, Panel B 
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Figure 4, Panel A Quote price discovery in UK primary listings 
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Figure 4, Panel A 
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Figure 5, Quote price discovery in foreign primary listings, Panel A 
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Figure 5, Panel B 
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Figure 6, Panel A Trading price discovery in 3 execution channels, Dow 30 (2007-2008) 
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Figure 6, Panel B  
 
 
  
Mean CFS
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
-12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1RegNMS+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6
NYSE
ARCA
NASDAQ
185 
 
 
Chapter Five: 
Liquidity and Fragmentation after MiFID on European   
Exchanges 
 
1. Introduction 
Public policy discussions often centre on improving consumer welfare. Welfare objectives in 
securities markets range from ensuring markets are fair and efficient to questioning how to 
distribute income. In the area of securities markets, the cost of transacting in shares or any 
asset is one of the most significant welfare questions (Demsetz, 1968) because of justice 
arguments that all participants in a market should be treated equitably.  
MiFID aims to create a pan-European equities market by stimulating competition in liquidity 
provision across European exchanges. It eliminates the ‘concentration rule’ prevalent in many 
EU nations that mandated routing of orders to national exchanges (i.e. if one wished to buy a 
French stock, one had to purchase it on the Paris Bourse – thus giving certain national 
exchanges monopolies in securities). This provided for greater competition in both explicit 
(relative effective spreads) transactions costs and implicit transactions costs (pre- and post- 
trade costs such as market access fees and central counterparty fees). MiFID spurred two 
major changes in European securities markets: first among these is the passport rule, which 
allows any security supervised by a national regulatory authority to be traded at any EU 
exchange. National exchanges with a monopoly prior to MiFID both had to compete with 
other established exchanges and new Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs), the European 
analogue to ATS/ECNs in the US offering other benefits such as lower latency, which allows 
for quicker trading. Therefore, the competitive environment produced by MiFID provides a 
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natural experiment as to whether MiFID achieves one of its claimed objectives of lower 
transactions costs by fragmenting order flow.  
With the growing transparency of transaction prices resulting from advances in the 
communications industry, regulatory authorities came to the opinion (Lannoo, 2007) that 
retail investors, a steadily growing category of market participants, may be paying sub-
optimal prices due to informational asymmetry. From that possibility stems the justice 
argument – that institutional investors or their brokers, as more sophisticated parties privy to 
greater information on the securities markets, may be taking advantage of retail investors 
with only a casual knowledge of markets. MiFID focused on best execution. In order to reach 
this ‘best execution’the EU followed on from the Reg NMS regulation of ‘best execution’ 
expressed through the introduction of a ‘national market system’ (SEC, 2004), whereby retail 
investors should be able to obtain the best ‘execution’ on their orders, defined strictly in 
terms of price. However, the definition of best execution under MiFID is substantially 
different from that in the US in that they have taken it beyond merely being an issue of price. 
In the European market best execution has also been defined in terms of time (speediest 
execution), size of trade (where one exchange may have cheaper liquidity at the best-bid and 
offer, but the value-weighted-average-price of the total liquidity demanded is less at a 
different location), and highest likelihood that the order would execute.  
This chapter utilises differences in trading practices and institutional obligations on the three 
key exchanges (London Stock Exchange, Paris Euronext, and Deutsche Borse – Xetra) that 
historically have dominated order flow in nationally listed shares. Deutsche Borse – Xetra 
pioneered movement among established European exchanges changing to full electronic 
trading in the late 1990s. By the advent of MiFID in November 2007, all the exchanges 
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offered a capability for electronic trading. Prior to the introduction of MiFID, Paris and 
London were highly characterized by client relationship-based mediation, both with contracts 
for active monitoring of brokerages and a differential fee schedule for known repeat 
customers. Whilst, in Germany there was reduced taxation on algorithmic trades relative to 
other types of trading (Hendershott and Riordan, 2009), which led to a greater proportion of 
algorithmic trading on Xetra (40% of trades) than on the other established exchanges
40
. Chi-
X was the successor exchange to Nomura’s Instinet trading service, initially as an upstairs 
service for institutional clients that matched their orders with one another. This exchange 
allowed institutional clients to trade large volumes without paying a heavy price for liquidity 
as large, or ‘block’ trades, would ‘walk the book’ and have a higher transactions costs. With 
the launch of MiFID, Chi-X transformed into a multilateral trading facility – an open 
competitor with exchanges for downstairs (‘lit’) order flow. Chi-X sought to attract 
institutional participants through two means – first, it targeted highly electronic traders 
sensitive to lower transactions costs or faster execution by trumpeting its low latency. 
Furthermore, it offered equity ownership in Chi-X to those institutional participants who 
would execute trades on it. As a result, in 2010, Chi-X trades more European securities by 
volume than any other exchange, and algorithmic trading accounts for 90% of that volume41.  
To investigate the effects of MiFID, one must initially examine the functions of a market. 
Markets function as a forum for the transactions that determine the true value of the asset42. 
Therefore, a market characterized by high transactions costs can be portrayed as deficient in 
its functions of price determination in addition to providing a forum for buyers and sellers to 
                                                            
40
 http://www.automatedtrader.net/news/algorithmic-trading-news/12383/deutsche-boerse-to-cut-xetra-
transaction-fees. 
41
 ibid. 
42
 Fama (1998) surveys existing literature on market efficiency, starting with Fama (1969). 
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meet, as transactions costs can reflect a lack of liquidity supply
43
. High transactions costs can 
also act as a deterrent to additional liquidity entering the market as those otherwise willing to 
trade opt to not trade on cost grounds. Therefore, transactions costs, which are often 
measured by relative effective spreads, (see, for example, Venkataraman 2001; Lee, 
Mucklow, and Ready 1993; and Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld 2011), are inversely 
associated with liquidity, which is a cardinal measure of the robustness and resilience of a 
market. High transactions costs represent a barrier to exchange and can compound existing 
obstacles to trading within a market - whether they are implicit in terms of regulatory 
barriers, or explicit in terms of market participants demanding a higher price for the right to 
transact in an instrument, as represented by the bid-ask spread.  
This chapter finds that that fragmentation arising after MiFID reduces relative effective 
spreads, and therefore, increased fragmentation leads to greater liquidity. This in turn implies 
that there is improved price discovery and equity in trading access across all trade types. 
Infrastructure changes on rival exchanges spur increased competition and liquidity in the 
form of lower spreads, possibly by the mediation of high frequency traders. Regulatory 
changes also affect transactions costs in Europe, as MiFID’s implicit best execution 
requirement led to a reduction in spreads – its abolition of France’s concentration rule 
encouraged competition for liquidity provision and slashed transactions costs.   
The instrument for analysis is the measure of fragmentation of a share, defined as the 
proportion of a share’s total volume traded on its ‘home’ or national exchange
44
. This chapter 
finds that incremental pre- and post- trade costs explain changes (reductions) in transactions 
                                                            
43
 Akerlof (1970) illustrates how information asymmetry can lead to ‘frozen’ markets where transactions do 
not occur. 
44
 Fragmentation is strictly operationalised as a percentage, where the numerator is the volume of trades on 
the home exchange, and the denominator is the total number of shares traded. 
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costs far more than regulatory changes or the introduction of a competitor. It finds evidence 
that MiFID and the Chi-X counterparty fee cut stimulated competition in liquidity provision 
as measured in relative effective spreads.  
The experimental design of this chapter involves the examination of three discrete events, and 
their impact on each of the individual stock exchanges and on the pan-European sample. 
Therefore, hypotheses are tested on the relevant data sets when examining the impact of a 
specific event on a given exchange, and on the ‘pooled’ sample when testing the pan-
European effect of fragmentation. Each exchange has unique market design features, thus is 
expected to react to a technological or regulatory change in a different manner. Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC) modelling is used to determine relevant variables of testing in 
each of these circumstances, with the proviso that Fragmentation, the key variable of 
interest, is tested in each regression. Some hypotheses are tested on multiple data sets to 
examine how market structure affects regulatory changes. As an example of how data sets are 
used, the hypothesis examining whether the introduction of Chi-X and the concurrent 
fragmentation had effected spreads is tested only on the data sets around the Chi-X launch, as 
this allows for the isolation of the effect of Chi-X’s entrance into the pan-European equities 
markets and the examination of Chi-X’s launch on spreads on each of the three major 
European exchanges. Table 1 lays out the data sets analysed in this chapter, the event they 
represent, and the observation period covered by the data. 
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Table 1 : Events Examined in This Chapter  
Each event has a separate data set. 
Stock Exchange  Event Observation Period 
London Chi-X launch January - July 2007 
London MiFID implementation August 2007 - February 2008 
London Chi-X fee cut January - July 2008 
Paris MiFID implementation August 2007 - February 2008 
Paris Chi-X fee cut January - July 2008 
Deutsche Borse Chi-X launch January - July 2007 
Deutsche Borse MiFID implementation August 2007 - February 2008 
Deutsche Borse Chi-X fee cut January - July 2008 
Pooled Sample MiFID implementation August 2007 - February 2008 
Pooled Sample Chi-X fee cut January - July 2008 
 
 
Section 2 of this chapter describes the model and hypotheses tested, as well as the theoretical 
literature substantiating the arguments put forth in both the null and alternative hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data and filters used to construct the data set. Section 4 puts forth 
empirical results and explanations as to what factors impact these results, and section 5 
concludes the chapter.  
2. Hypothesis and Model 
Literature in fragmentation posits that competing forces can either increase or decrease the 
amount of liquidity in the market. The introduction of a competitive market for trading does 
not necessarily increase the total pool of liquidity, but can decrease the economies of scale 
enjoyed by the previous monopoly provider (Madhavan, 1995). Alternatively, competition 
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can lower transactions costs - another factor in liquidity, -as market participants vie for 
market share (Hamilton, 1979), which leads to increased liquidity. A recent empirical study 
of US securities markets shows that after the introduction of Reg NMS, spreads increased45. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to posit that European securities markets will not be too dissimilar 
in their responses to the introduction of MiFID from the US. 
The questions examined can be condensed to the questions as to whether the notional 
existence of competition (the launch of Chi-X) is enough to drive fragmentation and reduce 
spreads, whether regulatory mandates alter the patterns of order flow between established 
exchanges and innovative newcomers (MiFID), and whether platform fees and costs are the 
prime determinant of order flow. If platform fees and costs do influence order flow the 
concurrent migration of order flow between exchanges cause changes in spreads (Chi-X 
central counterparty fee cut). 
The launch of Chi-X, the introduction of MiFID, and the Chi-X central counterparty fee cut, 
provide a natural experiment to study the effects of fragmentation on transactions costs.    
Chi-X as opposed to institutional upstairs networks) provides the first large scale 
(competition to LSE for order flow, while MiFID directs market participants to achieve best 
execution, which is primarily seen in terms of transactions costs. The Chi-X central 
counterparty fee cut allows for the examination of whether implicit (pre- and post-) trading 
costs drive explicit transactions costs. This is because if spreads are the same after the fee cut, 
for the first time, Chi-X is a less expensive trading platform than LSE, Xetra, and Paris 
Euronext. To examine these questions, this chapter posits and then tests the following 
hypotheses: 
                                                            
45
 Chung and Chuwonganant (2010) examine the impact of Reg NMS on relative effective spreads in US 
equities. 
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H10: Transactions costs will remain unchanged with increased fragmentation from the 
home exchange.
 
 
H1A: Transactions costs will decrease with increased fragmentation from the home 
exchange. 
There is varied evidence on the impact of fragmentation on transactions costs in the home 
exchange. Bessembinder (2003), for example, finds that increased fragmentation is associated 
with lower spreads. He finds that non-NYSE markets signal their intent to trade by entering 
the market with competitive quotes, and post quotes away from the national best bid and offer 
(NBBO) when they do not wish to trade. Batallio (1997) poses the cream-skimming 
hypothesis, which states that traders compete for certain lot sizes they find more valuable in 
which to trade. He documents Madoff Securities competition for order flow only in lots under 
5,000 shares, and finds that when Madoff Securities opted to do execute in lots under 5,000 
shares, spreads decreased. However, this behaviour was restricted to Madoff’s trading 
preferences – spreads were unaffected except when Madoff desired to enter the market as a 
counterparty to liquidity seekers. Madhavan (1991) contends that additional fragmentation 
diminishes existing economies of scale, and Batallio (1997) provides evidence that when 
Madoff was not seeking to trade, Madhavan’s (1991) hypothesis is correct. 
Hypothesis one is tested on all data sets, to examine how differing market structures and the 
resultant fragmentation affect transactions costs.  
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H20: MiFID’s best execution mandate, inducing fragmentation, will have no impact on 
transactions costs. 
H2A: MiFID’s best execution mandate, inducing fragmentation, will result in 
significantly decreased transactions costs. 
Chung and Chuwonganant (2010) find that spreads increase and depth decreases after the 
introduction of Reg NMS in the US. They interpret this as market participants’ prioritization 
of their trades by metrics other than price, such as lower latency and the anonymity resulting 
from order splitting. Therefore, the resulting order dispersion reduces economies of scale on 
the original exchange, leading to a higher price of liquidity as measured by transactions costs. 
This evidence substantiates Madhavan’s (1991) theory that increased fragmentation leads to 
higher transactions costs.  
The implementation of MiFID required market operations to invest in substantial systems in 
order for them to assess where best execution is found. Additionally, MiFID increased the 
compliance burden on market participants, who have to report their execution results. Market 
operators might rationally seek to recoup these investments through higher spreads. In 
Grossman’s (1992) model, he explicitly notes the cost of search. This cost is non-trivial, so it 
may be capitalized in spreads. In a vein similar to the Huang and Stoll (1996) model, the 
transition from a scenario in which one party (or an oligopoly) who is information-dominant 
in a security to a scenario in which the diffusion of that information among a plurality of 
players may significantly increase transactions costs. This effect may be particularly striking 
on Paris Euronext, where many securities have parties who are designated Liquidity 
Providers, whose job is to function as quasi-specialists, to ensure a consistent supply in 
liquidity for the share. Unlike specialists, however, they are not monopolists in the share.  
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Bennett and Wei (2006) empirically test Madhavan’s (1991) findings and document how 
fragmentation in NYSE-listed shares affects liquidity and volatility through a natural 
experiment in which NASDAQ firms switch to the NYSE, discovering that NYSE firms have 
lower bid-ask spreads that are attributable to the reduced fragmentation. Given that European 
securities markets operate in a similar way to US securities markets, one would expect 
increased fragmentation to lead to increased spreads. A factor that may influence transactions 
costs on Deutsche Borse – Xetra is the German government’s differential treatment of 
algorithmic trading in terms of tax (Hendershott and Riordan 2009). 
MiFID’s best execution mandate may lead market participants to act as legally required in the 
US, and guided by MiFID, that of ‘shipping orders’ to the ‘best’ quotation by price. In this 
scenario, should a broker be able to obtain a better price for an asset on Chi-X than on the 
traditional exchanges, she will send the order to Chi-X for execution. However, it is 
noteworthy that neither the European Commission nor national securities regulators have 
taken any action against market participants for perceived failure to meet best execution 
requirements under MiFID. 
Hypothesis two is tested on the four data sets at around the time of MiFID implementation – 
the data sets for London, Paris, Deustche Borse - Xetra and the ‘pooled’ data set including all 
three exchanges’ shares. Because the best execution requirement in MiFID’s regulatory 
change facilitated trading on Chi-X, MiFID’s implementation is examined separately from 
the launch of Chi-X. 
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H30: The abolition of the concentration rule in France will have no impact on 
transactions costs, in comparison to the UK and Germany, where no concentration rule 
existed. 
H3A: The abolition of the concentration rule in France results in a significant decrease 
in transactions costs, in comparison to the UK and Germany, where no concentration 
rule existed.  
One of MiFID’s directives was to remove the ‘concentration rule’, an umbrella term used to 
refer to national regulatory requirements to ship orders to the established national exchange 
(e.g. in France, trades must go through Paris Euronext under the rule). It is clear that such a 
change will result in more choice to investors as to where to trade and whether on established 
exchanges, MTFs, or Systematic Internalisers (desks within banks matching orders). As a 
result, the scale of fragmentation in countries with the fragmentation rule (the EU except 
Germany and the Netherlands) leads to transition from a pure monopoly to competition. 
Under Hamilton (1979), the abolition of the concentration rule will result in competitive 
effects as new liquidity providers, such as Chi-X, strive to increase market share, and thus 
decrease transactions costs. However, if Madhavan’s (1991) theory holds, additional liquidity 
providers across Europe will cause Paris Euronext’s economies of scale to diminish, and thus, 
increase transactions costs.  
Hypothesis three is tested on the pooled data sets. The effect of the removal of the 
concentration rule in French shares can be compared to Germany and English shares, two 
countries in which there was no concentration rule. 
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H40: The introduction of Chi-X will have no effect on spreads. 
H4A: The introduction of Chi-X will significantly reduce spreads. 
The concentration rule will have a different effect than MiFID, as there are no sunk costs that 
market participants must recoup. Due to MiFID’s best execution obligations, brokers were 
obligated to invest in technological solutions that would route orders to where they would 
execute more cheaply, because fragmentation provides a variety of venues on which trades 
can execute. While EU financial markets authorities do not enforce MiFID’s best execution 
mandate strictly, they do ensure that financial markets participants publish reports stating 
how they achieved best execution. In the markets of Germany and the UK, where no 
concentration rule existed, financial markets participants can be expected to have already 
implemented systems that achieve best execution. However, because the abolition of the 
concentration rule is a side effect of MiFID, this chapter decouples the two processes by  
separately examining a jurisdiction (France) in which the concentration rule existed, as well 
as two countries (Germany and the UK) in which there was no concentration rule. Gresse and 
Gajewski (2007), in their study of the London Stock Exchange’s SETS system, that lacked a 
concentration rule, find that SETS was characterized by higher stock price volatility, and 
hence inventory holders demand higher spreads to protect themselves against increased price 
risk. Conrad et al (2003) show that in the US, execution costs are reduced on Electronic 
Communications Networks (ECNs), the forerunners of the EU’s Multilateral Trading 
Facilities (MTFs), of which Chi-X is the most prominent. Smith (2008) notes that traders 
have heterogeneous preferences, thus, some will opt for Chi-X due to lower latency (and less 
ability for agents to front-run principals) and greater ability for anonymity. Chistella et al 
(2007) mentions that Chi-X’s market model and pricing structure is similar to the London 
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Stock Exchange and Deutsche Borse – Xetra and therefore, one may expect a differential 
effect from the introduction of Chi-X into the French market versus the British and Germany 
markets. However, one is only able to observe this effect on the margins because there is no 
clean observation window to examine the introduction of MiFID on the French market. Like 
previous hypotheses involving competition and fragmentation, existing literature presents two 
contradictory hypotheses. While Hamilton (1979) states that competitive effects will cause 
lower transactions costs, Madhavan (1991) notes that the introduction of a competitor does 
not necessarily increase liquidity, but cannibalises existing liquidity, leading to increased 
transactions costs. If Fragmentation’s coefficient is negative, then spreads have been 
reduced by Chi-X. If not, then the reduction in economies of scale caused by Chi-X’s entry 
has increased spreads. 
Hypothesis four is tested on the two data sets - those around the time of the launch of Chi-X 
on the London Stock Exchange and the launch of Chi-X on Deutsche Borse – Xetra. 
H50: The fee cut on Chi-X, inducing fragmentation, will have no impact on spreads.  
H5A: The fee cut on Chi-X, inducing fragmentation, will have a significant impact on 
spreads.  
Hendershott and Riordan (2009), find that algorithmic traders (which constitute a substantial 
amount of the activity on Chi-X) on Xetra engage in quasi-market-making behaviour, 
demanding liquidity when it is inexpensive, and offering it when liquidity’s cost is expensive. 
Hendershott et al (2010) show that the introduction of algorithmic trading on the NYSE in 
2003 decreased both spreads and the adverse selection component of the spread. However, 
Hendershott and Moulton (2009) show that NYSE’s introduction of a hybrid system leads to 
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increased spreads, as time-sensitive traders are willing to pay more for immediate execution. 
In addition, an increase in adverse selection under the hybrid system leads to spread 
increases. Notably, as many algorithmic participants execute in small blocks of shares, 
Barclay et al (2003) find that small trades, defined as those smaller than 1,000 shares, have a 
lower effective spread on exchanges with market makers than on ECNs/MTFs, and theorize 
that market participants see a greater adverse selection cost trading on anonymous platforms 
such as MTFs when compared with a known specialist or market-maker on a more 
established exchange. Hendershott and Jones (2005) find that overall liquidity decreased 
when Island, an American Electronic Communications Network, a technological antecedent 
to Chi-X, ceases to display its limit order book. In this vein, one may theorize that heightened 
activity on Chi-X will lead to more active competition on LSE, Paris Euronext, and Deutsche 
Borse – Xetra, and any activity that may catalyse Chi-X growth will lead to more active 
liquidity provision as measured in decreased transactions costs.  
Chi-X cut its central counterparty clearing fees effective 1 March 200846, and for the first 
time offered less expensive implicit trading costs (pre- and post- trade costs, as opposed to 
transactions costs, which are explicit) than those on the established exchanges. Chi-X did not 
impose a uniform cut, but European CCP fee cuts were 32.1%, and UK CCP cuts were 
11.8%. This reflects the different CCP fee environment in France, Germany, and the UK. 
Following from the Hendershott and Jones hypothesis that competition stimulated by the 
competitor to a domestic exchange will attract more liquidity to the market, one can assume 
that transactions costs in UK shares will fall upon Chi-X’s entry to the UK market. 
                                                            
46 http://www.chi-x.com/trading-notices-pdfs/TradingNotice0045.pdf. 
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Hypothesis 5 is tested on the four data sets around the time of the Chi-X counterparty fee cut 
– one for London, Paris Euronext, and Deutsche Borse; and one with the pooled data set 
examining the Chi-X counterparty fee cut.  
Testing liquidity poses some methodological challenges since existing literature does not 
define a specific model for liquidity. The general practice is to proxy liquidity as transactions 
costs
47
. It is uncertain what specific variables determine the level of liquidity, and therefore 
equation 5.1 posits a relationship between a number of key variables identified in the 
literature and transactions costs, which serve as a proxy for liquidity. This chapter 
operationalises transactions costs as relative effective spreads, because relative effective 
spreads represent the ‘round trip’ (buying and selling a share) trading costs. Measuring the 
‘round trip’ cost is important, as the limit order book may have a different price for liquidity 
on the bid-side than on the ask-side. 
This chapter presumes that trading and liquidity is a supply and demand interaction affected 
by several variables (See, for example, Demsetz, 1968). The model this chapter tests assumes 
that the associations are linear, but that it is not certain which variables are significant or in 
what direction (indicating differing impacts on liquidity). The estimation is made on a range 
of data representing order splitting (Fragmentation), size (Number of Trades), price 
volatility (Standard Deviation), and a country variable representing the presence of a 
concentration rule prior to MiFID (France). Interaction variables are used to test the 
interaction between the key variable of interest, Fragmentation, and other variables. 
 
                                                            
47
 Venkataraman (2004), Huang and Stoll (1996), and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1998) provide examples of 
execution cost studies. 
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The following equation is estimated using a range of data to test the hypotheses of interest:  
Spread = a + β1Fragmentation+ β2 Number of Trades + 
β3 Standard Deviation + β4France + β5Fragmentation*Number of Trades + 
β6Fragmentation*Standard Deviation + β7Fragmentation*France  
+ ε.                            (5.1) 
 
The variables are defined as follows:  
Spread, following Venkataraman (2001), is the relative effective spread of a share 
measured as a percentage of the share’s price. Venkataraman (2001) defines it as: 
Relative effective spread (percentage) = 200 * Dit * (Priceit - Midit ) /Midit.  (5.2) 
where Dit is the direction of the trade (buy or sell), Priceit is the traded price, and 
Midit is the prevailing bid-ask midpoint.  
   
Fragmentation is measured as the percentage of shares trading on the home exchange 
divided by the total number of shares trading on the home exchange and Chi-X. As 
volumes on other European exchanges post-MiFID are trivial, they are removed for 
the purpose of analysis. Therefore, a share not listed on any other exchange has a 
fragmentation value of 1, and a share evenly split between the home exchange and 
Chi-X has a value of .5. Therefore, Fragmentation represents the relative dispersion 
of order flow between the established exchange and Chi-X. 
201 
 
 
Number of trades is measured as the natural logarithm of the total trades in a given 
security. As such, it represents raw order flow in a share – the larger the number, the 
more activity in a share. However, this is mitigated by the price of a share – a share 
priced at 100 pence will likely have more transactions than a share priced at 1000 
pence.  
Standard deviation is measured as the 5-minute volatility of prices.  
France is an indicator variable testing the effect of the concentration rule, as among 
the three exchanges examined (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), only 
France had a concentration rule mandating orders to be shipped to the established 
exchange prior to MiFID. It is 1 for all stocks with primary listings on Paris Euronext 
and 0 for all others. 
Fragmentation* Number of Trades, Fragmentation*Standard Deviation, and 
Fragmentation*France in equation 5.1 represent the interaction between 
Fragmentation and other variables. They test the augmented effect on Spread over 
and above Fragmentation and its other interacting variable. 
Industry1, Industry2, Industry3, Industry4, Industry5, and Industry6 are dummy 
variables for industry categories to which an individual company belongs. Industry 
dummies are Utilities, Heavy Industry, Travel and Leisure, Basic Resources, 
Financial Services, and Miscellaneous, respectively. 
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In testing the hypotheses with equation 5.1, the following outcomes are expected if the null is 
rejected: 
The test of the first hypothesis is measured with the direction and significance of β1, the 
coefficient for fragmentation. In all tests, if β1 is significantly less than zero, increased 
fragmentation is associated with decreasing spreads, which supports Hamilton (1979).  
However, if the estimate of β1 is significantly positive, increased fragmentation is associated 
with an increase in spreads in line with Madhavan’s (1991) contentions. This is a hypothesis 
tested across all data sets and all events to examine whether increased fragmentation 
influences spread costs, and how. As the literature discusses, depending on whether 
fragmentation has a positive or negative effect on relative effective spreads, different theories 
may explain that behaviour. 
The second hypothesis is measured only on the MiFID data set, consisting of the 3 months 
before and after the 1 November 2007 implementation of MiFID. This hypothesis examines 
whether the substantial systems investment required to build efficient routing systems for best 
execution caused market participants to recoup this investment in the form of increased 
spreads. As these systems were quite expensive, the second hypothesis tests whether the 
fragmentation these systems were built to capitalise upon reduced costs. If β1, the coefficient 
for fragmentation, is significantly greater than zero, then the increased fragmentation is 
associated with rising costs. This is presumably driven by liquidity providers needing to 
compensate themselves for the infrastructure they created to ensure optimal execution. If β1 is 
statistically no different from zero or less than zero, it can be concluded that market 
participants did not demand a higher price for liquidity, and therefore recoup costs on these 
systems.  
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The test of the third hypothesis is the coefficient of β4, the coefficient for France. This test 
can only be performed on the ‘pooled’ dataset involving all UK, French, and German shares 
for the time horizon around the implementation of MiFID., as the goal of this test is to 
determine whether the presence of a concentration rule in France had a different impact from 
that of Germany or the United Kingdom. If β4 is significantly less than zero, the presence of a 
concentration rule has dramatically impacted the reduction in spreads on French shares in the 
pooled sample. Therefore, the concentration rule ensured order flow went through an 
oligopoly of providers on the Paris Bourse, and before MiFID’s abolition of it, there was not 
a competitive market for liquidity. If β4 is significantly greater than zero, the presence of a 
concentration rule meant that French market participants could not adroitly react to MiFID’s 
integration of European securities markets and the concurrent competition.  
The fourth hypothesis examines whether Chi-X’s central counterparty fee cut affected trading 
costs. This test is performed on all the datasets examining the time prior to and after the 
introduction of Chi-X’s central counterparty fee cut. As Chi-X’s rationale for cutting an 
implicit cost would be to garner increased order flow, β1, the coefficient of Fragmentation, is 
examined. As a cut in the costs imposed on traders will drive fragmentation, a reduction of 
Chi-X’s central counterparty fees is potentially of interest in that it is not an explicit 
(variable) cost of liquidity, but a fixed cost of trading and utilizing Chi-X’s services. If β1 is 
statistically significantly less than zero, the fragmentation resultant from the central 
counterparty fee cut reduced trading costs.  
The other coefficients in equation 1 represent the following effects, and are expected to have 
the following signs: β2, the coefficient for Number of Trades, represents a ‘size effect’ and is 
expected to have a negative coefficient in all the hypotheses and data sets tests – the larger 
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the volume of trading in a share, the narrower the transactions cost. β3, the coefficient for 
Standard Deviation, examines the volatility in a share. Existing literature shows that 
volatility can have two different effects – either those holding inventory seek to liquidate it 
due to the risk of fluctuating prices, or they demand a larger spread to compensate for 
gyrating prices. Coefficients β5 through β7 represent the interaction of the Fragmentation 
variable with Number of Trades, Standard Deviation, and France, respectively. Given the 
expectation that Number of Trades will have a negative coefficient at all times, the nature of 
the coefficient’s interaction with Fragmentation is dependent on whether Hamilton’s (1979) 
or Madhavan’s (1991) theory of fragmented order flow holds. Given the differing theories in 
existing literature, the same conclusion holds for the interactions between Fragmentation and 
Standard Deviation, as well as between Fragmentation and France. 
3. Data and Method 
The data is constructed from Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) tick data for the period 
from January 2007 to September 200848. Using Trade and Quote (TAQ) files, monthly data 
sets are constructed, including monthly averages of certain variables for every share listed on 
each of three main European exchanges: London Stock Exchange (LSE), Paris Euronext 
(Paris), and Deutsche Borse – Xetra (Xetra). Further analysis past September 2008 is not 
performed due to the turmoil in financial markets that would confound analysis. All the 
shares traded on the three exchanges are used49, and then shares are excised from the sample 
that have primary listings elsewhere. Therefore, the data sets do not include UK shares 
trading on Paris Euronext or Deutsche Borse, as the volume in UK shares on the two 
                                                            
48
 The TRTH data is accessed through the Securities Industry Research Centre of the Asia Pacific’s (SIRCA) 
platform. 
49
 e.g. British Petroleum, listed on London, is BP.L, where the .L indicates London. .PA indicates Paris listing, 
and .DE indicates Xetra listing.  
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exchanges is negligible.  Monthly analysis is per Sidhu, Smith, Whaley, and Willis (2008), 
because daily files may be overly driven by extreme events, and may hence provide 
unrepresentative results over the course of the time period studied. An exogenous event that 
may lead to high liquidity demand in the market (e.g. the default of Lehman) may bias 
examined values and lead to conclusions that are not related to interactions between the 
variables of interest. In addition, monthly data is used to produce a time series effect that can 
be analysed.  
The data sets include variables representing liquidity (relative effective spread, realised 
spread, and price impact), size effects (value of shares traded in the month and number of 
trades in the month), price volatility (standard deviation), latency (average time between 
trades), and idiosyncratic variables (such as country of primary listing, industry grouping, and 
fragmentation percentage between Chi-X and the primary exchange upon which the shares 
are listed). Companies are grouped into industry according to whether they belong to one of 
six categories: Utilities, Heavy Industry, Travel and Leisure, Basic Resources, Financial 
Services, and Miscellaneous. These dummy variables were incorporated to ensure that results 
are robust to industry category and that industry category is not a driver of transactions costs.  
However, investigation of industries shows no statistical link between industrial categories 
and the relative effective spread, so this variable is omitted from further analysis. 
Furthermore, as this chapter seeks to test fragmentation’s effect on prices, illiquid shares (the 
highest 10% of spreads) are removed. Tests on these shares show that illiquid shares bias the 
significance of variables around events. By way of example, spreads in illiquid shares are 
primarily driven by the lack of an active market for them, as opposed to fragmentation,   
trading country of origin, or short term volatility. Therefore, illiquid shares are not examined, 
206 
 
 
as they will not assist in the determination of whether fragmentation affects relative effective 
spreads. Therefore, analysis is performed on the final clean dataset of liquid shares where the 
provision of liquidity is competitive. Both a dataset including the illiquid shares traded on EU 
exchanges as well as one restricted solely to liquid shares is analysed to determine whether 
behaviour reflects that of the entire market, or solely liquid subsections of the market. This 
segmentation allows one to determine whether behaviour is characteristic of the entire 
market, or only that of liquid shares. This method of analysis allows this chapter to draw 
conclusions and determine whether they are applicable to the entire market or just the liquid 
section, which may reflect the behaviour of institutional traders.  In addition, the exchanges 
are examined both individually and collectively – although as Chi-X began to offer Paris 
CAC (Cotation Assistee en Continu, the major index of the French market) shares only in late 
September 2007, Paris is only included in ‘pooled’ estimates for the fee cut and MiFID50. 
Therefore, the Chi-X launch dataset’s window encompasses both January to March 2007, the 
three months prior to the launch of Chi-X, and May to July 2007, with April 2007 excluded 
as the month of the event. The MiFID implementation dataset’s window starts in August 
2007, running through the end of February 2008, excluding the November implementation of 
MiFID. The Chi-X central counterparty fee cut dataset starts January 2008 and ends July 
2008. Further analysis on events in the European markets is not performed due to the 
instability induced by the global financial crisis.  
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) modelling is used to specify the appropriate variables 
tested from equation 5.1. The model with the lowest BIC value that still includes the variable 
of relevance for hypothesis testing, Fragmentation, is then estimated. Bayesian inference is 
                                                            
50
 The effect of Chi-X competition on Paris is excluded, as no clean event window exists, using an observation 
window of the three months before and after the events of interest. 
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used to determine which variables account for a best fit on each of the data sets over each 
time horizon. This procedure is used for every data set. Per Raftery (1996), Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) modelling is useful when theory lacks a specific model and one 
needs a mechanism to identify which variables are relevant in testing a model. The regression 
is estimated on each data set using maximum likelihood estimation procedures51, allowing for 
the testing of the differential impact of various events on each of the three securities 
exchanges individually, as well as collectively. Additionally, the models tested are not 
homogenous, as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) filter specifies different models to 
test on the various data sets. For example, BIC modelling does not always indicate that the 
interaction variables are relevant. 
Bessembinder (2003) notes the importance of averaging methods when performing 
intermarket studies, as measures are very sensitive to differing treatments and quote initiation 
measures. As a result, monthly averages are used, and the Lee and Ready (1993) algorithm 
identifies the party initiating the trade. Zhao and Chung (2007) and other studies52 have 
settled on trade-weighted means as the unit of analysis, and their methods are followed. Stock 
months are used per Chung et al (2010) and Sidhu, Smith, Whaley, and Willis (2008), as 
daily analysis may be highly sensitive to biases with tail events occurring.  
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is a methodology that can be used when one is 
uncertain of the distribution of the data examined, and finds parameter estimates that would 
be most probable to create a distribution most likely to result in the data examined. Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation is statistically more robust than other estimation methodologies, and is 
                                                            
51
 PROC GENMOD in SAS. 
52
 Bessembinder (2003) and Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2004) employ this methodology.  
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thus used in this experiment
53
. As it cannot be automatically assumed that transactions costs 
follow a normal distribution, MLE is more appropriate than Ordinary Least Squares or 
Generalized Least Squares estimation procedures. 
This chapter assumes a linear association between the variables examined in the regression 
5.1 and the relative effect spread, which proxies for transactions costs. In all estimates, the 
relative effective spread of a share, in percentage of share price, is the dependent variable and 
is represented by Spread in the following models. Relative effective spread represents the 
round-trip (buy and sell) trading cost, and is defined as two multiplied by the natural 
logarithm of the quote midpoint divided by the trading price. It is calculated as a percentage 
of the traded price of the security so that securities can be compared across prices. Relative 
effective spreads are the measure of analysis in many contemporaneous studies, including 
Chung and Chuwonganant (2010) and Zhao and Chung (2007). These studies utilise relative 
effective spreads as a ‘round trip’ cost of trading, so analysis includes differential liquidity on 
both sides of the limit order book. As previously mentioned, relative effective spreads is a 
proxy for liquidity in that it has a linear negative relationship with liquidity – the lower the 
relative effective spread for an asset, the more liquid is the market for it.  
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
Fragmentation affects spreads during the advent of MiFID and prior to the Chi-X fee cut. As 
the coefficients for all regressions are negative, Hamilton’s (1979) theory that increased 
competition leads to decreased spreads holds. However, Fragmentation’s coefficient is only 
statistically significant for LSE and Xetra (as well as the pooled sample) for the 
implementation of MiFID and the Chi-X counterparty fee cut, as Table 2 displays. The 
launch of Chi-X does not have a statistically significant impact on fragmentation on any 
                                                            
53
 Myung (2003) describes the properties and uses of Maximum Likelihood Estimation.  
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exchange, and the level of fragmentation does not have a statistically significant impact on 
Paris Euronext at any time. In the pooled sample, consisting of shares from all three 
exchanges, Fragmentation’s coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for the implementation of MiFID and the Chi-X counterparty fee cut, as well as the 
interaction between Fragmentation and Number of Trades. Differences in significance occur 
between the Chi-X counterparty fee cut only on LSE, because Fragmentation has a 
statistically significant effect at the 1% level on the LSE for the counterparty fee cut, while 
Fragmentation’s statistical significance for the implementation of MiFID is at the 5% level. 
However, the implementation of MiFID and the Chi-X counterparty fee cut are of equal 
statistical significance, that of the 5% level, on Deutsche Borse – Xetra.  While 
Fragmentation’s coefficient is negative on Paris Euronext, it is not statistically significant. A 
possible explanation for the differential effect of Fragmentation between the London Stock 
Exchange and Deutsche Borse - Xetra is due to the treatment of algorithmic trades in 
Germany. As algorithmic trades have special tax treatment in Germany, high frequency 
market participants on Deutsche Borse - Xetra may not be as sensitive to marginal changes 
on Chi-X as those on the London Stock Exchange.  Gresse’s (2010) contention that the cost 
of liquidity under MiFID was only reduced for those who can access multiple liquidity 
providers seems to be borne out by the distinction in the results in Table 2 between 
Fragmentation and Fragmentation*Number of Trades. While Fragmentation has a 
negative coefficient, Fragmentation*Number of Trades has a positive coefficient. However, 
Table 3, displaying regression estimates, shows a number of factors impacting relative 
effective spreads. As one can expect, the greater the number of trades in a share, the lower the 
relative effective spread. Recall that a share solely traded on the London Stock Exchange, 
Paris Euronext, or Deutsche Borse - Xetra has a fragmentation score of 1, so a positive 
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coefficient means the higher the concentration of share trading, the higher the spread.  The 
relative lack of fragmentation on Paris Euronext may drive results on Paris Euronext. As Chi-
X only initially listed CAC 40 (the major French index) shares in September 2007, the order 
flow in Paris was not as fragmented as that in Xetra and London. Nevertheless, by the time of 
the fee cut, Paris’s fragmentation was greater than that of that of London and Deutsche –
Borse Xetra around the time of MiFID, as Table 2 displays.  Due to the finding that 
fragmentation has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, hypothesis 1 is rejected, 
as transactions costs decrease with greater fragmentation in all scenarios. Furthermore, even 
in the case of Paris, fragmentation has a negative coefficient, albeit one that is not statistically 
significant.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates for Transactions Costs 
The results are from the Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Spread = a + β1Fragmentation+ β2 number of trades +β3Standard Deviation + 
β4Fragmentation + β5France + β6Fragmentation*Number of Trades +β7 Fragmentation*Standard Deviation + β8 Fragmentation*France + 
ε.  However, β5 is only estimated on the pooled dataset, as only the pooled dataset allows for a comparison of French shares with British and 
German shares. Spread is the relative effective spread as a percentage of share price, number of trades (LNTrades) represents the natural 
logarithm of the number of trades in a security, Standard Deviation (stddev) represents the 5-minute volatility of share prices, and 
Fragmentation is the percentage of a stock’s total volume transacted on the national exchange. France is an indicator dummy set to 1 if a share 
is listed in France. Fragmentation*Number of Trades (FragTrades), Fragmentation*Standard Deviation (FragSD), and 
Fragmentation*France (FragFrance) represent the interactions between these variables.  P-values are in brackets underneath parameter 
estimates. 
Exchange Event Intercept LNTrades Stddev Fragmentation France FragTrades FragSD FragFrance 
LSE Chi-X 49.911 -4.4831 0.0143 -40.9615 
 
3.8335 -0.0128 
 
  
(<.0001***) (<.0001***) (0.2121) (0.3438) 
 
(0.3187) (0.7372) 
 
 
MiFID 40.4985 -3.1228 -0.0292 -21.4959 
 
1.7676 0.0321 
 
  
(<.0001***) (<.0001***) (0.0358**) (0.012**) 
 
(0.0227**) (0.049**) 
 
 
Fee cut 31.724 -2.5086 -0.0132 -17.5168 
 
1.4505 0.016 
 
  
(<.0001***) (<.0001***) (0.1275) (<.0001***) 
 
(<.0001***) (0.1022) 
 
          
Paris MiFID 72.1857 -5.6368 -0.964 -54.9515 
 
4.4925 0.5283 
 
  
(<.0001***) (<.0001***) (0.0073***) (0.5041) 
 
(0.5184) (0.7851) 
 
 
Fee Cut 62.7835 -4.6317 -0.7801 -54.0923 
 
4.0568 0.6916 
 
  
(<.0001***) (<.0001***) (0.0218**) (0.3879) 
 
(0.4452) (0.6594) 
 
          
Xetra Chi-X 62.4502 -5.6901 0.3172 -56.61 
 
5.2918 -0.3164 
 
  
(<.0001***) (<.0001***) (0.1988) (0.3613) 
 
(0.3327) (0.4868) 
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MiFID 65.5859 -5.8901 0.2713 -58.3078 
 
5.4085 -0.2997 
 
  
(<.0001***) (<.0001***) (0.5874) (0.0257**) 
 
(0.0209**) (0.7235) 
 
 
Fee Cut 53.3868 -4.7563 0.0482 -47.8679 
 
4.429 -0.0846 
 
  
(<.0001***) (<.0001***) (0.526) (0.043**) 
 
(0.0346**) (0.8522) 
 
          
Pooled MIFID 52.606 -4.3014 -0.0224 -32.1676 -0.1487 2.7707 0.0314 0.8073 
  
(<.0001***) (<.0001***) (0.2174) (0.0008***) (0.8611) (0.0012***) (0.1415) (0.6281) 
 
Fee Cut 52.2604 -4.5219 0.0158 -39.3551 1.5199 3.5809 -0.0134 -1.1883 
  
(<.0001***) (<.0001***) (0.2925) (<.0001***) (0.0776*) (<.0001***) (0.4605) (0.4181) 
 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Data Examined  
This table presents average values for various data sets used. Relative Effective Spread represents the relative effective spread of a share, 
calculated as a percentage of the share’s price. Number of Trades is the natural logarithm of the number of trades executed in a share. 
Standard Deviation is the 5-minute volatility of prices. Fragmentation measures the percentage of order flow between an exchange and Chi-X, 
where 1 indicates total order flow on the original exchange, and 0 indicates total order flow on Chi-X. 
 
Exchange Event 
Relative Effective 
Spread 
Number of Trades (natural 
logarithm) 
Standard Deviation Fragmentation 
LSE Chi-X launch 7.7067 9.2180 22.5904 0.9999 
LSE MiFID 7.5125 10.2334 31.5747 0.9916 
LSE Chi-X cut 4.7589 10.3987 33.6950 0.9319 
Paris MiFID 19.6178 9.0377 1.7163 0.9968 
Paris Chi-X cut 17.6127 9.1469 1.8075 0.9826 
Xetra Chi-X launch 12.6385 8.8940 1.6500 0.9998 
Xetra MiFID 11.6585 9.4869 1.8446 0.9916 
Xetra Chi-X cut 9.9213 9.4854 2.4859 0.9725 
Pooled MiFID 10.0578 9.8380 19.2961 0.9928 
Pooled Chi-X cut 8.8003 9.8539 20.5676 0.9524 
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The fee cut displays the highest statistical significance in the sample for the London Stock 
Exchange and the pooled sample. This would indicate that the fragmentation of the London 
market (a component of the pooled sample) around the time of the changes in infrastructure 
access costs (such as pre- and post- trading costs, including central counterparty fees) is the 
strongest determinant of relative effective spreads54. However, MiFID has a statistically 
significant impact on Deutsche Borse – Xetra and the London Stock Exchange both at the 5% 
level, and at the 1% level in the pooled sample. This finding is more startling in light of the 
lack of active enforcement of MiFID. Whilst the SEC actively enforced Reg NMS, MiFID’s 
American corollary, MiFID’s initial strictures only required trading firms to publish the 
extent to which they met best execution benchmarks. This was further complicated by the 
lack of a clear legal definition for best execution, as MiFID mentions ‘price, costs, likelihood 
of execution and settlement, size, nature, or any other consideration’ as factors upon which 
best execution is defined. However, MiFID mentions that the trading party (when brokers are 
trading as an agent for a customer) may ultimately define the benchmark for ‘best execution’. 
Due to the lack of any sort of transparency in order data, one is unable to assess whether best 
execution has been met. Therefore, in submitting their reports for the extent to which they 
met their fiduciary obligation under MiFID, brokers could claim time priority in filling an 
order, ‘size’ priority (in terms of VWAP or another benchmark under which they could claim 
they obtained the optimum price for the size of the order), or price priority (absolute best 
price). Nevertheless, at least a perception that best execution was a required benchmark by 
national regulators led market participants to seek best execution, loosely defined in terms of 
price, but with time as an important factor. As a result of this competitive pressure, liquidity 
                                                            
54
 The fragmentation of order flow between the London Stock Exchange and Chi-X is examined from a price 
discovery perspective in chapter 4. 
 215 
 
 
providers offered narrower spreads to liquidity demanders, which empirical evidence 
substantiates.  
 
MiFID is found to reduce trading costs because of the fragmentation that its implementation 
catalysed. On both the London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Borse - Xetra, Fragmentation 
is statistically significant at the 5% level, and Fragmentation is statistically significant at the 
1% level in the pooled sample. All three datasets show Fragmentation with negative and 
statistically significant coefficients. Therefore, at least for these datasets, hypothesis two can 
be rejected. However, although the Paris Euronext MiFID data set has a negative coefficient, 
it is not statistically significant. It is worth noting that MiFID is the first event where 
Fragmentation is statistically significant. Therefore, the launch of Chi-X does not affect 
spreads at a statistically significant level. Hypothesis four is therefore not rejected, that the 
introduction of Chi-X and the resultant fragmentation did not affect spreads. Therefore, 
empirical results do not show any effect of fragmentation on relative effective spreads during 
the launch of Chi-X in any of these three European markets. One reason for this could be the 
lack of a ‘critical mass’ traded on Chi-X. If there is insufficient liquidity at or near the BBO 
(best bid and offer), what may appear to be competition is illusory, because market 
participants cannot achieve similar execution quality on Chi-X for any meaningful 
transaction, and trading costs for a representative order may in fact be higher on Chi-X due to 
the laddering of the limit order book.  This may be explained by the pan-European nature of 
MiFID and that it included a regulatory mandate to route orders to Chi-X under the best 
execution requirement. Therefore trading behaviour was dictated solely at the discretion of 
brokers, instead of an implicit competitive pressure essentially determined by whether 
liquidity providers on Chi-X would offer comparable spreads around the launch of Chi-X, or 
 216 
 
 
whether net trading costs were lower after the Chi-X central counterparty fee cut (which, , 
was differential between the three exchanges examined). While the central counterparty fee 
cut was only 11% in London, it was 32% in Germany and Paris. Presumably, this reflects 
different price elasticities of demand for consumers of trading services, because market 
participants had an explicit legal requirement (albeit one that was not strictly enforced) to 
ship trades. Another reason the advent of Chi-X may have less robust effects on a pooled 
dataset is that Germany and the UK lacked a national ‘concentration rule’ that required any 
trades in a domestically-listed security to be sent to the national exchange. This created a 
monopoly on behalf of national exchanges in France, Italy, and other countries. However, in 
the two nations with a history of competitive provision of trading services, the introduction of 
a new competitor by itself may not dramatically alter the competitive scene for trading 
services. Therefore, the existence of Chi-X as a competitor in and of itself does not catalyse 
competitions, but rather, the competition and order-splitting galvanized by the 
implementation of MiFID lead to competitive pressures and the reduction of transactions 
costs. 
In addition, costs attributable to infrastructure (pre- and post-trade) costs may create a 
situation where, although relative effective spreads and other explicit costs are comparable 
and competitive, the cost inclusive of infrastructure rents (like central counterparty costs) 
may be uncompetitive with the traditional exchanges. Table 3 notes the average variable 
values for each dataset, and it is worth noting that fragmentation is above 99% on both 
Deutsche Borse - Xetra and the London Stock Exchange around the time of Chi-X’s launch. 
Therefore, competition between the established exchanges and Chi-X may not be sufficiently 
intense to provide for any effects that may reduce transactions costs, as measured by relative 
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effective spreads. On one hand, Chi-X initially guaranteed liquidity in FTSE and DAX 
components, so a selection process is inherent in the results. However, the dominance of this 
result across the sample seems to indicate that there was a fair bit of competition between the 
traditional exchanges and Chi-X. This may reflect liquidity search on Chi-X, or a desire for 
some of the larger traders to split their orders between the exchanges so that their competitors 
could not detect their ‘footprint’ and free-ride off their trades. Another factor may be the 
lower latency of Chi-X. With the introduction of Chi-X, latency sensitive-traders migrate 
there. This effect would be absent in subsequent changes, as MiFID and the Chi-X central 
counterparty fee-cut focus more on price-sensitive traders. 
 
With the results on the sample showing that the fee cut is the event around which 
Fragmentation has the greatest statistical significance, hypothesis five is rejected. However, 
although the London Stock Exchange and the pooled sample have statistical significance at 
the 1% level and Deutsche Borse - Xetra has statistical significance at the 5% level, Paris 
Euronext lacks statistical significance. Fragmentation possesses a negative coefficient in all 
regressions. This can be read in two ways: one, that market participants eagerly sought best 
execution inclusive of pre and post-trade costs. Two, that market participants were able to 
capture increased profits by migrating to venues with marginally lower implicit trading costs. 
Regardless of the explanation, given that lower central counterparty costs either flow to the 
security’s owner or to the firm trading as agent for the security’s ultimate owner, parties will 
be sensitive to lower inclusive trading costs.  
A possible explanation for the divergent effect of Fragmentation on the two continental 
exchanges may be due to the market structure of Deutsche Borse - Xetra and the tax 
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treatment of algorithmic trading. Xetra is characterised by a higher proportion of algorithmic 
trading than other European exchanges, and Germany has a special tax treatment for 
algorithmic trades. Therefore, to remain competitive with dealers on Chi-X, presumably 
Xetra dealers had to slash spreads while accounting for the tax differential. 
The concentration rule affected spreads, as the France dummy in the pooled sample is 
significant at the 10% level around the Chi-X counterparty fee cut. This indicates that the 
costs were higher due to centralisation (monopoly power of trading). After MiFID abolished 
that rule, French shares had a more competitive market in liquidity provision, which is 
reflected in this finding. Therefore, hypothesis three is rejected. An institutional characteristic 
of the Paris bourse is the presence of market makers known as Liquidity Providers. These 
participants, whose role is similar to that of a specialist – to ensure price stability and 
sufficient ability to potentially trade in these shares - led Parisian traders to remain on Paris 
Euronext, because the Chi-X order book might lack a preferred level of liquidity for trading 
in some shares. Liquidity Providers are quasi-specialists each backing a certain share. With 
this specialist system, the specialist will need to protect himself from price swings through a 
spread. However, once MiFID and the Chi-X fee cut spur competition, the Liquidity Provider 
is no longer a monopolist in certain shares, because MiFID abolishes the concentration rule - 
and the fee-cut may lead to competition in liquidity provision from parties other than 
Liquidity Providers.  However, due to Liquidity Providers’ substantive role in the Paris 
market, this may account for the finding that Standard Deviation is statistically significant at 
the 1% level for around the time of the implementation of MiFID and at the 5% level around 
the time of introduction of the Chi-X central counterparty fee cut. Because the coefficient is 
negative, the lower the volatility, the lower the transactions costs. This is consistent with 
existing literature modelling volatility’s effect of transactions costs. While this volatility 
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effect is persistent on Paris Euronext, it appears on the London Stock Exchange and Deutsche 
Borse – Xetra only around the time of the introduction of MiFID. This may reflect a market 
for more competitive liquidity provision around MiFID, as European authorities seek to 
enforce best execution practices. However, the effect is not uniform across the London Stock 
Exchange and Deutsche Borse – Xetra. The London Stock Exchange has a negative and 
significant (at 5%) coefficient from Standard Deviation, but Deutsche Borse – Xetra has a 
positive and significant (at 5%) coefficient around the time of the implementation of MiFID. 
One explanation for this divergence may be the higher rate of algorithmic/high frequency 
traders on the established exchange in Germany due to the special tax treatment afforded to 
algorithmic trades.  
Number of Trades, which serves as a proxy for firm size or liquidity, is continually a 
significant determinant downwardly affecting spreads, although this is not surprising. This 
may be due to two different causes. On one hand, this could be an obvious reflection of 
increased liquidity in the larger shares traded on exchanges. On the other hand, the magnitude 
of this effect seems to indicate that something else is driving it. The ‘size effect’ is significant 
at the 1% level for all data sets examined.  
In all instances where Fragmentation is statistically significant, the interaction between 
Fragmentation and Number of Trades is also statistically significant. Therefore, increased 
Fragmentation in the presence of high liquidity drives lower transactions costs. Additionally, 
on the London Stock Exchange circa the implementation of MiFID, the interaction between 
Fragmentation and Standard Deviation is statistically significant at the 5% level. This could 
reflect short-term volatility induced by MiFID’s best execution requirement and arbitrageurs’ 
attempts to profit from the differences between costs on the London Stock Exchange and Chi-
X.  
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5. Conclusion 
MiFID affected transactions costs, but not to the extent that an infrastructure change (Chi-X’s 
fee cut) did. To that extent, MiFID must be viewed as a catalyst that facilitated the launch of 
MTFs such as Chi-X and stimulated competition in liquidity provision. MiFID’s effect on 
France’s concentration rule is twofold: Although country variables are not statistically 
significant, fragmentation increases spreads55 in Paris. This is explained by market 
participants’ need to recapture their investment in systems to meet the best execution 
mandate. The starkest results show that the augmented competition on the London Stock 
Exchange, stimulated by the Chi-X central counterparty fee-cut, slashed spreads. This result 
is still highly significant even in the presence of confounding variables.  
 
                                                            
55
 E.g. Fragmentation has a negative coefficient. 
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Chapter Six: 
Conclusion 
 
Regulation of financial markets has focused on questions of welfare and equity since the 
Great Depression. Among these questions is that of the fair price of capital and the 
functioning of markets for all participants. A form of market abuse is insider trading – resting 
on the basis that the insider is capitalising on information he has misappropriated from the 
corporation, and is thus exploiting his trading counterparty. Central to the confidence of the 
public in securities markets is the belief that regulatory authorities properly monitor the 
markets to find and prosecute any parties participating in market abuse. These efforts raise 
the question of how apparent insider trading is in terms of its impact on the markets.  
Chapter 3 finds that insider traders move prices more than non-insiders, but transact in 
marginally larger lot sizes. However, their impact on prices seems to be driven by the desire 
of insiders for instant execution certainty, because insiders use of buyer-initiated ‘buy’ orders 
(market orders) accounts are highly significant. This may also be driven by aggressive 
insiders executing significant lot sizes, and thus ‘walking the limit order book’, resulting in a 
greater price impact. In addition, the anonymity hypothesis of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) is 
verified, as trades on specialist exchanges move prices in a highly significant (1% confidence 
level) fashion, while those on dealer exchanges are not statistically significant.  
The transformation of securities markets has raised two important threads of questions on 
informed trading – in the context of insider trading, the increasing sophistication of securities 
markets and communications technologies has led critics of the markets to wonder how 
equitable they are and whether predation of retail investors takes place by parties with better 
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information. In the context of informed trading, the growing move towards electronic trading 
and technological methods of portfolio allocation have led to new means of trading – both 
computer-mediated trading as well as off-exchange trading with the introduction of 
Multilateral Trading Facilities. The move to technology has also led to regulatory efforts to 
ensure retail customers obtain the best terms for their orders in terms of price. As a result, 
international securities markets have moved towards national (US’ Reg NMS) or continental 
(EU’s MiFID) models. These obligations have created a transformation in the securities 
markets. 
Chapters 4 and 5 investigate two aspects of the EU’s MiFID regulation. Chapter 4 finds that 
although MiFID enabled the launch of Chi-X, a Multilateral Trading Facility, it was not its 
implementation but Chi-X’s infrastructure fee cut that caused the majority of informed trades 
in UK shares to migrate from the London Stock Exchange to Chi-X. Chapter 4 uncovers 
different price discovery patterns for UK shares depending on whether they have other 
primary listings outside of the UK, and shows that quote-based price discovery patterns are 
vastly different from trade-based price discovery patterns in the case of liquid UK shares on 
the LSE and Chi-X. Chapter 5 finds that transactions costs on the London Stock Exchange, 
Deutsche Borse – Xetra, and Paris Euronext are all affected by MiFID, but not to the extent 
that the same counterparty fee cut on Chi-X leads to a decrease in relative effective spreads. 
A possible interpretation of this is that there is a large number of marginal traders extremely 
sensitive to both latency (speed of trading) issues and marginal costs of trading, as the central 
counterparty fee is a fixed cost and cannot be changed by the liquidity provider, but only by 
exchange and other trading infrastructure providers. While MiFID’s abolition of the 
concentration rule did not affect spreads in France, spreads increase after MiFID in France, 
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indicating that in the case of the French market, a reduction in economies of scale occurred 
on Paris Euronext. Differences in reactions to volatility (as proxied by 5 minute standard 
deviation of prices) between the London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Borse –Xetra may be 
attributable to different tax treatment for algorithmic traders in the UK and Germany.  
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